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ERRATUM SHEET 
As a result of the oral examination the following errors were corrected 
and additional explanations made. 
1. Reference to page 71 and page 93 paragraph 2 to the top of page 94. 
The following is a correction of the discussion of the presence of 
heteroscedasticity when employing the linear probability function 
technique of estimation. The least squares estimates derived using 
this technique will still be unbiased and generally consistent but 
the formula for calculating the standard errors of the estimates will 
no longer hold. The effect of this error in the formula will be an 
underestimation of the standard errors of the parameter estimates. In 
the results that follow therefore the use of the conventional formula 
for the standard error will cause us, at the margin, to accept as 
significant at the 9~~ level, parameter estimates which are not in 
fact different from zero at this probability level. In any case, the 
results presented regard parameter estimates at or very near the 
rule of thumb, two standard deviations from zero, as non-significant 
so that the effect of the heteroscedasticity is unlikely to seriously 
affect the broad conclusions drawn. 
2. Chapter V - The Probit Model of Takeovers, page 149. Results not 
reported were obtained for size on its own and size with the valuation 
ratio. In both cases the probit estimate for size was non-significant, 
it failing, in the latter case, to improve the explanitory power of 
the estimated equation as well as leaving the parameter estimate for 
the valuation ratio virtually unchanged. 
3. Page numbers of minor typographical errors corrected in the text: 
pages 16, 18, 42, 44, 64, 71, 74, 93, 115, 128, 132, 145, 160, 163, 183. 
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ABSTRACT 
There are three aims to this thesis. First, in chapter I, the record 
of takeover activity in the U.K. from 1957-69 using a census of U.K. 
public quoted companies is analysed. This involves an examination of 
the frequency of takeovers over time, the industrial pattern of take-
overs, the characteristics of raiders, differences between the performance 
of acquired and surviving firms, the payment practices and the btd 
premium, the distinction between takeovers and mergers, unsuccessful 
takeover bids and defensive strategies, and finally the timing of the 
offer with respect to the acquired firm's accounting period. This will 
set the scene for the second aim of the thesis which is the development, 
in chapter II, of a theory of the causes of takeovers based on the 
valuatlon discrepancy hypothesis suggested by Robin Marris.as well as 
more directly in terms of the financial characteristics of the acquired 
firms whose impact should be felt via the stock market valuation of the 
firm. 
In chapters III and IV these models of takeovers are tested at the 
industry level through the use of the linear probability function 
estimation technique. It was found that the valuation ratio, profits 
and growth emerged as si~nificant influences On the probability of 
takeover in a majority of industries but that Size, retentions and 
liquidity, in general, failed to provide any important contribution 
to an explanation of the causes of takeover. Attempts to analyse 
the differences in the industry results in terms of industry character-
istics proved unsuccessful. Of primary interest is the market valuation 
as an explanation of takeovers for it offers not only an explanation 
of takeovers based on the price of the acquired firm, but also it forms 
rti 
the basis of the operation of the security constraint in Marris's 
managerial model of firm behaviour. Although demonstrating the 
existence of the valuation constraint in the form enrtsaged by Marris, 
i argued that this provided only a necessary condition of his revision 
to the theory of the firm and did not provide a basis for choosing 
between one or other of the posited managerial objectives of the new 
theories of the firm or the neo-classical formulation of profit 
maximization. 
In chapter V an alternative estimational technique is employed 
o~ aggregate data ienoring the industry classifications; that of probit 
analysis. The results for the market valuation and the financial 
variables of profits, growth and retentions offer greatly improved 
results over the linear probability function in terms of the proportion 
of firms taken over at various levels of the explanatory variables. 
Aside from more fully exposing the nature of the takeover process and 
its role as a constraint on managerial discretion, little contribution 
can be made towards the chOice of appropriate managerial objective. 
The third and final aim is to relate the takeover process to the 
appropriate model of the theory of the firm which has not been possible 
in the earlier chapters. For this I turned to an analysis of the 
takeover raiders and attempt to derive mutually exclusive predictions 
for the raider's performance relative to their industry average perform-
ance for the two assumed objectives of growth maximization and profit 
maximization. Reasonably clear distinctions are drawn on the basis 
of profits, growth, retentions and valuation ratio and the sign test 
used to demonstrate that the performance of raiders is better explained 
by the assumption that they seek to maximize growth rather than profits. 
INTRODUCTION 
Previous research into the field of takeovers and mergers, with 
several notable exceptions, haa suffered both trom the lack of an 
appropriate theoretical structure and consequently, as I shall argue 
below, misplaced emphasis, as well as weak statistical methodology 
which has caused many misleading and otten incorrect conclusions to 
be drawn. It is only recently that researchers have attempted to 
examine takeovers as an aspect of firm behaviour whereas previouely 
they were regarded primarily in the light ot the workings of the 
~ket mechanism. The emphasis placed upon market pressures as an 
explanation of takeovers tended, at least in part, to ignore the 
firm's role in takeover activity. Furthermore, the empirical exam-
ination of this activity has consequently been concentrated on its 
etfects at the industry level rather than its causes at the fir. 
level; also. the analysis generally has been insufficient to demon-
olftrah what ha.s occured, or, what would be more important, why it 
has occured. 
The purpose of this inquiry is threefold. I shall first set 
down the record of takeover activity in the U.K. over the period 
1957-69. For this purpose a census of all public quoted companies 
exclusive of ~everal industry groups has been undertaken and data on 
a number of financial and stockmarket variable. COllected tor each 
* of the 3566 firms in the population for each year. Such a description 
aa the possession of this data makes possible will embody an analysis 
of the following: the frequency of takeovers through time, the difter-
ences between industries in the takeover rate, .h __ ':l!Jethod of payrAent 
* A full description of the census population and the data collection 
procedures appear in Appendix I 
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and the bid premium, the characteristics ot acquiring tirms or raiders, 
the performance ot takenover and non-taken over firms, the distinction 
between takeovers and mergers, unsuc.esafUl taltHver-bllclsl,a.ct-'et ... :tve 
strategies employed by tirma under otter, and the timing of the otter 
and its relation to the acquired tirmJs accounting period. This first 
aspect of the inquiry will not only present the most complete record 
of takeover activity during the period and as such will be ot interest 
to a wide spectrum of observers, but also will attempt to examine the 
usually ignored participant ot the takeover, n .. ely the a.,1iHed fum. 
The second aim ot this paper is to develop a theoretical model ot 
taKeovers and teat it with reference to the data collected. Thus not 
only will what has happened be described, but I shall attempt to discover 
why it has happened to particular tirma and not others. The methodology 
adepted will ditfer from .oat of the previous investigation. into the 
takeover phenomenon in so tar as the emphasiS and conclusions rely 
neither on the purely descriptive survey method nor on the case study 
method. Neither of these research approaches is invalid as long as 
conclusions with the fUst are accepted as possibly misleading 
generaliaations and with the second are limited to the small number 
ot firms studied. 
The descriptive survey approach usually encorporates a number ot 
issues relating to takeovers including: changes in concentration, 
monopoly and the public interest; bidding techniques, strategies and 
detensive strategies; the financing of takeovers; and taxation and 
legal considerations. There are a number ot books which deal with 
these and other aspects ot takeovers * and since the scope of this 
study must necessarily be limited, I shall consider the above only 
~ These include Bull and Vice (1958), Cook and Cohen (1958), Mennel (1962), 
Moon (1968), Stacey (1966), and Reid (1968) 
~-
ind~rectly in so tar as it relates to the causes ot takeoyers. This 
Bort ot approach 1s valuable in that it provides necessary background 
information which leads to an understanding of the elimate and way in 
which takeovers occur. It also indicates likely fruittul areas ot 
research by suggesting factors which may be important in explaining 
what influences whether or not a firm is taken over. This is its 
virtue but also its short coming; tor by sole reliance on this approach 
one can go no further in explaining the causes of takeovers. 
The case study approach, apart from revealing the intricacies of 
the internal structure of the firma examined, has little to contribute 
to an understanding of the factors influencing other takeovers because 
of the absence of any theoretical yardstick. Without such theoretical 
terms of reterence, which this study seeks to identify, conclusions 
from the case study approach are necessarily limited to the firm or 
firms involved in the investigation. When a yardstick has been made 
available, however, it is possible tor the case study technique to 
come into its own. The firma investigated must no longer be studied 
in isolation but rather can be viewed as deYiations from the mean of 
the population thereby rendering the conclusions of greater general 
significance. Thus the present study is aimed at filling the 
methodological gap created between the two paths of research. 
The approach adopted here is to set out the causal hypotheses 
of takeovers at the firm level and then to develop a testable model 
of takeovers. Multiple regression techniques will be employed to 
examine the causes of takeovers within industry classifications. We 
shall also employ the technique of probit analysis to examine similar 
hypotheses uaing all firms' data taken together. 
The third aim of this study is to attempt to relate the takeover 
phenomenon to the recent developments in the theory ot the firm. 
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Until recently, takeovers have been examined primarily at the industry 
level whereby considerations such as the effect takeovers have on 
market structure and as an aspect of market conduct and performance 
were considered. Furthermore, takeovers were viewed as a means of 
achieving the 'optimal' size, or exceeding it, whereby discussion was 
lead to the analysis of oligopoly and monopoly models. Interest 
seemed to settle on more normative questions of the social desirability 
of large firms which possess significant market power. Both in this 
country and abroad where the takeover boom of the fifties was felt, 
governments were prompted to reassess their existing controls in the 
light of this historically unprecedented takeover activity. The 
economist's role in all this was confined to rather weak statements 
concerning the abuses or 'evils' of monopoly and the co.piling ot 
accounts and comparisons of the legal and institutional treatment of 
companies which have become large through acquisitions. Throughout, 
the assumption made by economists was that takeovers were undertaken 
solely for profit, whether it be achieved by way of scale economies or 
market power. 
In the late fifties and early sixties dissatisfaction was 
expressed with this assumption of profit maximisation. In part the 
attack was ba~ed on the inability of the classical model of the theory 
of the firm based on profit maximisation to explain or account for 
the nature of various observed economic phenomenon such as takeovers, 
as well as the belief that in the modern corporation where ownership 
and control was separated, the assumption that managers would act to 
maximise profits for the owners rather than their own utility directly 
was unrealistic. The classical model and its inability to explain the 
takeover boom of the fifties was due to several aspects of the nature 
ot the activity. First, it was international, occuring in a number of 
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countries suul taneously j second, its sheer I18.gni tude could not be 
accounted for by the desire of achieving scale econoaies especially 
since other evidence appeared to the effect that, With the exception 
~f 8~veral industries, the • optimal , scale had been reached and 
~ 
exceeded; third, the harsber governaental controls of monopoly 
introduced and applied both in this country and abroad had reasonably 
~ecluded the posdibi1ity of achieVing and aainta1n1 ng excessive 
~onopoly power; foarth, it emerged that large firma, and by iaplication 
those firms undertaking takeovers, did not seem to be more profitable 
a than smaller non-acqu1ring firaej finally, there was the emergence 
in the sixties of conglomerates, whose takeover actiVity had the 
possibility neither of economies of scale nor monopoly profits, and 
which have si~ce demonstrated generally poor perforaance. All this, 
while not necessarily conflicting with the idea of long-run profit 
maxi~i8ation, was neither predictable nor explainable in teras of the 
clasbical acdel. 
A number of attempts have been made to reftraulate the theory of 
the fir.. Host notable &song them are the works of W.J. Bauaol (1959), 
Robin Harris (1964) and Oliver Williamson (1964). While each attributes 
different betavioral objectives to manage.ent, they all shared a ccmmon 
starting point. It was the explicit recognition of the separation of 
ownership and control typified in the modern public company. fo the 
extent that eharehold1.ng is diaperse, owners will find difficulties 
(costs) involved in attempts to induce managers to maxiaise the profits 
(wealth) accruing to the shareholders. This is seen as a condition for 
the existence of managerial discretion and hence an explanation for the 
See Johneton (1960) 
u See Singh and Whittington (1968) 
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departure from the traditional assumption that the firm (and by 
implication the managers as employees) will seek to maximise the 
profits to the owners. Interest and debate has continued as to the 
nature of the managerial motivations to be specified in their objective 
function.% It is unlikely, however, that the debate will ever finally 
be resolved for two reasons. First, many of the proposals are very 
similar (e.g. Baumol's sales maximisation and Marris's growth 
maximisation) 60 that few, if any, distinct predictions could emerge 
H 
which could be empirically tested. That is, there is no direct way 
HS! to test the objectives of managers, only the predictions which the 
various hypothesized objective functions generate. Second, it is 
unlikely that within such a heterogeneous group as that of the company 
sector there ~ven exists a Single appropriate objective which managers 
would seek. Thus, having specified managerial discretion in terms of 
a utility function, it is likely the ingredients could not only be 
numerous and coapeting but also subject to external constraints imposed 
by the owners through the stockmarket. The operational managerial 
objective could not only vary between firms due to differences in 
owner control but also could change through time as circumstances 
altered withh the firm, the industry or even the economy. 
Despite the difficulties involved in the generalizing of managerial 
objectives I ahall examine in chapteril the predictions derivable trom 
the managerial approach to the theory of the firm for takeover raiders, 
using Marris's growth maximisation hypothesis as my model. These 
A u.eful summary of the debate appears in Singh (1971), pp. 6-10 
This point has been stressed by Baldwin (1964) 
~ An attempt was made recently by Newbould (1970) to uncover the motives 
behind takeovers by questioning the managers who undertake them. This 
methodology suffers from those of the case study approach described 
above as well as the necessity of relying on the managers to reply 
accurately. 
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predictions will be contrasted to those of a profit maximising model 
in order to see whether it is possible to derive distinct predictions 
for the two and if so to see which is the empirically more appropriate. 
In addition to considering the implications takeovers have for 
managerial objectives, possibly a more general view of the aaaagarial 
revisions may be gained by eXamining the constraints on managerial 
~ discretion. Such constraints have been incorporated into a security 
variable in the managerial objective function. This desire for security 
which competes with the attainment of the managerial objective(s) stems 
mainly from two sources. Firstly, it reflects the existence of the 
threat of owner sanction, which (at the extreme) will imply a loss of 
job, or more moderately a possible curtailment iA the manager's power 
to divert resources away from the owners (e.g. the removal of slack). 
This will depend on the degree of departure from the profit maximising 
position and the dispersion of shareholding which reflects the 
difficulties involved in employing such a sanction. 
Secondly, there is an externally imposed security constraint 
operating through the stock market value of the company because of 
H the fear of takeover and consequential loss of job. The achievement 
of an objective which results in a departure from the profit maxim1sing 
position will adversely affect the market valuation of the company and 
hence lead to an increase in the likelihOod·,of takeover. The impact 
of this source of the security constraint is dependant again on the 
extent of the departure trom the profit maximising position~(i •• « the 
extent to: which attempts to achieve the objective results in a fall 
~ Baldwin (1964) has suggested this and Encarcion (1964) investigated 
the effect on the firm's choices of speCifying constraints for use 
in a lexicographic utility function. 
H Singh (1971) pp. 148-149 finds that with a sample of 45 takeovers 
approx:lmately 50% of the directors of the acquired company were 
dismissed within two years of the tAkAnVA~ 
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in the market valuation) as well as the transaction costs involved in 
the acquisition of the firm by another company. There may be other 
factors which affect the impact of this constraint such as the 
def~n6ive position of the firm and the manager's ability to move 
quickly back towards the profit maximising position and thereby raise 
the market valuation. At the extreme, the pursuit of an objective 
which directly competes with profitability may result, instead of 
takeover, in bankruptcy, which has an even more certain effect on 
managerial security. 
A major part of this study is to investigate the nature and 
existence of such an inverse relationship between the market valuation 
and the probability of takeover because of its implications on 
managerial security and hence the new theories of the firm. Heavy 
reliance will be placed on the work of Robin Marris (1964) who not 
only viewed the security constraint upon the managerial objective of 
growth maximisation in terms of the threat of takeover but also develops 
a theory of takeover based upon the market valuation of the firm. 
I shall elaborate on his theory in chapter II when a testable model 
of takeovers will be developed. 
Before embarking on this study of a census of U.K. public companies, 
I ran a pilot study on a random sample of 250 U.K. companies designed 
to reveal the problems likely to be encountered in the data collection, 
formulation and testing for the existence of this valuation-takeover 
~ 
relationship. A highly significant relationship with fairly low 
explanatory power was found. This gave rise to the hope that with 
an expanded population, additional variables, improved specification 
See Kuehn (1969) 
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of the variables, stratified sampling at the industry level and more 
rigorous testing procedure, the nature of the valuation-takeover 
relationship and the takeover mechanism could be more fully exposed. 
Subsequent to the publication of th* results of this pilot study, 
Ajit Singh (1971) has examined the relationship between the market 
valuation and other financial variables and takeovers. He employed 
data on a sample of 2126 U.K. public quoted companies for the period 
1948-1960 to examine mainly the characteristics of taken over and 
non-taken over firms. In addition to differences in the composition 
of the companies examined, the time period, and the emphasis placed 
on industry analysis in this study, Singh relies primarily on 
discriminant analysis as his method of testing various hypotheses 
about takeovers. Nevertheless, where meaningful comparisons can be 
drawn between the results of Singh's study and this, reference will 
be made. 
The scope of this study will be limited to the three aims described 
above because of the enormity of the general subject of takeovers. As 
stated earlier, the content of the descriptive survey approach to the 
* subject are only touched upon. A dynamic formulation of the model 
and the exploration of the desirability or otherwise of takeover 
activity at its present levels has been omitted entirely but never-
theless rema1n possibilities for further research. Some discussion 
of the takeover actiVity overtime, however, will appear in chapter I. 
See pages 2 and 3 above. 
-10-
CHAP'l'ER I 
THE RECORD OF TAKEOVER ACTIVITY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is the primary purpose of this chapter to describe and analyse 
a number of aspects of the takeover activity that occured during the 
period January 1st, 1957 to December 31st, 1969. This will also serve 
to acquaint the reader with the climate surrounding this historically 
unprecedented level of takeovers in order that an appreciation of the 
theoretical model developed in the next chapter may be gained. 
1.2 THE FREQUENCY OF TAKEOVERS 
In the 13 year period under study there were 1554 takeovers of 
public quoted U.K. companies or 43.42,% of the 3566 companies in the 
census population. This represented net assets of acquired companies 
of £6837.855 million, and a market value of £13154.398 million. By 
comparison with Singh's data for the 13 year period 1948 to 1960 there 
were only 461 takeovers out of his sample of 1844 companies or exactly 
2~~ of the total. However, 405 of these occured during the period 
~ 1954-60. Thus it appears as though the wave of takeover activity of 
the sixties had its beginnings some time after the mid-fifties. Indeed, 
Singh indicates with the use of Board of Trade data, that both in 
terms of the number and value of takeovers the boom appeared to take-
~S! 
off in 1959-60. 
A more complete picture of the frequency of takeovers during the 
boom is offered by table I. It shows the annual number, bookvalue, 
Singh (1971), p. 23 
u Singh (1971), p. 38 
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TABLE I 
ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF TAKEOVERS 
I II III IV 
.n1AR NO. OF TAKEOVERS BOOK VAL. OF T-o'S MKT. VAL. OF T-o'S EXTEL IN 
1957 76 127.509 117.556 107.7 
1958 83 194.281 190.696 164.6 
1959 138 253.180 363.256 148.4 
1960 107 298.555 473.959 180.9 
1961 113 335.172 678.664 194.8 
1962 98 244.660 399.645 194.0 
1963 90 216.096 392.786 210.0 
1964 112 290.032 438.341 222.9 
1965 100 466.582 710.396 215.4 
1966 89 386.832 566.871 221.8 
1967 144 1060.992 1701.564 237.0 
1968 240 1960.520 4752.553 339.8 
1969 
..l&i.. 1,,3,444 2368.111 332.2 
TOTALS 1554 6837.855 13154.398 
Note: columns II and III are in £m. and column IV is an index, 1956 ... 100 
and market value of assets acquired during 1957-69. Book value in 
column II is measured as the net assets of the acquired firms and 
market value (column III) is the value on the stock market of the 
acquired firma' voting shares after all bidding had been reflected 
in the price of the firms' shares. These latter two indices of 
frequency will tend to overstate the value of the taken over firms 
~~_the extent that minority interests remain (i.e. not all shares 
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are acquired at the time of the offer). Nevertheless, typically 
minority interests are acquired at a later date 80 that this bias 
would only be evident in the last few years. In any case, since the 
emergence of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in 1968, minority 
interests have tended to be rapidly acquired following the Code's 
recommendation •• The market value indicator will at the same time 
underestimate the size of the transaction in that preference shares, 
debentures, non-voting shares, etc. were excluded. This bias is likely 
to be significant so that the magnitude of the boom is even greater 
than indicated by table I. It must also be remembered, however, in 
making such time series comparisons that inflation (both in terms 
of assets including revaluations and share prices) will explain some 
of the rise in the book value and market value indices. In column 
IV is the EXTEL Security Value Index obtained by taking the average 
of the monthly mean value over each 12 month period. While the 
market went up by a factor of over 3 during the period, the market 
value of the takeovers increased by a factor of over 40 up to 1968 
and a factor of over 20 up to 1969. 
A visual indication of the frequency of takeovers over the period 
1s presented in charts la. through Id which indicate respectively 
the monthly number, book valae, market value and EXTEL index. The 
first three have been smoothed by seasonal adjustment to ease inter-
pretation but the monthly raw data for all series appears in Appendix 
II. 
A number of points of interest emerge from the data on the frequency 
of takeovers. All indices indicate a general increase in the takeover 
activity both in terms of number and value. However because of the 
sources of bias mentioned in the previous paragraph, chart la, the 
NO. OF TAKEOVERS PER MONTH 
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monthly number of takeovers gives a more representative picture of 
the nature of the increase through the period. From the middle ot 
1958 to the middle ot 1959 there was a rapid increase in the number 
ot takeovers, it doubling from roughly 5- 6 per month to 11 _ 12 per 
month. From then until the middle of 1963 there is a slight downward 
trend in activity, although it continues to exceed the pre - 1958 
lev~ls. A d~cond minor peak occurs in 1964 where the average increases 
trom roughly just over 7 per month to around 10 per month. This level 
drops back to around 7 per month in the middle of 1966. From then 
there was a rapid increase, reaching its peak in the last halt ot 
1968. On the smoothed data it reached a rate ot over 22 takeovers 
per month or on average over one successful otf.er every. busine •• da7. 
On the raw data, July 1968 was the month ot highest activity with 28 
offers being made while in December 1958 there were 27. From then until 
the end ot the period, the activity tell off, though still exceeding 
the pre - 1966 level at roughly 13 per month. The indications are 
that the takeover activity in 1970 has been maintained on an average 
of roughly 11 - 12 per month. 
This moat recent boom within the boom emerges as the most promlnant 
teature of the results presented. Examining charts Ib and Ic, it can 
be seen as virtually the only feature in an upward trending series. 
No doubt the non-emergence ot the two previous minor waves of activity 
is due to the upward trend in the value indices due to inflation in 
book values and stock prices over the period. 
On this pOint, chart Id is the monthly EXTEL security value index 
and at fi~st glance appears to be highly correlated with all indices 
of frequency. Thus, not only does the rise in .tock prices account 
tor some of the increase in the market value of takeovers, but also it 
-16-/' 
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8~8gest9, .e8~e ef the a,,..eB~1gft eeF •• lat1ea, a eaysal relationship 
between the two. That is, the market value index and particularily 
the 1966 - 1968 boom w111 to some extent be the result ot the apparent 
correspond1ng rise in equ1ty values in that the rise 1n secur1ty prices 
will mean that 'larger' compan1es are being taken over. Nevertheless, 
as pointed out earlier, this only accounts for a small proport1on ot 
the increaso in the market value of the takeovers assuming all firm's 
share prices rise with the market. Further, s1mply the rise in the 
market value of firms would not account for the increase in the number 
of takeovers observed in chart Ia. Research under taken in the U.S. 
and (1966) 
by R.L. Nelson (1959) also indicates an observable correlat1on between 
the frequency of takeovers and the index of stock pr1ces and the 
business cycle, but 80 far a causal explanat10n remains illusive.· 
The question of why when market prices are generally rising (or h1gh) 
the takeover rate should be riSing (or high) may be explained by the 
leaders taking over the laggers. That is, the assumption that all 
firms' share prices increase in a riSing market may obscure the dif-
terentials or variance in stock prices that could be exa"ggerated";in 
a rising market. If differentials did increase, it is clear that 
takeover acti vi ty is likely to increase. Acqu1ring firms or raidel's 
would wish to takeover other firms when their own share prices are 
high and when the market is optomistic since it would, on the one hand, 
lower the effective cost of the acquisition to the extent it was paid 
for by a share issue and, on the other, it would be likely the rising 
market would be prepared to accept the additional equity. Furthermore, 
the acquired firms, if they are laggers, would not only be relatively 
For a critical view of this work see Hindley (l972~ 
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'cheap', but also would be in a weak defensive position in that for 
some reason or other they have tailed to keep up with the market trend. 
It is not possible to test this hypothesis directly with the data 
so far presented but the market valuation of the acquired firm is 
suggested for the theoretical model to be developed in chapter II. 
1.3 INDUSTRIAL PATTERN OF TAKEOVER ACTIVITY 
Just as the incidence of takeovers has not been uniform over time 
so also has it varied between industries. It is obvious that there are 
significant differences between industries in terms of risk, rate of 
return, structure, growth in demand, • optimal , size, etc.. It is also 
likely that such differences could result in differences in the level 
and timing ot takeover activity. Thus whila discrepencies between 
firm's market valuation may partially explain why takeovers occur, 
additional motives for takeover are likely to be discovered through 
an examination of the industrial environment and the d1fferences 1n 
the takeover rate which emerge. 
To accomp11sh this, the 3566 firms in the populatiQn were allocated 
to 67 industrial groups, each firm being allowed to appear in one or 
• more industr~es according their degree of diversification. The 
distribution of firms by number of industrial classes appears in 
appendix I, table IV. Using these industry classifications, Table II 
gives the ranked proportion of takeovers by industry. The most striking 
feature of these results is the marked differences in the takeover 
rate between industries. Seven industries lost over 5~ of their 
members through takeovers while 9 industries lost under 30.%. Also, 
by simply subtracting column II from column I and comparing this with 
Table V, appendix I gives the full description of the industry 
classes wh11e an abreviated description appears in table II below. 
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TABLE II 
RANKED INDUSTRY CLASSES BY PROPORTION OF TAKEOVERS 
I II III 
~ INDUSTRY NO. OF CO'S NO. OF T-9'S PROP. OF T-O'S 
1 Soft Drinks 
2 Breweries & Distilleries 
3 Chemists 
4. Food 
5 Textiles - Rosery & Underwear 
6 Medical equipment 
7 Textiles - Cotton 
8 Stores - Tailors etc. 
9 Textiles - General & Distrib. 
10 Chin~ Glass & Pottery 
11 Hotels & Restaurants 
12 Rubber Products 
13 Paints 
14 Wharves & Warehouses 
15 Cable Mfrs., Rope, etc. 
16 Clothing Mfrs. & Merchants 
17 Animal Feeding Stuffs 
18 Stores - Dept. & Mail Order 
19 Motor Car & Cycle Mfrs. 
20 Asbestos, Asphalte & Tar 
21 Oil - Prod., Refining & Dist. 
22. Car & Cycle Acc. & Components 
23 stores - Gen'l Merchants 
24 Entertainments 
25 Refergeration 
26 Containers & Pkg. Material 
27 Machine Tools 
28 Launderies 
29 Textiles - Artificial Fabs. 
30 Timber & Woodcutters 
31 Aircraft Ace. & Components 
32 Textiles - Wool 
33 Engineers - Electrical 
51 
166 
74 
255 
92 
49 
108 
90 
218 
60 
88 
50 
81 
44 
86 
178 
70 
77 
41 
46 
37 
219 
89 
73 
33 
105 
245 
34 
134 
101 
116 
129 
282 
31 
98 
43 
139 
49 
25 
55 
44 
104 
28 
41 
23 
37 
20 
39 
79 
31 
34 
18 
20 
16 
94 
38 
31 
14 
44 
102 
14 
55 
41 
47 
52 
113 
66.78 
59.04 
58.11 
54.51 
53.26 
51.02 
50.93 
48.89 
47.71 
46.67 
46.59 
46.00 
45.68 
45.45 
45.35 
44.38 
44.29 
44.16 
43.90 
43.48 
43.24 
42.92 
42.70 
42.47 
42.42 
41.90 
41.63 
41.18 
41.04 
40.59 
40.52 
40.31 
40.07 
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TABLE II (cont.) 
I II III 
~ INDUSTRY NO. OF CO'S NO. OF T-O'S PROP. OF ~.O'S 
34 Radio & TV, Photog. 
35 Misc. Machinery 
36 Bus & Road Haulage 
37 Printers & Publishers 
38 Builder's Merchants 
39 Shipbuilders & Docks 
40 Property 
41 Newspapers 
42 Leather Goods 
43 Engineers - Heating & Light 
44 Paper & Pulp 
45 Bricks, Cement & Tiles 
46 Agricultural Machinery 
47 Finance & Mortgage 
48 Engineers - Metal Mlrs. 
49 Engineers - Marine & Mining 
50 Carpets & Floor Coverings 
51 Chemicals 
52 Plastics 
53 Tobacco & Matches 
54 Shipping 
55 Furnishers - Mlrs. & Stores 
56 Hardware & Ironmongery 
57 Ironlounders & Steel Mlrs. 
58 Toys & Sporting Goods 
59 Boots & Shoes 
60 Office Equipment 
61 Car & Cycle Dealers & Rprs. 
62. Engineers - Civil & Const. 
63 Engineers - General 
64 Stores - Jewelers 
65 Engineers - Textile Mach. 
66 Builders & Contractors 
67 Insurance Brokers 
12' 
316 
43 
147 
228 
45 
256 
43 
49 
188 
80 
130 
83 
83 
250 
144 
79 
106 
137 
24 
71 
115 
143 
135 
42 
64 
56 
128 
187 
326 
38 
34 
178 
18 
:..~o 
122 
17 
58 
88 
17 
96 
16 
18 
69 
29 
47 
30 
30 
88 
50 
27 
36 
46 
8 
23 
37 
46 
42 
13 
19 
16 
36 
50 
87 
10 
8 
40 
3 
It .... 
39.87 
39.53 
39.46 
38.60 
37.78 
37.50 
37.21 
36.73 
36.70 
36.25 
36.15 
36.14 
36.14 
35.20 
34.72 
34.18 
33.96 
33.58 
33.33 
32.39 
32.17 
32.17 
31.11 
30.95 
29.69 
28.57 
28.13 
26.74 
26.69 
26.32 
23.53 
22.47 
16.67 
column I an indication of the effect the takeovers have had on the 
structure of the industry can be gained. For instance, of the 51 
soft drink manufacturers which existed during the period, only 20 
remain independant at its end. 
A detailed discussion of the industry differences and their effect 
on the character of the intra-industry takeover activity will appear 
in chapters III and IV where two models of takeovers will be tested 
at the industry level. I shall attempt to discover there not only 
whether the characteristics of the firm are an important determinant 
of the probability of takeover but also the characteristics of the 
industry. ParticularlT, the structure of the industry and the degree 
of concentration will affect the takeover rate. That is, if an 
industry is highly concentrated at the beginning of the period, the 
takeover rate is likely to be lower than for a less concentrated 
industry. Also, the state of demand will affect the takeover rate. 
In declining demand conditione, one wo~d expect a contraction of 
output by a reduction in the number of firms. Takeovers in such 
can • 
conditions/provide an alternative to the bankruptc1 courts as the 
means of contracting the industry's output. Additionally, if firms 
expect and desire growth, one would anticipate a similar though perhaps 
less marked result to occur under conditione of static or slowly 
growing demand. However, one would also expect this latter industry 
to have its effect felt on the performance of the firms in the industry; 
falling demand tending to lower the rate of return. One could there-
fore argue that this would emerge from the characteristics of the firm 
Dewey (1961), p.257, has taken this point further. He argues that 
most mergers in the U.S. "have virtually nothing to do with either 
the creation of market power or the realization of scale economies. 
They are merely a civilized alternative to bankruptc~ or the 
voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from falling to riSing 
firms." 'I 'shall return to this point in chapter II •• 
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analysis in chapters III and IV, rendering industry analysis trivial. 
In fact such reasoning is incorrect, as a poorly performing firm in 
a growth industry could not be considered identical to an equally poorly 
performing firm in a contracting industry. For instance, straight 
comparisons between firms involved in Stores - Tailors etc. whose 
members had an average before tax profit rate of 16.~ and average 
annual growth rate of 8.~ and Insurance Brokers which on average 
had profits before tax of 47.~ and grew at 97.~ per year, would 
overlook such differences and consequently prejudice any conclusions 
about the nature of the takeover activity.· 
In addition to the large variation in mean and median performance 
of firms between industries, a further indication of the importance 
of an examination of takeovers at the industry level is offered in 
table III. This table contains the annual number and proportion to 
total of takeovers for 5 major industrial headings which experienced 
particularily heavy takeover activity: Food, Breweries & Distilleries, 
•• Engineering, Textiles and Building. The takeovers in these broad 
industry classes accounted for nearly two-thirds of all takeovers in 
the period. 
Striking differences emerge between these industries with respect 
to the timing of the waves of takeovers. In both the Breweries & 
Distilleries and Food industries the highest proportion of raids 
occured during the 1958-60 minor takeover boom while with the others, 
the highest proportions occured during the more recent boom, tbe1958-60 
wave hardly being apparent at all. Furthermore, the Engineering 
Appendix II, table II gives the mean and median values of industry 
performance for the various financial and stock market indicators • 
.. These last three represent combined industries - i.e. Engineering, 
nO.S 8-17; Textiles, no.s 38, 53-57; Building, 4-6. (See appendix I, 
table V). 
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TABLE III 
ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAKEOVERS IN FIVE MAJOR INDUSTRIES 
1MB BREWERIES % FOOD % ENGINEERING % TEXTILES % BUILDING % 
1957 5 5.1 5 3.6 23 5.5 12 5.4 8 
1958 2 2.0 11 7.9 23 5.5 12 5.4 4 
1959 15 15.3 22 15.8 25 6.0 15 6.8 4 
1960 16 16.3 11 7.9 28 6.7 13 5.9 3 
1961 14 14.3 9 6.5 24 5.8 7 3.2 9 
1962 9 9.2 9 6.5 14 3.3 17 7.7 8 
1963 6 6.1 7 5.0 21 5.0 15 6.8 8 
1964 3 3.1 14 10.1 22 5.3 29 13.1 14 
1965 5 5.1 14 10.1 29 7.0 11 5.0 8 
1966 4 4.1 4 2.9 26 6.2 13 5.9 6 
1967 9 9.2 6 4.3 48 11.5 21 9.5 13 
1968 8 8.2 17 12.2 86 20.6 38 17.2 36 
1969 2 2.0 ;!O 7.~ 48 J.1.5 18 8.1 20 
TOTAL 98 100.0% 139 100.0% 417 "'99.9% 221 100.~~ 141 
'" the discrepancy from 100.0% is due to rounding 
industry showed remarkable stability in takeover activity up to the 
most recent takeover boom while others display considerable variation 
over the same period. The general impression these results offer is 
that the takeover activity is to some extent an industry phenomenon. 
Certainly the two boom periods described earlier emerge, but it is 
also clear that it would not be totally correct to ascribe this solely 
5.6 
2.8 
2.8 
2.1 
6.4 
5.6 
5.6 
9.9 
5.6 
4.2 
9.2 
25.5 
14.2 
"'99.go~ 
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to general valuation discrepancies resulting from a rising market 
index. Within the booms were waves of activity affecting particular 
industries more strongly than others. A more detailed investigation 
into particular industries than is possible here would no doubt 
throw up structural and institutional factors to which the waves 
could be attributed. An example of such is the Textile Reorganisation 
Commission set up in the early sixties to encourage restructuring of 
the textile industry and the introduction and acceptance of canister 
beer which can be safely transported resulting in the possibility for 
cost savings through large scale centralised breweries. 
Thus, in formulating the model of takeovers in chapter II, I 
shall test the various hypotheses concerning the acquired firms' 
characteristics, industry by industry. The desirability of this is 
indicated by the results presented in this section: industries differ 
in the level of takeover activity, the growth rate and the rate of 
return, as well as the takeover pattern over time. 
1.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF RAIDERS 
While the primary purpose of this study is to identify the 
differences between firms which are taken over and those which are 
not, I shall also focus attention upon the differences between raiders -
firma which undertake takeovers - and the surviving firms which 
generally do not. The purpose of this aection is to describe some 
of the characteristics of raiders as a means of setting the scene 
for the analysis of raiders' motivations in chapter VI. 
Of the 1554 takeovers of firms within the population, 1244 were 
undertaken by raiders also within the population, the remaining 310 
raids being instituted by firms outside. Table VII in appendix I 
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gives the breakdown ot these firms by the reason they were not 
included and the number ot takeovers by the firms in each category. 
One can note that by far the largest category of outside raiders were 
non-quoted companies. The remaining 1244 takeovers were undertaken 
by a total of 643 raiders. TableY gives the distribution ot these 
internal raiders by number and proportion of raids and the number and 
proportion of these raiders which were subsequently taken over in 
each category of the number of raids. 
TABLE n 
DISTRIBUTION OF RAIDERS BY NUMBER OF RAIDS 
NUMBER OF PROPORTION 
NUMBER NUMBER PROPORTION OF RAIDERS OF RAIDERS 
OF RAIDS OF RAIDERS RAIDERS TO TOTAL (%> TAKEN OVER TAKEN OVER (%> 
1 405 62.9 121 18.8 
2 121 18.8 23 3.6 
3 44 6.8 8 1.2 
4 28 4.3 1 0.2 
5 14 2.2 4 0.6 
6 14 2.2 2 0.3 
7 3 0.5 0 0.0 
8 6 0.9 0 0.0 
9 2 0.3 0 0.0 
10 1 0.2 0 0.0 
12 1 0.2 0 0.0 
15 3 0.5 1 0.2 
44 1 0.2 0 0.0 
TOTAL 643 100.0% 160 24.9% 
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The first point to notice in table IV is that raiding is by no 
means limited to a small number of select firms, for over l~ of 
all firms in the population undertook at least one raid. Also, it 
appears that raiders are to some extent partially immune from the 
threat of takeover as only 24.~ of raiders eventually get taken 
over compared with 43.4% of all firms. Furthermore, given a raider 
makes at least two takeover~ the proportion declines to 16.4%. It 
further declines to l3.~~ and just under 11% of the raiders being 
takenover if they make at least three and at least four raids 
respectively. The most prominent raider is Courtaulds Ltd. with 
44 raids (mainly of small textile companies), followed by a large 
gap; then Slater Walker Securities Ltd., Viyella International Ltd. 
and Whitbread Ltd., each with 15 raids. 
I next attempted to examine whether there were significant 
differences between the firms which made 3 or more raids in terms 
of various financial characteristics of the firms •. Two sets of 
regressions were run using first, the number, and second, the value 
• of the raids on the pre-tax profit rate, growth rate, retention ratiO, 
•• liquidity ratiO, valuation ratiO, and average size. A sample of 
these results appear in table V below. Taking the level of significance 
of the estimated coefficient of ~ or approximately twice its standard 
error, it can readily be seen that in no case is any of the variables 
a significant determinant of either the number or value of the takeovers 
made by an individual raider. This would tend to indicate that the 
body of raiders (i.e. the 117 firms which had undertaken three or more 
Profits after tax and cash flow were alao tried in place of pre-tax 
profits but produced similar results and therefore are not ahown • 
•• The independant variables are defined in appendix I, section II.G. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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TABLE V 
RAIDERS REGRESSION RESULTS 
CONSTANT PROFIT RT. GROWTH RT. RETN. RTO. LIQ, RTO. ~ SIZE 
-
4.7364 
- .. 2.2813 0.2248 1.6142 1.9115 
(1.1620) (2.5970) (0.3242) (2.5713) (2.0193) 
4.8289 
-0.0696 '.ea50 (0.8571) (0.5630) (O.G03G) 
55.5792 
-22.3027 -C).985l 
-37.0465 20.7851 
(16.7944) (37.5345) (4.6862) (37.1633) (29.1860) 
40.5179 
-8.7921 0.9632 
(12.3737) (8.1278)(8.0432) 
Note: numbers in brackets are the standard errors of the associated 
coefficients 
Note: the dependant variable in regressions 1 and 2 is the number of 
takeovers while the dependant variable in 3 and 4 is the market 
value of the raider's acquisitions. 
raids during the period) is extremely homogeneous. Firms which under-
took the largest number (or value) of raids were neither more nor less 
profitable than firms undertaking the smaller number (or value), nor did 
they grow faster, retain more or leas, be more or less liquid, be valued 
h1gher or lower on the market or be of significantly different size. 
This conclus1on 1s of relevance when I.come to examine raidera' performance 
with respect to the performance of firms in their respective industries 
in chapter VI for it lends support to the methodology adopted of 
treating raiders and their mot1vations as a reasonably homogeneous 
group. 
Up to now in the discussion in this chapter of the motivations 
behind takeovers I have taCitly assumed that takeover8 occured primarily 
.i 
0.Q16 
S.025 
9.023 
0.834 
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within the same industry boundaries. To examine whether or not this 
tenda to be the caae I took a sample Of 593 takeovers which represented 
the total takeovers undertaken by the 117 firma which had made three 
or more raids. Theae were classified as horizontal (th ..... atage of 
the industrial process), or v.rtical (.ither a aupplier or distributor 
of the raiders primary output) or conglom.rate <where no apparent 
productive links exist). The result of this is that 438 of the sub-
sample of raids or just under 74% w.re horizontal, 108 or just ov.r 
l~ were vertical and only 47, or l.ss than ~ were conglom.rate. 
(It may b. of intereat to note that all but 10 of the conglom.rate 
takeovers occured betw.en 1965 and 1969.) Thus, while conglomerates 
and their importanc. appear to be increasing, they as y.t have marginal 
b.aring on the U.K. takeover sc.ne and hence do not command that 
d.gree of int.rest which they have merit.d in the U.S.. For the rest, 
tak.overs by the 117 raiders are primarily w1thin the same industrial 
activity or at a d1ffer.nt stag. of relat.d industrial process.s. 
To sh.d further light on this and to s.e wheth.r the pres.nc. of 
a large number of raid.rs in an industry tend to result in sreater 
tak.over act1vity than if f.w were present, I again used the 117 
raiders with thr.e or more takeovers and rank.d the 67 industries 
by the number of raiders in .ach.· I also ranked the industri.s by 
.. 
number of raids and proportion of raids and calculated rank correlation 
coeff1ci.nts and significanc. t.sts. The reaults of this are aa 
folloW8: 
NUMBER OF RAIDERS nTH PROPORTION OF TAKEOVERS 
r • 0.299 z • 2.428 which is significant at the ~ l.v.l 
Because of the procedure of multiple 1ndustry classes adopted, the 
117 ra1dera usually appear in more than one industry • 
•• Se. appendix II, table III for the data. 
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NUMBER OF RAIDERS WITH NUMBER OF TAKEOVERS 
r .. 0.789 z .. 6.497 which is significant at the 1% lnel 
Thus it would appear that the presence of raiders in an industry is 
associated with the takeover activity in that industry; in other words 
most ot the takeover activity is ho~zontal in nature. This apparent 
~estatement of the earlier results is included lest queries arise over 
the method of classifying takeovers as horizontal, vertical or conglom-
erate. Moreover, these latter results are for the number and proportion 
ot all takeovers in each industry and thus confirm the pattern which 
w~s apparent trom the sub-sample of 593 takeovers previously employed. 
The purpose of presenting the results and discussion included in 
this section is to set the scene for an analysis of the characteri8tics 
ot raiders and their implications to the theory of the firm in chapter 
VI. The latter results relating raiders to industry classes will 
also have bearing on the industry analysis under taken in chapters III 
and IV. 
1.5 PERFORMANCE OF TAKEN OVER FIRMS CONTRASTED WITH NON-TAKEN OVER FIRMS 
In this section I shall present 80me very crude results, the 
purpose ot which is suggestive for the more detailed analysis of the 
differences between taken over and non-taken over firms in chapters 
III and IV. In table VI are the mean values over the entire time 
period of 6 characteristics of the tirm for the two groups - taken 
over firms and non-taken over firms - and the percentages that the 
characteristics of the taken over firma are ot the non-taken over 
firms. As can ea8ily be seen for the profit rate, growth rate, 
valuation ratiO and size, there are large ditterences between the 
two groups; the growth rate of taken over firms being approximately 
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TABLE VI 
MEAN VALUES OF PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRED AND SURVIVING FIRMS 
VjJUABLE MEAN VALUE OF T-O MEAN VALUE OF NON-I-O % OF COLUMN 1 TO 
Pre-tax Profit Rate 0.1151 0.1932 59.6 
Growth Rate 0.0760 '.1985 39.9 
Retention ~tio 8.3365 8.4864 82.8 
Liquidity Ratio 
-G.'sac -1.8700 82.9 
Valuation Ratio 0.8627 1.5214 56.7 
Size (Net Assets) £m 4.9974 8.0097 62.4 
61% of the value for the surviving firms. !he retention ratio and 
liquidity ratio offer less important inter-group differencea, each 
being greater than 80,% of the surviving group's mean. Thus, for the 
three most important indices of performance, profits, growth and 
valuation, the acquired firms performed subatantially worse than 
firms which survived. 
The crude data in the above table gives, however, no indication 
of the variance or overlap between the two groups. Furthermore, 
while there are large differences between the means for some variables, 
the skewnes8 of the distribution could be serving to make the groups 
appear to be more distinct than they really are. For example, if 
few of the very largest firms are taken over, the mean value presented 
in the above table could over state the actual group separation. 
based on the full distribution. In table VII is the median values 
of the same 6 variables, this variable offering a better indication 
2 
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TABLE VII 
MEDIAN VALUES OF PERFORMAHCE OF ACQUIRED AND SURVIVIB'G FIRHS 
VARIABLE MEDIAN VALUE OF 1'-0 MB!?UI VALUE OF NON T-o % OF COL 1 TO 
Pre-tax Profit Rate 0.0855 8.1276 67.8 
Growth Rate '.8228 8.8982 23.3 
Retention Ratio 0.3360 8.3301 1'1.8 
Liquidity Ratio 
-0.1571 .... 1741 98.2 
Valuation RatiO 1.6295 8.9780 64.4 
Size (Net Assets) em 1.4491 1.5697 92.3 
of central tendency than the mean tor skewed distributions. Indeed, 
by examining the median values one tinds that not only does the ettect 
ot the retention ratio and liquidity ratiO Tirtually disappear, but so 
does that ot size. Protits, growth and valuation, however, only 
marginally change, in tact the ditterences being accentuated with 
respect to the growth rate. 
Neither table VI nor VIr shed light on the problem ot within 
group variation or oTerlap between the two groups with respect to the 
indices. While the ditterences in means or .edian. giTe. 80.e indication 
that the pertormance ot the two groups is likely to be ditterent, it 
tells us neither the degree ot overlap nor does it giTe any indioation 
ot the e~tent ot any systematic relationship operating 8uch that a 
change in the pertormance ot one tirm would increase the likelihood 
ot a tirm moving trom the group ot surviTing tUlU to the group ot 
acquired tiras, i.e. taken over. I shall leave discussion ot the 
2 
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latter point to chapter V where the probit model ot takeovers will 
be developed. Meanwhile, the toll owing data in tables VIlla to VIII. 
otter a visual indication ot the overlap ot the two groups. In each 
table is grouped data by variable ot the number ot acquired and 
surviving t1rJu and the proportion ot taken. ever tirma to the total 
in each group. Liquidity i8 omitted tor this analysis because no 
relationship emerges. 
TABLE VII Ia 
?-lUMBERS OF SURVIVING AND ACQUIRED FIRMS FOR GROUPED PRE-TAX PROFIT RATE • 
PROPORTION TO 
GROUP NO. OF SURVIVING FIRMS NO. OF ACQUIRED FIRMS TOTAL IN GROUP 
.... 5. - -e.le 2 34 9.944 
-1.10 - O.GO 19 81 8.810 
0.00 - 0.05 91 163 0.642 
0.05 - tt.lO 308 347 8.538 
0.10 - 0.13 249 214 8.521 
0.13 - 0.17 367 234 '.389 
e.17 - 0.20 234 129 8.355 
8.20 - 0.25 287 148 8.3~ 
'.25 - 1.30 168 90 0.349 
1.3e - 0.40 16G 70 0.304 
0.40 - 0.50 66 22 1.25. 
0.50 - 1.00 53 19 0.264 
1.00 - over 8 3 0.375 
TOTAL 2012 1554 
• Protits atter tax and cash flow were a180 grouped and results similar 
to those ot pre-tax protits were obtained. 
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TABLE VIIIb 
NUMBERS OF SURVIVING AND ACQUIRED FIRMS FOR GROUPED GRom RATE 
, -~ PROPORTION TO GROuP NO. OF SURVIVING FIRMS NO. OF ACQUIRED FIRMS TOTAL IN GROUP 
-
-0.50 
-- -<>.10 2 40 0.952 
"'.10 
-
o.oe 93 268 9.742 
0.00 
-
0.03 143 305 0.681 
0.03 
-
0.07 276 346 0.556 
0.07 
-
0.10 219 156 0.407 
0.10 
-
0.15 291 156 0.349 
0.15 
-
0.20 224 83 0.278 
0.20 
-
O.3G 268 89 0.249 
0.30 
-
0.40 143 42 0.227 
0.40 
-
0.50 70 23 0.247 
0.50 
-
0.70 98 28 0.222 
0.70 
-
1.00 53 13 0.197 
1.00 
-
over ~ --U.... 0 •• 77 
TOTAL 2012 1554 
TABLE VIIIc 
NUMBERS OF SURVIVING AND ACQUIRED FIRMS FOR GROUPED RETENTION RATIO 
.;" .. PROPOR'fION TO 
~. NO. OF SURVIVING FIRMS NO. OF ACQUIRED FIRMS '1'OTAL IN GROUP 
··-9.99 
- -1.00 11 17 e.687 
-1.00 - -0.50 13 22 Q.629 
-0.50 
- -0.20 20 32 0.615 
"'.2- - -8.10 7 23 '.781 
-8.10 
-
0.00 20 43 8.'83 
0.60 
-
0.10 70 76 0.521 
0.10 
-
0.20 113 117 0.509 
0.20 
-
0.30 175 144 0.451 
0.30 
-
0.40 358 219 0.388 
0.40 
-
0.50 486 233 0.324 
0.50 
-
0.60 388 242 0.384 
0.60 
-
0.70 191 138 0.419 
0.70 
-
0.80 79 59 0.428 
0.80 
-
0.90 24 23 0.489 
0.90 
-
1.00 20 62 0.756 
1.00 over 37 
TABLE VIIId 
NUMBERS OF SURVIVING AND ACQUIRED FIRMS FOR GROuPED VALUATION RATIO 
~ NO. OF SURVIVING FIRMS PROPORTION TO NO. OF ACQUIRED FIRMS TOTAL IN GROUP 
_.00 
-
0.20 3 37 0.925 
0.20 
-
0.30 9 89 0.008 
0.30 
-
0.40 19 116 0.859 
0.40 
-
0.50 48 172 0.782 
0.50 
-
0.60 77 187 0.708 
0.60 
-
0.70 100 135 8.574 
0.70 
-
0.80 140 139 9.498 
0.80 
-
0.90 136 116 1.460 
0.90 
-
1.10 287 160 8.358 
1.10 
-
1.30 240 133 0.357 
1.30 
-
1.50 201 76 0.274 
1.50 
-
1.70 161 51 0.241 
1.70 
-
2.00 181 50 0.216 
2.00 
-
3.00 240 66 0.216 
3.00 
-
4.00 72 7 0.089 
4.00 
-
over 
-2!.. ~ 0.169 
TOTAL 2012 1554 
TABLE VIIle 
NUMBERS OF SURVIVING AND ACQUIRED FIRMS FOR GROUPED SIZE 
£m PROPORTION 'rO 
GROUP NO. OF SURVIVING FIRMS NO. OF ACQUIRED FIRMS 'rOTAL IN GROuP 
';.0 
-
.1 787 627 
'.443 
:.1 
-
2 385 334 0.465 
2 
-
4 349 250 0.417 
4 
-
7 178 140 0.440 
7 
-
10 76 "64 6.457 
10 
-
15 72 47 8.395 
15 
-
20 44 29 0.399 
20 
-
30 40 33 0.452 
30 
-
125 61 27 O.3G7 
125 
-
500 16 3 0.158 
500 
-
over 4 • 8.000 
All variables thus show a large degree of overlap, nOne providing 
a perfect discriminator between the two groups ot acquired and SurT1ving 
tirma. It, however, instead ot thinking in terms ot separating the 
two groups on the basis ot pertormance variables such that one i. 
attempting to tind critical values of the variables over which the 
firm will certainly get taken over, one considers the movement ot 
the variables in terms of increasing or decreasing the probability 
ot being taken over, then the data presented above takes On considerable 
signiticance. All variables except size and retentions, which seems 
• to possess a U-shaped distribution, appear to move virtually mono-
tonically trom one extreme to the other and thus with the above inter-
pretation, can be used to describe the way in which the level ot any 
given variable tor a tirm will determine its probability of being 
taken over and also how a tirm can alter the probability by changing 
ita tinancial policies. The theoretical underpinnings behind each 
variable l • ettect on the likelihood ot takeover will be considered 
in the next chapter and the data contained in tables Villa through 
VIlle will be statistically analysed in the pro bit model in chapter 
V. Possibly the most important reason tor c~oosing the above _~ 
.. dification to the critical level discr1a1nation interpretation is 
that ot omitted variables. With any cross-section study there will 
be random variation in such a critical level as well as variation 
attributable to omitted or unspecitiable variables. The most important 
omitted variable is likely to be the 1ndustry climate as indicated 
by the data presented in section 1.3 above. Thus one could interpret 
the data presented in the previous table. as encompassing a distribution 
• iI shall return to this pOint in chapter IV. 
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ot individual tirm's critical levels for the varioue variables, they 
(the critical levela) diftering not only as the resUlt of random 
variation, but aleo because ot various aspects of their industrial 
settings. I ahall return to this interpretation in chapter V as it 
torma the basis ot the probit model of takeovers. 
A less important but yet interesting aspect of the ditterence 
between taken over and surviving tirma 1s the age d1etribution of the 
two groups. Since tirma entering the population of public quoted 
companies were included up to June 1966, the youngeat a tir. could 
be as of December 1970· would be 4i yeara old. Table IX gives the 
age distribution ot taken over firma and surviving tirms as measured 
by the ditterence between the date at which the firm went public and 
our baae date ot December 1970.and the proportion ot tirma taken over 
in each age group. 
TABLE IX 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF TAKEN OVER AND S~IVING FIRMS 
PROPORTION TO 
AGE GROUP 
'YEARSl NO. OF SURVIVORS NO. OF TAKEOVERS mAL IlPGROUP 
4i - 10 465 120 20.5 
10 15 178 105 31.1 
15 2e 184 136 42.5 
20 25 259 221 46.0 
25 30 16 16 50.0 
30 35 170 168 49.7 
35 40 93 110 54.2 
40 45 145 149 50.1 
45 50 77 88 53.3 
50 
-
60 70 70 50.0 
60 over 355 371 51.1 
TOTAL 2112 1554 
• See appendix I sections 1.3 and J.3 for a description of this age 
variable. 
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As indicated by the proportions, there appears to be a greater 
incidence of takeovers of older companies than of young one.. Ot 
the 1768 firma which went public since the last war, only 582, or 
less than one-third have been taken over while of the 1798 firma which 
went public during or before the war 972, or well over one-half were 
taken over. ~here are likely to be several reasons for this. First, 
the low inCidence of takeover in the younge.t firms is probably due 
to the fact that normall~ at least for the first few years after gOing 
public, control (i.e. over 5oP~ of the voting power) is retained in 
the hands ot the director. making an involuntary takeover impossible. 
Second, one would think that the managerial motivations (e.g. growth) 
which prompted the firm to go public in the first place would set it 
apart from the performance ot the typical taken over firm which w. 
have already seen in this section, tends to be a poor pertormer.· 
1.6 THE METHOD OF PAYMENT AND THE BID PREMIUM 
In this section I shall describe two further aspects ot the 
takeover scene - the method u.ed tor payment tor the acqUired tirm 
and the premium over the pre-ofter price that the acquiring firm 
has paid. 
Payment practices employed in the takeover process can be 
categorized into five basic groups; cash only, cash plus some ot 
the raider'. shares, shares only, convertible unsecured loan stock 
or loan stock plus .~es, and finally by a company exchange whereby 
• A similar argument is put forward by Ma (1960). He suggests that higher 
mortality rates of older companies (both bankruptcy and takeover) may 
be due to their failure to supply dynamic management, the tendency to 
be conservative, that young companies are still experiencing the phase 
ot expansion which brought the. into the market, or that perhaps entry 
requirement. have been made more stringent over time and tinally the 
decline in concentration of certain old indu.tries has played some part. 
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the terms agreed are that the company to be acquired agrees to 
purchase a subSidiary of the raider, paying tor it by the issue 
ot a sufficient number of its shares to give .the raider voting 
control.· m b1 X i t La e g ves he d1stribution of the .arious payaent 
practices and the way each has varied over time. As the fieures 
TABLE X 
METHOD OF PAYMEN'l' OVER TIME 
YEAR CASH % CASH&SHARE % SHARE % LOAN STI % CO EXCH % 
1957 31 40.8 12 15.8 31 4f.8· 1 1.3 1 1.3 
1958 44 53.0 15 18.1 22 26.5 1 1.2 1 1.2 
1959 75 54.3 29 21.0 33 23.9 0 0.0 1 0.7 
1960 47 43.9 21 19.6 38 35.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 
1961 38 33.6 36 31.9 36 31.9 3 2.7 0 0.0 
1962 40 40.8 17 17.3 35. 35.7 4 4.1 2 2.0 
1963 41 45.6 21 23.3 19 21.1 6 6.7 3 3.3 
1964 57 50.9 24 21.4 26 23.2 2 1.8 3 2.7 
1965 43 43.0 26 26.0 21 21$8 7 7.0 3 3.0 
1960 23 25.8 25 28.1 19 21.3 22 24.7 0 0.9 
1967 57 39.6 36 25.0 15 10.4 33 22.9 3 2.1 
1968 70 29.2 43 17.0 53 22.2 72 30.0 2 8.8 
1969 
....ll 28.8 ....u 18.9 ~ 25.6 ..!i1. 28.6 ....2 0.0 
610 336 390 190 19 
Note: • deviations trom 100.0}6 are due to rounding .rrors. 
YEAR 'NHLJb 
76 100.0 
83 100.0 
138 99.0· 
107 99.9· 
113 100.1· 
98 99.0· 
90 100.0 
112 100.0 
100 100.0 
89 99.9· 
144 100.0 
240 100.1· 
~ 99.9· 
1554 TOTALS 
• Se. appendix I, .ection II J.4 tor a more complete description ot the 
otter tel'll8. 
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represent the terms of the successful offers, they conceal a cash component 
present in virtually all takeovers - that cash used to acquire shares 
through the market prior to or during negotiations. From table X it can be 
seen that the most common method of payment was a cash offer for the shares 
of the acquired firm, This method was used in just under 4~~ of the cases. 
A share exchange was the second most common form of offer and was used i~ 
just under 2~~ of the takeovers. The third most frequent payment practice 
was a combination of the first two, whereby the offer involved a share ex-
change with an additional cash inducement. This was used in just under 21% 
of the takeovers. The employment of convertible unsecured loan stock by 
itself or in combination with some of the raiders' shares was used in over 
l~ of the takeovers and finally there were 19 cases where a company exchange 
formed the basis of the acquisition. The most prominent point to notice in 
the lower part of table X is that in the most recent takeover boom, convertible 
unsecured loan stock was frequently chosen as the method of payment, while 
previously it was virtually unknown. The advantage of this as a form of 
payment is that it neither affects one's liquidity position as would a cash 
payment nor does it dilute one's equity if the company 1sacquired at a price 
in excess of its book value. Furthermore, it appears to have been perhaps 
more readily accept1ble to the owners and the market that would a total 
payment of shares. It does, however, result in the raider becoming more 
highly geared but this may not be particularily worrying if he can earn more 
than the usual 7 - ~ required to service the loan stock on the acquired 
assets. On top of thiS, the issue of convertibles for takeovers provide 
a handy way to alter the capital structure of a firm which desires 
growth but whose past record prevents it from seeking funds directly 
through the capital market. The use of loan stock appears to have 
caused some reduction in the percentage of the other three main 
methods of payment although the chief method to suffer was the method of 
-39_ 
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Ii".,-U I:>l Uti. 'lhis is not surprising as the I-ecent takeover boom 
o~¢ur.d du&~~g an optiD11stic rising stockmarket and a period of 
governmeut financial controls on "bank lending. In the 1959 _ 0(, 
mihor takeover boom. however, there appears to be no corre.ponding 
fall in the use of cash for acquisitions, it continUing to .ceouat 
for ovaI- one-halt of the takeoveI-s in 1958 and 1959. 
While considering payments practices as an aspect of the takv~ 
over scene, I also attempted to examine the determination ot the 
bid premium, i.e. the amount the raider pays in excess of the pre. 
bid price ot the shares ot the tirm(s) it acquires. This was 
meaaured by the ditference between the low.st share price that 
operated in the year ot the otter (or in the previous year it the 
otter occured.o early in the year for a representative pre-bid 
price to have been established free of any ofter reaction) and the 
final ofter price per share, normalized by dividing by the low ahara 
price in order to arrive at the percentage increa.e in the ah~. 
price. A sub-sample of the total takeovers is employed in the 
analysis of the bid premium comprising 593 otters undertaken by the 
/ 117 raiders previously examined in section 1.4 above. Such a 
",tlatiUed sample was used to .1IIlplity the process ot relating the 
bid premium to raider's characteristics as well as those ot the 
acquired firlll •• 
The primary hypothesis I wished to examine is that the bid 
premium will depend on the relative financial strengths of the raider 
and the acquired tira. The term. oftered and subsequent negotiations 
w11l depend on the raider's relative strength and his ability to pay, 
the acquired tirm'. ability to otter a detens. and thereby improve 
.. the terms, and the market's reaction to the bid which could r.ault 
in upward adjustments to both the acqUired firm's and the raider's 
valuation. Both would atfect the bid premium, the tormer indirectly 
through the possibility ot an improved after and the latter to the 
extent that the otter contained a component ot the raider's ahare •• ~ 
The model assumes that: 
and BP (2) 
where BP is the bid premium, SR is the raider'. size (net assete), 
Su 1.a the acquired tira'. size, .0 that ~ - SA!' i8 the dittel"ence 
between the raider~.8 8ize and the acquired firm' 8 size and h.nc:e a 
measure of their relative strength., PR.18 'he raider' 8 profit rate 
(before tax), PAr i8 the acquired tirm'. protit rate (before tax), 
~ 18 the raider'. liquidity ratio, LAF i8 the acqUired firm's liquidity 
ratiO, ViR i8 the raider. valuation ratio prior to the otter, and 
VRAF is the acquired tirm's valuation ratio prior to the otter _ 
both being measured with the annual low share price in the numerator. 
All variableB except the la8t two were me .. ured at the late8t accountiu6 
period prior to the otfer. 
• Manne (1985) ha. suggaated that by lOOking at the bid premium and the 
movementa of the raider's ahare. upon the announcement of the of tel" 
it might be po •• ible to di.tingui8h between .ergera motivated by 
IIIOnopol,. prot1 t and those trying to e8tablish more efficient llAnage-
ment in poorl,. run companie.. He postulated that the former would 
re.ult in an hczeaae 1& both:.raiderts .. d a .. u.red firm'. ahare 
prioes while the latter would re.ult in a decline in the price ot the 
raider'a ahare.. Primarily motivated by the .ocial implicationa ot 
this .uggestion, he wa., however, unable to eapirically te.t it. 
It i. aaticipated that: 
~BP/ c) (SR - SAF) < 0 (a) 
~BP/.~ > 0 (b) 
~ BP/.) VRAF .( 0 (0) 
bBP/~ ~ > 0 (d) 
clBP/ .) L Al" )& (e) 
~ BP/~ PR ')0 (1) 
a BP/. PAl" >0 (g) 
The anticipated relationship in (a) asserts that the greater the size 
difference between the raider and the acquire. firm, the weaker the 
acquired fir.'s relative derenaive position in terms of bargaiDing 
.. power and the les8 chance there w11l be of attracting other raiders 
with higher bids seeking to block the original raider tro. increasing 
his market share. Both factors would tend to have a daapen1ng effect 
On the bid prea1um. ~he relationship in (b) states that the higher 
the raider'. valuation ratio the greater the bid premium and 18 bau6d 
on the fact that a high valuation rati~ will ettectively lower the 
cost of the acquisition to the extent that the raider's share. fora 
part or all of the offer so that the raider could afford to • pay' 
more for the acquired firm's .. set.. Relationship (0) states that 
.. See section 1.8 for a discussion ot the defensive strategies adopted 
by acqUired firm •• 
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the lower the acquired f1ra's valuat10n rat10, the weaker 1t. defene1ve 
poe1t10n, the lower market valuat10n moat likely being the result of 
a poor prof1t record and poor future expect10n.. Desp1te the acqu1red 
firM's argument that it may be an artificially low valuation, it is 
the mark.t which set the valuation and it ia up to the market to acc.pt 
any ofter terms which woUld 1aprove on the pr.-bid price ofth. 
acquir.d firm's ahares. The partial relationship et (d) ia a atatement 
of the raider's ability to pay for the acquired firm out ot liqUid 
a.seta such that the more liqUid the more it could aftord to pay either 
1a a eaah otter Gr an otfer with a cash compon.nt.... !l'he relat10nship 
of (e) stat •• that the acquired firm'. liquidity will positively attect 
the bid premium and ia bas.d on the improved detensiv. position that 
ready cash would otf.r ....... !l'he relationships of (t) and (g) tollow trom 
what haa already been asserted with r.apect to the valuat10n ratio above •• 
The~(th~etor. repreaent alternative but pos.ibly more directly causal 
relationship. with the bid premium than (b) and (c). It 1. tor this 
reason the two .eta ot variable. appear in .eparat. equations. 
MUltiple regressions w.re und.rtaken on the two equations in 
(1) and (2) above and the re.Ult. appear in table XI. In general 
thes. results seem to indicate that the particular .pecification of 
the T<ar1ous variables likely to enter into the relationship have had 
no appreciable ettect on the b1d premium. !he only two signiticant 
parameter estimate. at the ~ probability level are the raider'. 
profit rate (PR) and the acquired fira's protit rate (P~) although 
/ 
'/A1== 
... Over 6Q% ot all takeovers contained a cash component in the ofter, 
either in total or with aome other torm ot paym.nt (see table X above) 
and in virtually all takeovers cash was used to acquire shares on the 
market • 
...... See section 1.8 tor a discuaaion ot the defensive strategies. 
TABLE XI 
BID PREMIUM REGRESSION RESULTS 
REG CONSTANT 
--.... 
SR - SAr Pa Pu La LAr R4 
I 0.85582 -0.00005 0.87402 
-6.73507 
-0.89751 ·ea.971 O.O~ 
(0.11885) (0.00035) (0.21765) (0.34869) (0.20172) (0.20712) 
REG CONSTANT SR - SAl' Viit VRAF La LAl a2 
2 0.85838 -1.00009 -0.01183 0.00514 -0.07041 0.17962 0.00: 
(0.12436) (0.00035) (0.07215) (0.05212) (0.20915) (0.22565) 
Note: 8tandard errors appear 1n brackets below the assoc1ated parameter 
.at1mates. 
the latter takes on the oppos1te a1gn trom that anticipated. It 18 
d1ff1cult to aee how this latter result coUld be interpreted e.pec1ally 
since the parameter estimate for VRAF proved to be insignificant. That 
ia, the low profits causing a high bid premium does not appear to act 
through the valuation ratio as antic1pated by the alternative 
spec1f1cations of equation8 (1) and (2). A88ide from profitability, only 
the size difference variable <s. - SAr) and the acquired firm's liquidity 
ratio take on the s1gn anticipated from relationships <a> through <e) 
although none are stati8tically sign1ti~t. 
It was perhaps optimistic to expect the above models to adequately 
expla1n what 1., atter all, an extremely complex operation involving 
not only varioua aspects of the performance of the firma 1nvolved but 
• also the per80nalit1es of the indiVidua18 concerned with the negotiations. 
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It would appear that the 
l~·o.tJ. 
'noiee' g.nerated trom the latter sourc. haa 
~... mp~ the e.erg.nc. ot the anticipated "'~&Dle... N.vertheless, 
whil. the profit rate of the raid.r remains a signiticant determinant 
ot the bid pr.lIl1um, on its own it .xplains at best less than 4% ot 
the variation in tho bid premium. Untortunat.ly, by itselt this is 
not particUlar1¥.: intormative. One does not knOll' whether the high 
profits are in 80me way promoting optimism through t. the otter terms 
or whether it is due to a third tactor skch as the indUstrial structur. _ 
an oligopo118tic structur. allOWing high protits tor the raider but 
also incr.asing the comp.titiveness by oth.r tirms in the industry tor 
the .xpansion ot market share.by acqui8ition, the competition tor the 
acquir.d tirm (.ith~·.a'wal or .. , .. t1al) causing the bid promium to 
be rai8ed. 
1.7 TAKEOVERS AND MlRGEi§ 
While the vast majority ot the takeov.rs wer. undertak.n by the 
usual method of one tirm making a conditional offer tor the aharo. ot 
another, in 39 cases th.re occur.d a merg.r wh.reby a nOW' company wa. 
torm.d to acquir. the assets of the two or more compani.s involv.d in 
the n.gotiations. In all cases the shares of the new company •• 1'e 
o::chang:'d in agreed proportions tor the shar.. ot the merging companies 
and th.r.fore are not cont.st.d takeover.. N.verth.l.... with the 
takeov.rs und.rtak.n by conditional off.r th.y may be either agreed 
or contested and there was no r.adily available means ot di.covering 
which. ror this reason, rather than reject these 39 mergers which took 
their torm u.ually tor tinancial conv.nience rath.r than because they 
w.re siagled out because ot their element ot agreement, I atte.pt.d 
to id.ntity the dolll1aant tirm in the n.gotiations in order to clas8ity 
-45-
the co.pani.s as raid.r or acquir.d tirm(s). In any cas., to oait the 
compantes would serve to bias the industry r.sults und.rtaken in chapters 
III, IV and VI. Appendix I s.ction II.B contains the procedure adopted 
to identity the tiras involved in the 39 .ergers. Basically on. wishes 
to discov.r which co.pany was strongest at the tim. ot the n.gotiations 
and also ther.tor. which emerged with control ot the new co.pany. 
Thr.e .ethode are used to accomplish this clase1tication ot co.panies 
into the cat.gories ot raider or acquired t1rm(.): a) the compoa1tion 
ot the new board ot directors tro. the board. ot the •• rging co.pani.s, 
b) the book value ot the m.rging tirma, and c) the market value ot the 
merging tirms. A .ystem ot weighting the various post. on the new 
board was used so that it was pos.ible which ot the m.rging companie. 
were able to place their board in the key positions in the new company. 
I looked at the new company two years att.r the merger to give a 
repre.entativ. view ot the control ot the new company aince tok.n 
position. may be giv.n to the dir.ctors ot the w.ak.r compaD1 in the 
merger n.gotiations which are .ubsequently phased out by 'golden 
handshake'. Th. oth.r two procedures adopt.d were to look at the 
relative size., both book value and mark.t valu., ot the merging 
companie. as the control ot the new ooapany through the otter ter •• 
agreed will largely be determin.d by the r.lativ. siz.s ot the 
participant. _ the largest tirm obtaining a great.r proportion ot the 
voting ahares ot the new company. I was able with the use ot the •• 
procedures to aatistactorilJ cla .. ity the m.rgtag companies as raiders 
or acquired tirms b.caus. ot the high degree ot agr •••• nt between the 
three proc.dur ••• 
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1.8 UNSUCCESSFUL TAKEOVER BIDS AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES EMPLOYED 
As noted in appendix I section J.6, it was possible to identify 
unsuccessful takeover bids as from January 1966. There were 44 failed 
offers of firms which were not later teken Over in the period up to 
December 1969 mentioned in the press during this 4 year boom period 
while there were 637 sucoessful takeovers in the same period. These 
failures represent approximately 61% of the total otters made. Of 
course, there were many more tailed otters resulting not only trom 
a battle between several tirms tor control ot another tirm, one ot 
whom was eventually successful, but also a tailed otter tor a firm 
which was later successtully taken over in the sample period. 
I have not undertaken an analysis ot the performance ot the 
tirms which were able to tend ott an otter as opposed to those who 
were unable to or those who welcomed the ofter because ot the saall 
number ot unsuccesstul takeovers.'- There are, however, indications 
trom prese reports of how these 44 companies were able to avoid being 
taken over. The analysis ot the financial characteristics and 
performance ot taken over and surviving firms in chapters III and IV 
will have obvious implications on the policies a firm should adopt 
in order to avoid being taken over (e.g. adopt policies to raise or 
keep up the valuation ratio). Once an otter has been made, however, 
it will be up to the persuasiveness ot the director's arguments on 
both sides of a contested bid which will either trustrate or assist 
the ofter or, more usually, attect the terms ottered by raising the 
• An attempt to do just this was made by Duvall and Austin (1965). 
Using discriminant analysis they found the worse the performance 
ot a company, the greater chance tor success by the raider and that 
firms which had contests (either tor partial or total control) 
generally pertormed woree in terms ot rate ot return than their 
respective industries. 
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market valuation of the company for which the offer has been made. 
Contesting a bid can also have the effect of attracting a second 
(or third) bidder thus tending to improve the terms or divide the 
oppoattion making 811GDU8"IID~e,l,d1tt1:01il;t. '!'he arguments employed by 
the dir~ctors of the firm under ofter range trom the inadequacy ot 
the terms by expla1n1ng past performance and giving oPt1imistic 
forcasts for the future to cri tici8IDs ot the ottering company-' 
especially when there is a share component to the otter terms. More 
concrete moves can be undertaken to trustrate a bid such as raising 
the dividend, purchasing its own shares on the market which would 
both help to prevent the raider gaining control and also tend to 
push up the market price ot its own shares, seeking assistance trom 
merchant banks or even other tirms in the industry who Right wi*h 
to prevent the raider trom increasing its market share, waging a 
takeover itse1t and paying by a share issue to reduce the proportion 
of shares the raider has acquired and to place these new shares in 
more trie.dly hands and tinally inviting a more friendly bidder to 
ofter tor the shares of the firm in the hope they would offer more 
job security to the directors of the tirm under otfer.· 
Simply tor directors to attempt to enlist support through 
press propaganda baa in general been unsuco ••• f-Ul.1n· .ta~q: ott an 
offer. The more positive actions mentioned in the previou8 paragraph 
have brought 80me limited sucoess to the firm under otter. Atter 
all, most takeovers are contested to some degree but nevertheless, 
the vast majority are successtul. The most usual reason tor the 
failure ot an otter is that the directors control sufticient shares 
• See Hayes and ~aussig (1987) tor a discussion of similar strat.g1es 
e.p10yed in the U.S •• 
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or sufficient are in friendly hands to block any takeover attempt. 
It has been the case in at least 12 of the 44 unsuccesaful takeovers 
that the directors controlled over 5cPfo of the voting eqUity making an 
unwanted takeover iapoasible. Others were undoubtedly blocked by 
directors holding a substantial minority ot the equity and then 
enlisting support from other large shareholders to prevent the 
acquisition. At least another three unsuccesstul otters were reterred 
to the Monopolies Commission which subsequently blocked the proposed 
takeover. These two cause a ot failure point out a difterence within 
the group ot tirms which were able to avoid being taken over. Thirty-
five ot the failed takeovera were amall tiraa having net aaaets of 
le88 than £5m.. The rest except tor one with net aasets of £12m. all 
had net assets in excess of £2Om.. Table XII gives the grouped size 
distrib.tion of these companies whioh were able to thwart an otter 
tor their shares. 
It is in the £5.. and under group ot companies that at least 
12 takeover attempts were blocked because directors possessed voting 
control and would not sell. The intervention by the Monopolies 
Commission blOCking the otter occured in the £2~m. and above size 
groups. Thus it would seem from the small proportion ot tailed to . 
successful takeovers and the tact that probably at least balf of 
the unsuccessful takeover bids were prevented either by the government 
or through voting control being within the firm or in friendly handa, 
there is little a firm can do to avoid being taken over once the 
offer has been made. 
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TABLE XII 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF UNSUCCESSFUL TAKEOVER BIDS 
SIZE (£m} NUMBp OF COMPANIES 
o - 1 15 
1 - 2 6 
2 - 3 7 
3 - 4 4 
4 - 5 0 
5 - 6 3 
6 - 10 e 
10 - 15 1 
15 - 20 0 
20 - 30 5 
30- 40 0 
40 - 50 1 
50 - 70 0 
70 - 100 
....2-
TOTAL 44 
_ .... w""' __ 
1.9 THE ACQUIRED FIRM'S ACCOUNTING DA'l'E AND THE TIMING OF THE OFFER 
Using the data collected on the otter date and the date the 
tirm'. account. close tor the year, it 18 possible to examine whether 
there is any tendency tor the raider to time its otter with respect 
to the closing ot the accounts ot the tirm which it i. attempting 
to takeover. Since I shall be basing much ot the argument in the 
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next four chapters on the assumption that the financial performance 
ot the firm will atfect the likelihood of its being taken over, it 
might be expected that the otter would be instituted with reapect to 
the availability of the latest performance information on the fira. 
The accounting date, however, i8 not the date on which the accounts 
are presented to the shareholders at the annual general meeting and 
published in the press. These usually occur about 6 aontha after the 
date on which the accounts close although in some cases when the firm 
is in 80me sort of financial difticulty such as making a large loss 
and poasibly reorganizing its internal structure, the lag can be aa 
much as two years. 
By plotting the distribution of the number ot months between 
the latest accounting date tor which accounts .ere subsequently 
presented and the date of the otter tor the tirm's shares against 
the number ot takeovers corresponding to each, one can discever wh.th.~o 
there appears to be any pervasive tendency for the raiders to time 
their ofters with respect to the availability ot the latest accounting 
data ot the firm they wi*h to acquire. This distribution is presented 
in table XIII below and plotted in the chart below it, tigure II;:: 
.. mentioned earlier, there are a small number ot firma which 
were bid tor which had tailed to produce accounts tor a long time 
atter they had closed their books, usually because they had experienced 
some sort ot tinancial ditticulty during that accounting period. This 
explanation would roughly oover the takeovers in the third column of 
table XIII or those for which the time between the accounting year 
end to. the la.t published accounts was 18 months or more. Where 
the interval is less than 18 month. there dees appear to be a ayste .. tic 
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TABLE XIII 
DIJ'.l.:lnBaTH.ll~ OF TAKEOVERS BY TIME BETWEEN ACCOUNTING YEAR END AND OFFER 
' .. BOER NtlMBER OF 
OF MONTHS TAKEOVERS 
0 2 
1 11 
2 31 
3 58 
4 90 
5 115 
6 107 
7 143 
8 
....!jl.. 
TOTALS 698 
NUMBER OF 
TAKEOVERS 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
2 4 
NUMBER NUMBER OF NUMBER NUMBER OF 
OF MONTHS TAKEOVERS OF MON'.rHS TAKEOVERS 
9 142 18 9 
10 139 19 5 
11 146 20 1 
12 119 21 1 
13 82 22 0 
14 93 23 1 
15 55 24 0 
16 32 25 1 
17 ~ 26 ......L.. 
836 20 • 155· 
FIGURE 1I_~' 
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
MONTHS 
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relationship between the timing ot the otter and the accounting date. 
The approximate bell-shaped distribution that results when the data 
is plotted shows a sharp increase in the number ot otters up to 7 
months atter the accounting date, the level ot activity being 
maintained over the next 4 month. and then declining thereafter. 
The moet likely explanation for this is that with a lag of roughly 
5 to 7 months between the date on which the booke clOse and the 
publication of the results, raider •• eem to be t1aing the otfer 
with respect to the time when the late.t results have been made 
available. Thus the .echanism woUld appear to be that following 
the publication of the re.ults, the raider formulate. an ofter on 
the basis of these result. and then make. the otter toraal, the 
formUlation of the otfer terms requiring 80me ti.e as well. Thi. 
is consistent with the plateau in the number ot otter. between 7 
and 11 months atter the acoounting date. 
Of course there are a number ot other taotor. that would enter 
into the decision and timing ot the otter, the m08t important being 
the share price ot the tirm whioh the raider is considering acquiring 
and the raiders own share price it he intends to pay tor the tirm 
with some ot his shares. Also, tirms give 80me 1nd1cat10n ot their 
pertormance during the year by way ot 1nterim stat.ments and dividend. 
and the raider could act on the ba.1. ot th.... Nevertheless, tro. 
table XIII and the a.soc1ated diagram, the indicat10ns are that the 
raider's dec1sion to .ake an otter tor the shares of another tira is 
based predominantly on the publ1cation ot a comprehens1ve account ot 
the state ot th1. tirm and that the tormal otter 1. made .hortly atter 
thi. 1ntoraation i. aade available. 
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The evidence and explanation offered above Will be uaed in the 
next chapter where the model of takeovers is ba.ed upon the cosparative 
financial performance ot acquired and non-acquired firaa. !hat ia, 
the evidence is consistent with the assumption that Will be employed, 
namely that at leaat ~"of the explanation of why firma are taken 
over lies with their finanCial performance as indicated by accounting 
data. And thus, it is assumed to be on such data that the raider is 
acting when he decides to undertake an offer tor the firm's share 
capital. 
1.10 SUMMARY 
A. stated in the first section ot this chapter, the purpose wa. 
to describe and analyse a number of aspects ot the recent takeover 
activity as .ell as set the scene for the developaent in the next 
chapter of a model of takeover.. In doing so I have accomplished the 
first aim of this study. 
A number of hypotheses concerning the causes of takeovers have 
been raised in this chapter. Specifically, it was suggested that 
the large inter-industry differences in the takeover rate could be 
attributed to various industry characteristics, e.g. the .tate of 
d.mand, concentration, rat. of return, etc. To ignore the industrial 
.etting therefore would b. to omit an essential element ot the cau.e. 
of takeover. Additionally, various financial and stockmarket variable. 
relating to the fira including its profit rate, growth rate, retention 
ratiO, liquidity ratiO, size, and valuation ratio were suggested as 
influences on whether or not it was taken over. The.e took on relevance 
in addition to that offered by the individual financial variable. 
because there was some evidence that the offer occured in conjunction 
with the publication of these financial variables in the firm's 
annual account.. Finally, atte.tion was drawn to the characterist1cs 
of the raider where it e.erged that the group of tirms which had 
undertaken 3 or more ra1ds was reasonably homogeneous. This tact 
will be used in chapter VI where the characteristics ot raiders w111 
be related to the characteristics of non-raiders to indicate 
d1fferences and to see what these difterences imply about the raider's 
mot1vations and the theory of the tirm. 
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!mtPftR II 
.,·.1'O~K MARKET AND FINANeI 
.AL VAIUABLts AND A 1'BEORY OF 'UKEOVER 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I shall set o~t a theory of takeovers based Upon 
comparisons of the financial and stockmarket performance of firms 
taken over and firms not taken over. I .. not attempting to aimply 
discriminate between the two groups on whatever basis proves statistically 
signiticant,· but rather hope to provide economic justitication for 
the inclusion ot various variables which theoretically shoUld operate 
to determine the causes of takeover. Only then can meaningtul COD-
elUsions with respect to the theory of the tirm be drawn trom the 
statistical testing procedures employed in chapters III and IV. 
2.2 THI VALUATION RATIO 
Defined earlier as the ratio of the stock market value of the 
fir.'s capital over the book value of the firm's assets, the valuation 
ratio forms an integral part of Robin Harris's sanagerial theory of 
the fir •• •• By viewing the constraints on managerial behaViour in 
terms of a desire for security which competes with the achieve.ent 
of a given objective, a primary source of the threat to managerial 
security is provided by the likelihood that a given set of tinancial 
• We shall discuss this point further in chapter V section 5.3 where 
we sumarize the results and conclusions for the various modela employed 
in this study • 
.. More recently an allied hypothesis was put forward by Gort (1969). 
He argued that mergers occur because of difterences 1n valuat10n 
of assets between buyers and aellers and attr1butes changes 1n 
valuat10n to rap1d changes in stock pr1ces or when techn1cal change 
is great. He attempts to test this propos1t1on in a cross-aect10n 
study of 1ndustry merger rates. For a critical analys1s of this 
work see Hindley (1972). 
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policies will result in the firm being taken Over. Marris postulated 
a theory of takeover in terms of subjective valuation discrepancies 
between the value ot the firm to the raider and the value the market 
places on it. Where a positive discrepancy exists between the raiderta 
and the market's assessment, takeover will occur. The theory as it 
stands 1s not operational Since the raider's valuation of the firm 
is a non-observable parameter. The theory is restated by Marris in 
terms of a probability function such that the lower the valuation 
ratio of a tirm the greater will be the probability that a raider 
with a positive valuation discrepancy will come forward and hence the 
greater the probability that the firm will be taken over. The theory 
i8 now in a form where it is capable of being te.ted by suitable 
comparisons between the valuation ratios of acquired and non-acquired 
f1rms. 
In addition to its role as a constraint on managerial behaviour 
in Marr1s's theory of the firm, the inclusion ot the valuation ratiO 
as a determinant ot the probability of takeover can be examine. trom 
the raider's point of view. Assuming a firm wishes to expand ita 
operation, it can either set up a new plant to its requirements or 
acquire an existing firm with suitable attributes. While the supply 
of suitable firms may be limited, the latter course can haV8\.'several 
advanta.es. Not only does the raider 8ucceed in removing a competitor 
as .e11 as possibly reaching additional marketa and enhancing ita 
pool of managerial skills, but it may alao be able to acquire a given 
set of assets cheaply. because ot the existence of a large number of 
f1rms whose assets are valued on the market below their book value. 
purely in terms of an inveatment decision by potential raidera, the 
~~er a firm's valuation ratiO the more attractive it become. to 
acquire as part of their expaneion plane. 
Because the valuation ratio ie determined in the stock market,. 
its level is based not only on the market'e evaluation of its past 
performance (e.g. protits grow~h&Bd retentions policy) and present 
state (e.g. eize and liquidity), but also on the market's expectation~ 
ot its future. Thua, two firms with identical records and size and 
liquidity positions but with one valued lower on the market than the 
other will be subject to differing probabilitie8 ot takeover _ the 
lower valued firm faCing the greater threat. 
2.3 SIZE (NET ASSETS) 
It i8 anticipated that the size ot a firm will attect the likelihood 
that it will be taken over - the large tirm being relatively sater than 
the small. This expectation of a negative sign relating size to the 
probability ot takeover ia based on two institutional observations. 
Firat, it is nearly always the case that the raider is signiticantly 
larger than the firm it acquires. Thus a large firm woUld tace tewer 
potential raiders than a amall fira and thereby have a smaller chanee 
of being taken over. Furthermore, to acquire a large company involves 
greater risks to the raider and increaaes the ditticulties involved 
in integrating it into the raider's existing structure. Seoond, to 
acquire a large company as oppoeed to a amall one, places greater 
atrains on the sources of tinance ot the purchase whether it be on 
the liquidity poaition ot the raider when caah is involved or the 
market's willingnesa to accept additional equity or convertible loan 
stock (and the potential strains arising through increased gearing 
_ when this latter payments practice ia used) it thoae are choaen as 
• Although containing both measures ot book value and market value, the 
valuation ratio ia primarily market determined in the sense that the 
numerator is the moet highly variable component. 
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the method of payment. Possibly serving to ob8cure this size-takeover 
relationship is the evidence previously presented by Ma (1960) that 
mortality is higher in old firms and old firms tend to be larger than 
young firma. 
2.4 THE PROFIT RATE 
To the extent the valuation ratio is influenced by the past profit 
performance of a firm, the inclusion of the profit rate as a determinant 
of the probability of takeover is an alternatiTe specification of the 
functional relation8hip. The profit rate provides an indicator of the 
success of the eXisting management of a firm and if the past record is 
poor then presumably a different set of management could earn a greater 
rate of return on the given assets. It is not independent of the 
valuation ratio because the raider's calculations concerning potential 
profitability ot an acquired firm are not based on the expected retul~ 
on the acquired net asset value but on the expected return relative to 
the cost of the acqUisition. Furthermore, the market determination 
of the valuation ratio will to some extent be based upon the firm's 
past profit record. Only if a poor profit record depresse. the valuation 
ratio sufficiently to make the likely cost of the firm (including the 
bid premium) in relation to its potential profitability under the raider's 
control attractive will the takeover bid occur. At the extreme, a 
company making losses and facing the possibility of bankruptcy would 
become a takeoTer candidate· as its performance would undoubtedly 
result in a low and therefore attractive valuation ratio to a potential 
raider. The above reasoning forms the basis of Marris's argument tor 
See Dewey (1961) and the tootnote on page 20 aboTe for a discussion 
of the assertion that takeoTers are simply an alternative to 
bankruptcy. 
r 
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ro1ying solely on the valuat10n ratio aa the constraint on h1. specified 
objective function. He assume that ki 
s see ng h1gh rates of growth wh~ch 
neces~ily involves the sacr1f1ce of profits below the profit 
max1~izing ~ate of return will directly tend to depress the valua~~ou 
ratio thereby inviting the threat of takeover. 
There .tIl be a competing inflUence tending to confound the 
negative influence profits and consequently the valuation ratiO hwve 
on the probabi11ty of takeover. Marris'. original theory of takeover 
was based on the subject1ve valuat10n discrepancy of the raider and 
the stock market. If the poor profit record was the result of bad 
management then it i8 possible that even a very low valuation rat10 
of a firm is unattractive to the raider. !his coUld occur 1f the 
bad management caused the assets of the firm to have no value to any 
potential raider (either because they were established to produce a 
product for which there was no demand or if they were al10.ed to 
deteriorate faster than the rate of deprec1at10n) even though they 
• retained some positive value on the books. Alao, if the poor profits 
were partly the result of a bad record of labour relations by the 
firm's management, unless the potential raider thought it coUld improve 
on the strike record, and that woUld probably be very diff1cult, the 
firm could rQmain an unattractive purchase no matter how great the 
apparent possibilit1es for 1mproving on the f1rm's rate of return 
were it to be acquired cheaply. Herein lies a.source of 'n01se' to 
the posited pr.t1t &ad valuation ratio relat10nsh1ps and explains why 
a firm could survive for a number of years with low profits and a low 
------------------------------------------------------
This belongs to the general class of measurement error problems with 
the valuation ratio and other financial var1ables. They may also stem 
from undervalued aaseta on the firm's books and differences between 
firm'a accounting practices although to the extent the account1ng 
procedures vary between industries and are fairly comparable within 
industries, the industry analysia of chapters III and IV will allevi.ata 
this problem. Asside from recognizing theae potential source. of bias 
thero is little one can do to remove it. 
valuation ratio without being taken over •• 
2.5 THE GROWTH RATE 
It is anticipated that the firm's growth rate of net assets will 
negatively influence the probability that it is taken over in a .aDner 
analagous to the expected role of profits and the probability of takeover. 
That is, the past growth record of a firm is expected to affect the 
probability that the firm is taken over through its influence on the 
valuation ratio. This is based on the notion that the market values 
a firm according to its expectations about the firm's future growth 
rate of earnings. Thus both its earnings record and its growth rate 
should provide different sorts of indicators of the past performance 
of the firm and hence a basis for the market to assess its value. 
Marris has noted the possibility that firma- attempting to maximize 
their growth rate may become takeover candidates because of the chOice 
of an 'excessive' growth target caused loss of control and consequently 
failure to meet the profits constraint imposed through the valuation 
ratiO." Such a firm would be in a much stronger defensive position 
than one with both low profits and low growth as the former could 
lower its growth rate and as a consequence increase its prOfitability'" 
while the latter has no such defense. More recently Marris has argued 
We shall discuss this point in detail in the conclusion of chapter 
III since several authors have placed widely different interpretations 
to the existence of an imperfect valuation ratio-takeover relationship. 
.. Marris (1964) p. 123 and 259 • 
... This corresponds to the argument developed by Penrose (1959). However, 
it has been suggested by Eatwell (1971) p. 409 that the low observed 
correlation between growth and profitability is due to other factors 
which influence the relationship which may vary between industries, 
over time, and between different types of firms. By implication, any 
given firm, at a given point in time, would still face the Penrose 
trade-off between profits and growth. 
that survival is dependent upon adopting a growth maximizing POlicy. 
and that firma which do otherwise (e.g. maximize profits) w11l be 
those which fail to survive. While I am not intending here to examine 
this assertion, this view is consistent with the treat.ent of the 
growth rate and the profit rate in this study, (i.e. as separate 
influences on the probability of takeover but associated through 
their role as factors affecting the market's determination of the 
valuation ratio). 
2.6 THE RETENTION RATIO 
It is expected that the choice of retention ratio (and hence 
dividend payout ratio) by management WOuld affect the probability 
of takeover again by way of its influence on the valuation ratio. 
Not only does the market have a positive preference for dividends, 
but an increase in the payout ratio (i.e. a fall in the retention 
ratio) is usually seen as indicative of the fira's managements 
expected improvement in future earnings. For similar reaSODs, 
low or falling dividend ratiOS would tend to depress the valuation 
ratio. Furthermore, firms making very low profits woUld need to 
retain a very large proportion of after tax earnings simply to 
provide capital for replacement investment to stay in operation. 
Thus, not only by itself would the retention ratio be expected to 
affect the probability of takeover, but also it woUld be expected 
to act as a 'shifter' to the profits effect, both operating by way 
of the valuation ratio on the probability of takeover. 
2.7 TIE LIQUIDITY RATIO 
A further influence on the probability of takeover is the firm's 
See Marris (1908). 
l1qu1d1ty posit10n. It 18 obv10us that very l1qu1d f1rms w1ll be 
attract1ve takeover cand1dates at low valuat10n rat10s, espec1ally 
during periods of t1ght ored1t. Furthermore, a highly liquid firm 
would presumably not command a healthy market valuat10n as it would 
be sitting on cash or marketable securities that could be made 
available for profitable capital investments e1ther to expand the 
output of its main product or diversify. The illiquid firm would 
presumably be doing preCisely that through the use of its available 
cash flow and debt. Certainly a large section of the market would 
approve of such policies (providing the debt did not reach a 
dangerous le.el and was not used to finance current los.es) and 
reward the firm with a 'eate' valuation ratio. 
It is likely however that the very poor perfOrming tirm in 
terms ot profits would also have a low liquid1ty position, it 
requiring its cash reserves to service its loan stock, undertake 
some replacement capital investment and poss1bly show face with some 
sort of token dividend. This ettect would, however, be felt by way 
ot the protits variable, but, to the extent that it was present, 
would serve to obseure the basic relationship between the liquidity 
ratio and the probability of takeover. 
2.8 'rIlE INDUSTRIAL gmwa 
Aa indicated in the previous chapter, the conditions operating 
in a particular industry will attect the probability ot takeover 
(e.g. growth ot demand, concentration etc.). However, the tirm can 
only over a long period ot t1me through diversitication attect ~ which 
industry it is classed. Since a certain emphaais ot this study ia 
·in considering the characterist1cs ot the tirm which the manage.ent 
... 
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control and the probability of takeover, the eftect the industry class 
has on the probability of takeover within it is only of desCriptive 
interest. It would be misleading,' however, to use this as a justifi-
cation for ignoring the industry difterences in th.~t&k •• v.r~l"ate and 
performance and concentrating on the empirical verification of aggregate 
theoretical relationships. as set out in this chapter. Because of 
the large inter-industry variations in each of the variables considered 
a possibly overwhelming volume of 'noise' would be introduced, serving 
to confound the aggregate statistical relationships. Such 'noise' is 
certainly attributable to the industry characteristics, but since the 
vast majority ot takeovers occur within the same or sia1lar industries, 
it is the performance ot the firm with respect to siailar tirms in the 
same industry which will single it out as a takeover candidate. The 
question asked is whether a firm is undervalued by the market for a 
given set of possibilities facing all firms in the industry and not 
whether a firm possesses a low valuation ratio as compared to all firma 
in the industrial population. For instance, a tirm with a valuation 
ratio ot 0.6 would be above the industry median if it were a skipping 
coapany but, les8. thaa half that of the industry median it it were in 
... the entertainments industry. Furthermore, managers WOuld be comparing 
their performance relative to tirms in the same line and raiders 
(except for the conglomerates) would be scrutinizing tirms on the basis 
of performance or cheapness relative to similar potential acquisitions. 
The necessity ot undertating an examination of takeovers on an 
industry basis exists tor all the variables discussed in this chapter 
both for reasons ot accuracy of theoretical ~ statistical specification • 
See appendix II table II for the mean and median values ot each 
industry's performance tor the various stock market and finanoial 
variables. 
1n a low growth industry relatively (with respect to all firms in the 
industrial population) low valuation ratios, low growth rates, low 
profit rates, low retention ratios and high liquidity ratios could 
all be safe, while appearing to indicate a high risk of takeover if 
compared to firms in a high growth industry or even in the aggregate 
relationship. Furthermore, what may be a large dominant firm o~ £2&m 
net assets in one industry could be undersized relative to the scale 
economies available in another industry. 
In this chapter I have set out briefly the anticipated theoretical 
relationships for the primary financial and stockmarket variables to 
be employed in the statistical examination to follow. Nothing has 
been said concerning the functional form ot any ot the relationships, 
whether they are linear or curved, or the appropriate lag structure ot 
~" the response. These ~ matters ~ be determined .. ".1e.111 rathex 
~ theoretically and a& syea will ee considered when the models are 
formally constructed and tested in the next two chapters. 
The primary emphasis in this chapter has been how the characteristics 
ot the firm would attect its likelihood ot being taken over. Ot 
particular interest is the valuation ratio since it reflects not only 
the purchase price of the tirm, but also incorporates the joint ettects 
of the other financial variables of the firm. !hree conclusions may 
be drawn from this concerning the procedure to adOpt to test the 
importance of the anticipated relationships. First, the valuation ratio's 
role is crucial to the takeover mechanism. Second, the other financial 
variables which influence the probability of takeover but whose etfect 
~ operate through the valuation ratio should be examined separately 
from the valuation ratio. Third, the analysie should be undertaken 
at the industry level so that the wide inter-industry variations 
in the variables be supreesedin order to examine the hypotheses 
concerning each variable as relative to firms in a similar industrial 
situation. 
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CHAPTER III 
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS OF TAKEOVERS I 
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OF THE VALUATION RATIO AND SIZE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I shall develop and test various formulations 
of the first of two basic models of takeovers employing two variables 
discussed in the previous chapter. This first model investigated 
is based on the anticipated inverse relationship between the valuation 
ratio and the probability that a firm will be taken over. The 
valuation ratio and the financial variables are included in separate 
models since it was expected that the effect of the latter would be 
felt through the valuation ratio. I shall investigate a number of 
relation8hips based on various possible formulations of the valuation 
ratio and 8ize, a variable not expected to be correlated with the 
valuation ratio. Finally, each of the 67 industries w11l be treated 
separately since it is expected that it i8 the indicatora of the 
firm's performance relative to comparable firma in the same indu8try 
which Single it out as a takeover candidate. In this way, the specif-
ication of the model is improved such that the variations attributable 
solely to the industry class will be removed thereby giving the 
variables a greater chance to capture the posited dependence of the 
probability of takeover on each. 
3.2 THE MODEL 
The valuation ratio presents not only the .ost interesting -.-
theoretical relationship with the probability of takeover, but also 
the moet difficult to specify. As noted earlier, the theory put 
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forward by Marris is based on the presence of a positive di.crepancy 
between a potential raider's valuation of a firm and the market's 
valuation. Where such exists, takeover should occur. While the 
potential raider's valuation of a firm is not obserTable, the theory 
can be made operational by treating the relationship as a probability 
function. Thus, the lower the valuation ratio of a firm, the 
greater likelihood it will be taken over. 
Distinct problems remain, however, in the meaaurement of a 
tirm's valuation ratio. Since it is detined in terms of the market 
value ot the tirm divided by the book value or alternatively, the 
price of the ordinar.7 voting .hares over the net •••• ta per .har., 
it is obvious that a ditterent valuation ratio exi.t. for ev.r.7 
market price that prevailed over the period. Furthermore, the 
denominator is only an accurate retlection ot the book value ot the 
firm on the day the tirm closed it. accounts tor the year. Since 
it appeared that raide~t1med their bid with respect to the publication 
ot the accounts ot a potential acquisition, it would seem pl.usible 
that any underestimate ot the tirm's book value which did not retlect 
growth that may have occured between the laat accounts and the otter 
would not be seriou. aince the raider appears to base his decision 
on the best available intormation (i.e. the state of the tira as ot 
the last accounting period). As far as the choice ot the 'correct' 
numerator, presumably one desires to use that price which the raider 
based his decision whether or not to make the offer. The theory gives 
us no further indication except that it should be a price so •• time 
prior to the otter. The solution adopted was to e.ploy three .easures 
ot the valuation ratio ter tirms taken over: Vla - the valuation ratiO 
-in the year prior to the otter with the annual low share price in the 
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numerator; Vlb - the valuation ratio in the year prior to the otter 
with the average ot the annual high and low share price in the 
numerator; and VIc - the valuation ratio in the year ot the otter 
with the annual low share price in the numerator. 
In order to make comparisons ot these measures ot the valuation 
ratiO with tirms which have not been taken over it was necessary to 
determine some representattve level ot the valuation ratio tor these 
survivors. Consequently, two possibilities will be considered: V _ 
Oa 
the average valuation ratio over all available years using the annual 
low share prices in the numerators; and VOb - the average valuation 
ratio measured using the average ot the annual high and low ahare 
prices in the numerators. In order to explore the possibility ot a 
non-linear relationship between the valuation ratio and takeover, 
logarithmic values ot the above tormulations will also be used. 
Because ot the long time period covered in this study, tour 
possibilities exist that may tend to obscure the valuation ratio 
relationship. Since the hypothesiS I wish to examine is tramed in 
terms ot the tirm's pertormance, not only relative to the industry 
class, but also at a point in time, it is assumed that the raider 
chooses the most attractive takeover opportunity when he makes an 
otter. Thus the tirm's attractiveness (or cheapness in terms ot 
the valuation ratio) is relative to the other available takeover 
opportunities at the time the otter is made. No difticulties exist 
with employing the measures of the valuation ratiO above it the 
relationship remains relatively .table throughout the period, (i.e. 
the probability that a tirm in a ~ven industry with a given valuation 
ratiO will be taken over remains unchanged throughout the period). 
- The tirst possibility i8 that trends in the stock market could alter 
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the critical level of the valuation ratio which signalled a firm was 
going to be taken over. For instance, during the 1967-69 takeover 
boom, the EXTEL Security Value Inde~ doubled from 200 in November 
1966 to over 400 in January 1969.· If thi8 affected all firm's 
share prices, the poorest performers could find their valuation ratios 
rising even though the probability that they would be taken over 
remain unchanged. Second, during a boom period of takeover activity 
a 'band wagon' effect and pressures to maintain their market share 
could cause raiders to adjust upward the level of valuation ratio 
that would prompt them to make an otfer. Third, both the above 
mentioned etfects could maintain raider's desires to make takeovers 
within an industry, even though both the falling supply of acquirable 
firms resulting trom past concentration through takeovers and market 
speculation by sectors on potential takeover candidates to reap the 
bid premium, caused valuation ratios ot the surviving firms to rise. 
Finally, a learning effect by surviving firms that takeover8 may be 
prompted by the possession of undervalued property assets could cauee 
them to revalue more often. If eo, a cauee of takeovers in the 
earlier part of the period could be suspended in the latter part 
so that at first firas with high valuation ratio. (i.e. with an 
artificially low denominator) would be observed to be taken over 
but as learning progressed and revaluations occured, lower and lower 
levels would be necessary to provide the raider with a given reqUi8ite 
return on the acquisition. 
The solution adopted to remOve these possibilities was to specify 
the model in terms of the relative hypothesis described in the previous 
See appendiX II table I. 
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paragraph. That is, the valuation ratio measures, V
la
, V
lb
' and V
lc 
were divided by the average of the industry for the year in which 
the takeover occured (V'1a' V'lb' and V~c) appropriately measured 
using the same definition of the numerator as the acqUired firm's 
valuation ratios. The valuation ratio for the non-taken over firms 
were divided by the industry average for all years (VA
O
). In this 
way the hypothesis that it was the relative cheapness of the firm 
at the time of the acquisition that caused the takeover could be 
tested removing any possibility ot bias entering in the way described 
aJove. The surviving firm's valuation ratios were s1milarlt:noraalized 
in order to make them comparable to the proportionate variable 
constructed for the acquired firms. 
To these various formulations ot the valuation ratio relationship 
is added firm size measured as net assets at the accounting date prior 
to the offer if the firm was taken over (Sl) or the average size 
over the period if it was not, (SO). Unlike the other financial 
variables discussed in the previous chapter it was not antiCipated 
• that the firm's size would influence the valuation ratio. As with 
the valuation ratio, size was alternatively employed as a ratio to 
the industry average size for the relevant year if the firm was 
taken over (S~) and relative to the industry average for all years 
if it was not, (SAO). 
A dummy dependent variable, T, is used in regre8sions run on the 
above variable8 taking a value of 1 if the firm was taken over and 
o otherwise. This technique i8 known as a linear probability tunction 
.. 
and has been commonly employed where there i8 a dicotomou8, all or 
Singh and Whittington (1968) p. 67 tind no linear correlation between 
size and the valuation ratiO • 
.. For two economiC examples ot the use ot the linear probability function 
see Orcutt et. ale (1961) and Lee (1964). 
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nothing response to given values of the independent variable. I 
choae the linear probability function to test the hypotheais at the 
induatry level because its interpretation is closely related to the 
tleuretical formulation -_i.e. that:the level ot the valuation ratio 
inversely affects the probability that a firm will be taken over. 
With the linear probability function, the conditional expectation 
of the dependent variable given the values of the independent 
variables may be interpreted a8 the condit10nal probability that the 
event occurs. The calculated values of the dependent variable from 
the parameter estimates Using regression techniquea then are esttaates 
of this conditional probability. There are however several problems 
with the use of thia technique. The disturbance term will not have 
a constant variance, it varying with the values of the valuation ratio 
thus violating the classical aasumption of homoskedasticity.· The 
expected values of the par~eter estimates would remain unbiased but 
there could be bias in the estimated value and they will have need-
leasly large sample variances as therefore would the predictions. 
A second ditficulty concerns the interpretation of the calculated 
values as conditional probabilities since they can lie outside the 
interval 0 to 1. This however is not critical since their interpretation 
can easily be restricted to values within the meaningful range 0 to 1. 
as only the extreme values of the independent variables will tend to 
produce calculated values outside this interval. For instance, only 
very high values of the valuation ratio could produce conditional 
probabilities of takeover of less than 0 and it would s~btract little 
to interpret this as a firm which was immune from the threat of takeover •• 
For a demonstration of this characteristic ot the linear probability 
function see Goldberger (1964) pp. 248 - 255. 
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An alternative technique and that adopted by Singh (1971) in 
his study of takeovers is discriminant analysis.· While this technique 
has been shown by R.A. Fisher and G.W. Ladd to be tormally equ!valent 
to the linear probability function,·· its interpretation is somewhat 
cumbersome when repeatedly applied to a large number ot indUstries. 
The definitions ot the variable. used to examine the intluence 
ot the valuation ratio and size on whether or not the tirm was taken 
over are S1J7!!!I!a"ised:jb61ow: 
it T = 0 then 
T = a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the 
firm was taken over and 0 it it was not. 
VOa • the valuation ratio averaged Over all available 
years measured using the annual low share 
prices in the numerators 
VOb = the valuation ratiO averaged over all available 
years measured using the average of the annual 
highs and lows in the numerators. 
= logarithmic values of the variable defined 
above 
log VOb = logarithmic values of the variable de tined 
above 
v I VA = V divided by the average of the valuation 
Oa Oa rltios ot all tirms in the industry over 
all years measured using the annual low 
share prices in the numerators 
VOb I VA • V divided by the average ot the valuation 
Ob ri@ios ot all tirm. in the industry over 
all years measured using the average ot 
the annual high and low share prices in 
the numerators 
So = size (net assets) ot the tirm averaged over all 
available years 
So I SA • So divided by the size of all tirma in the 
o averaged over all available years 
• For other economic examples ot the use ot discriminant analysis see 
Durand (1941), Tintner (1952), Blood and Baker (1958), and Ladd (1968) • 
.. Fisher (1944) and Ladd (1966). 
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if T = 1 then Vla = the valuation ratiO in the year prior to the 
offer with the annual low share price in the 
numerator 
= the valuation ratiO in the year prior to the 
offer with the average of the annual high and 
low share prices in the numerator 
VlC = the valuation ratiO in the year of the ofter 
wi th the annual low share price in the 
numerator 
log Vla = logarithmic val*eef th. yariable defined 
above 
log Vlb = logarithmic value of the variable defined 
above 
log Vlc • logarithmic value of the Tariable de tined 
aboTe 
• Vi divided by the average ot the 
v&tuation ratios of all tirms in the 
industry in the year prior to the otter 
with the annual low share prices in the 
numerators. 
Vlb / VAlb = Vib divided by the average ot the valuation ratios ot all tirms in the 
industry in the year prior to the otter 
with the average of the annual high and 
low share prices in the numerators 
VlC / VAlc • V divided by the average ot the vlfuation ratios ot all tirma in the 
industry in the year ot the otter with 
the annual low share price in the 
numerators 
Sl • size (net assets) ot the tirm at the accounting 
period prior to the otfer 
• 8
1 
divided by the average size ot all 
t rma in the industry tor the year in 
which 81 was measured. 
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Using th.s. variabl.s, the following 9 r.gr.aaion equations were 
d.riv.d to be run on each industry using comparable measures of the 
valuation ratio and siz •• 
1.) 1fT .. 0: VOa ' SO; if T .. 1: Vla, Sl 
2.) it T .. 0: VOb ' SO; if T .. 1: Vlb, Sl 
3. ) if T .. 0: VOa ' SO; 1f T .. 1: Vlc , Sl 
4.) if T .. 0: VOa I VAOa' So I SAO; 1fT • 1: Vla I V~a' Si I SAl 
5:) if T = 0: VOb I VAOb' So I SAO; 1fT .. 1: Vlb I V'Ib' Sl I S~ 
6.) ifT .. 0: VOa I VAOa ' So I SAO; if T .. 1: Vlcl V~c' Sl I S~ 
7.) ifT .. 0: log VOa; ifT • 1: log Vla 
8.) if T .. 0: log VOb ; 1fT .. 1: log Vlb 
9.) ifT • 0: log VOa; if T • 1: log VlC 
3.3 RESULTS 
A sample of the results appear in tables XIV and XV and a summary 
of the r.sults for all industri.s appears in table XVI b.low. Tabl. 
XIV contains the full r.sults for the furnishing industry, •• l.ct.d 
b.caus. it is illustrative ot an industry w.ll b.haved according to 
the hypoth.si. but n.v.rth.l •• s not untypical. Tabl. XV pr.s.nt. the 
'" co.pl.t. results for two regr.ssions in .ach indu.try, b.ing tho •• 
which demonstrate the eff.ct ot the valuation ratio most clearly. The 
summary in table XVI shows the proportion of the 66 industri .... in 
which each variable prov.d to be both significant and possess the 
'" One regression was sel.cted from r.gr.ssion. 1.) to 6.) and the oth.r 
from the 10garitha1c formulations, regr.ssion. 7.) to 9.) • 
.. Indu.try nuaber 60, In.urance Brok.rs, was dropped in this analysis 
b.cau.e it contain.d too few obs.rvation •• 
DUMMY 
Im8RI:SSION NO, 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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TABLE XIV 
REGRESSIONS ON THE FURNISHING INDUSTRY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ON THE VALUATION RATIO AND SIZE 
CONSTANT VALUATION RATIO ~ ..L.. X-
0.62956 -0.24433 --<>.00191 • ,.35147 0.15599 
(0.07524) t( ••• 5343) (0.09198) 
0.56742 -6.18393 -0.00216· 4.51194 0.07719 
(0.08217) (0.05659) (0.00207) 
0.57980 -0.19580 -0.00211· 5.70961 0.10327 
(0.07787) (0.05385) (0.00204) 
0.33496 -0.16184 -0.01117· 2.71837 0.03635 
(0.07099) (0.07030) (6.00940) 
0.36780 -0.18962 -0.01047· 3.79628 0.98294 
(0.06980) (0.06494) (0.90927) 
0.31759 -0.13854 -0.01136· 2.29675 9.82560 
(0.07084) (0.06837) (0.00945) 
0.34004 -0.37305 43.76380 9.26812 
(0.03742) (0.05639) 
0.35901 -0.30343 20.40530 0.13901 
(0.04151) (t.06717) 
0.34704 -0.33581 32.15760 0.20920 
(0.03911) (0.05921) 
NOTE: standard errors ot the associated parameter estimates 
appear below each in brackets. Also, only those 
parameter e.timates mark •• with an asterisk (.) tail 
taemerge as s1gn1t1cantat the ~ level. 
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TABLE XV 
SELECTED REGRESSION RESULTS 
ALL INDUSTRIES - VALUATION RATIO AND SIZE 
INn NO REG NO CONSTANT VAL RATIO ~ ..L - R2 
..lL 
1 1 0.57850 -0.19138'" 0.00293'" 3.80451 0.08291 82 
7 0.32050 
-0.32271 15.18750 0.13854 
2 1 0.77897 
-0.36084 0.00049'" 7.18920 0.13252 115 
7 0.39069 
-0.42069 27.18050 0.17963 
3 1 0.79476 
-0.25505 -0.00158'" 2.41089'" 0.06566 46 
7 0.52279 -0.40875 11.75090 0.17490 
4 1 0.71265 -0.28993 -0.00277'" 9.87853 0.16686 128 
7 0.36150 
-0.41183 51.06040 0.27708 
5 1 0.27444 -0.00629'" ... 
-0.00923 1;56013'" 0:00381 178 
7 0.28936 
-0.20014 29.53000 0.13395 
6 1 0.59617 -0.15249 -0.00364'" 7.10045 0.07111 226 
7 0.40190 -0.24159 28.56180 0.10517 
7 1 0.73617 -0.29648 -0.00095'" 3.50619 0.07201 84 
7 0.39246 -0.35347 12.94940 0.11532 
8 1 0.45175 -0.12126 -0.00442'" 5.62490 0.06474 186 
7 0.29800 -0.22663 30.17810 0.13156 
9 1 0.42755 -0.01655 0.00021'" 1.73575'" 0.00428 281 
7 0.44570 -0.27339 54.97250 0.15sel 
10 1 0.46322 -0.15161 -0.00203'" 10.66440 0.07930 325 
7 0.27336 -0.25432 52.78680 0.13515 
11 1 0.70031 -0.38476 -0.00148'" 10.52400 0.16070 144 
7 0.29838 -0.32838 32.97360 0.17702 
12 3a 0.39809 -o.03444 ... r, -0.00154'" 0.99276'" -0.00410 250 
7 0.35278 -0.23821 35.93260 0.11951 
Ib 0.25328'" 0.01835 ... ·' -0.00281· ... 34 13 0.22030. -0.18090 
7 0.24709 -0.10617'" 0.68518 -0.04023 
a This was the only regression which had a negative parameter estimate 
in this industry. All forms were, however, insignificant. 
b Regression 1 is illustrated as it is usually the 'best' form. In this 
industry all parameter estimates were insignificant and had the wrong 
sign. 
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TABLE XV {cont.l 
INn NO REG NO CO!iSTANT VAL RATIO §lJ! F ~ .lL 
-
14 1 0.43084 
-0.05'44· 0.00155" 4.49842 0.0'832 187 7 0.40646 
-0.35854 57.04720 0.22742 
15 1 0.58327 
-0.28458 
-0.00245 6.65575 0.10577 135 7 0.26487 
-0.36643 26.40060 0.15308 
16 1 0.64764 
-0.17219 
-0.00599" 6.83101 0.06356 243 7 0.42671 
-0.33159 39.04140 0.13227 
17 1 0.42294 
-0.02283 
-0.00022" 2.58893" 0.01220 305 7 0.39256 
-0.26310 47.18300 0.12903 
18 1 0.70912 -0.25109· 0.00220· 1.68112· 0.03065 33 
7 0.04579 
-0.15837 4.41918 0.06830 
19 1 0.83059 
-0.68192 -0.00205" 4.03746 0.15274 45 
7 0.21734 -0.33784 12.61130 0.19081 
20 1 0.75294 -0.39591 -0.00479· 7.79156 0.19695 79 
7 0.28402 -0.35427 30.00910 0.26175 
21 1 0.62763 -0.04835 " " -0.00088 2.71753" 0.06473 60 7 0.43963 
-0.28969 5.60684 0.05871 
22 1 0.62957 -0.24433 
-0.00191 • 8.35647 0.15599 114 
7 0.34004 -0.37305 43.76380 0.26812 
23 1 0.40390 -0.07055" -0.00158· 1.79075" 0.00951 143 
1 0.32381 -0.17550 18.72350 0.10470 
24 1 0.63680 -0.17415 -0.00051" 1.69522" 0.02520 42 
7 0.42243 -0.21227 7.14233 0.10908 
25 1 0.76791 -0.28663 -0.00243· 13.11780 0.14010 217 
7 0.41580 -0.35315 49.18870 0.17862 
26 1 0.60393 -0.28618 0.00173" 7.96240 0.13632 126 
7 0.28613 -0.23437 22.20800 0.13821 
27 1 0.60748 -0.20227 -0.00918" 3.34822 0.09742 56 
7 0.34474 -0.26046 9.14671 0.11318 
28 1 0.71687 -0.17948 -0.00057· 4.12697 0.09483 80 
7 0.50222 -0.26705 13.62260 0.12685 
29 1 0.36676 -0.01717· -0.00046" 1.37804" 0.00098 137 
7 0.36112 -0.19918 19.69560 0.11439 
., 
-78-
TABLE XV (copt,) 
:mD NO REG NO CONSTANT VAL RATIO SIZE 
..L ~ 
.. 
-0.00138'" 2,03922'" 30 1 0.48684 -0.05274' 0.01679 7 0.45718 
-0.24242 16.68170 0.10574 
31 1 0.79522 
-0.24598 
'" 3.53133 .0.00341 0.U651 7 0.48804 
-0.28970 10.19370 0.14080 
32 1 0.58882 -0.24878'" 
-0.01082'" 1.59827'" 0.01584 
7 0.29039 
-0.28731 7,58774 0.10238 
33 1 0.40789 -0.04754· 0.00055'" 1.41477'" 0.00578 
7 0.38983 
-0.19252 13.84820 0.21712 
34 1 0.88756 -0.27084 0.00158'" 7.11429 0.14855 
7 0.30339 -0.38837 40.93800 0.27825 
35 4· 0.42083 ·0.03080 
'" 
-0.01539'" 1.40227'" 0.00299 
7 0.45892 -0.15882 9.43488 0.09802 
1 0.88800 -0.10308 .0.00398 8.48937 0.11513 
7 0.80407 -0.30847 23.34010 0.11452 
37 1 0.78459 .0.45021 0.00318'" 8.09272 0.18240 
7 0.31808 -0.41875 22.95980 0.24888 
38 5· 0.37185 -0.03508· -0.02888'" 1.03283'" 0.01000 
7 0.47751 -0.23255 32.45070 0.14542 
39 1 0.72842 -0.28884 -0.00427· 5.44587 0.10805 
7 0.40710 -0.35257 24.23220 0.17812 
1 0.48528 -0.00114'" -0.00045· 0.81898'" -0.02188 
7 0.51371 ·0.18871 14.01080 0.15028 
41 ,. 0.40457 -0.00110· -0.01144 3.13715 0.02144 
7 0.58830 -0.18392 $8.48000 0.11055 
42 1 0.73085 -0.11812 -0.01870 4.98080 0.11105 
7 0.53033 .. 0.20184 12.49800 0.10482 
• -0.08052 • 0.07U7 43 5 0.42028 .0.00883. 2.54277. 
7 0.52837 .0.08148 0.20785 -o.~509 
44 ,. 0.77424 -0.24794'" -0.01024 2.08322 0.09175 
'1 0.83742 -0.28447 8.01338 0.07295 
• .ODt ot tbt resrt •• 1on. 1D 'ki. 1Ddu.trr .a. 111D1t1oaat but \he 
re., ••• 1on .bOYD had 'b. b11h •• t , valu •• 
.JL 
124 
50 
49 
42 
101 
70 
166 
84 
178 
104 
13 
255 
88 
49 
51 
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TABLE XV (cont.) 
INn NO REG NO CONSTANT VAL RATIO ~ F ~2 
...lL 
-
45 1 0.59157 
-0.09495 ... 2.14330'" -0.00550 0.05349 43 7 0.43232 
-0.14800 7.73007 0.11759 
46 1 0.78891 
-0.42486 
-0.00045'" 7.83677 0.19606 80 7 0.13891 
-0.45487 31.76250 0.27115 
47 1 0.41138 -0.01135'" 0.00093'" 1.22773'" 
-0.00218 146 7 0.44148 
-0.18743 22.97900 0.12564 
48 5a 0.57216 .0.13313 
-0.02714 4.47437 0.11573 74 
7 0.64368 
-0.16692 11.51860 0.11397 
49 1 0.76126 
-0.19932 -0.00276'" 6.87671 0.17762 77 
7 0.50059 
-0.35837 27.00110 0.24511 
50 1 0.76236 -0.19986 -0.00178'" 5.38542 0.11900 90 
7 0.51254 -0.26433 18.12500 0.15194 
51 5b 0.34662 -0.01135'" -0.03452'" 1.57338'" 0.00850 88 
7 0.40792 -0.12421 11.10290 0.09375 
52 3 0.71143 -0.36355 .a.(). 00215'" 2.40463'" 0.07798 38 
9 0.36524 -0.43869 11.01450 0.19174 
53 1 0.65465 -0.19225 -0.00252'" 2.40565'" 0.02893 108 
7 0.37233 -0.25660 13.84090 0.09881 
54 l e 0.48724 0.00337 -0.00286'" 1.60987'" 0.00379 218 
7 0.42293 -0.15223 15.38520 0.06649 
55 1 0.72626 -0.15554 -0.00232'" 3.06434 0.05343 92 
7 0.50934 -0.22390 12.15150 0.09938 
56 1 0.60527 -0.21048 -0.00056'" 6.16594 0.09763 134 
7 0.36411 -0.15109 11.30790 0.06495 
57 1 0.53018 -0.11305 -0.00355'" 4.36304 0.06630 128 
7 0.37170 -0.17118 12.36930 0.07494 
a Regression 5 was the only torm where the valuation ratiO was signiticant. 
b None ot the regressions in this industry was significant but the 
regression shown had the highest F value. 
c Regression 1 is illustrated as it is usually the 'best' torm. In this 
industry all parameter ext1aates were insignificant and had the wrong 
sign. 
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TABLE XV (cont,) 
DO> NO REG NO CONSTANT VAL RATIO SIZE 
...L ~2 
-
-
..JL 
58 1 0.40290 • -0.00078· 0.52134'" -0.00504. 
-o,lU97 24 7 0,38162 
-0,08198 2,42868· 0,01155 
59 1 0.38003 
-0.00142'" ... 0.60063'" -0.00024 
-0,02730 83 7 0.40656 
-0.13946 11.36620 0,10140 
61 1 0.38438 
-0.00321'" ... 0.98514'" -0.00084 
-0.00410 256 
7 0.40712 
-0.25173 34.48480 0.11261 
62 1 0.42891 
-0.04415 -0.00055· 2,82112 0.04041 106 
7 0.39244 -0,28226 35.52140 0,24029 
63 1 0.69633 
-0.41194", -0.00203'" 2,96695 0.06852 34 
7 0.36220 -0,30288 3.16335 0,03308 
64 1a 0,15555'" 0.40129", -0.00021'" 
'" 0,08811 2,52505", 37 7a 0.42905 0.06670 0.15388 -0.05252 
65 1 0,38839 ... -0,00269'" ... 
-0.01140 -0.02424 ... 1.07415 ... 69 
7 0.26097 -0,10507 1.74470 -0.00371 
66 4 0.44584 • -0.01305· • 0,09609 44 -0.00742 ... 1.41240 ... 
7 0,46729 -0.14227 3.18319 0.02619 
67 1 0.79040 -0.40597 -0.00339'" 5.58991 0.22897 43 
7 0,38427 -0.42557 18,39790 0,27607 
a Regressions 1 and 7 are illustrated as they are usually the 'best' form. 
In this industry all regressions had parameter estimates ot the valuation 
ratiO of positive sign and all but 3 were significant. 
NOTE: Those parameter estimate. marked with an aaterisk C.) fail to emerge 
as significant at the ~ level. 
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TABLE XVI 
VALUATION RATIO REGRESSIONS • SUMMARy 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES WITH PROPORTION OF INDUSTRIES WITH REG NO SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE SIGN SIGNIFICAN'l' NEGATIVE SIGN ~~l VALUATION RATIO SIZE VALUATION RA'l'IO SIZE 
-
-
1 39 5 59.1 7.6 
2 17 5 25.8 7.6 
3 29 5 43.9 7.6 
4 4 11 6.1 16.7 
5 11 10 16.7 15.2 
6 2 12 3.0 18.2 
7(. 59 89.4 
8 42 63.6 
9 55 83.3 
3.4 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this section I shall initially discuss the results ot the 9 
regressions run on the turnishing industry presented in table XIV. 
This is ottered purely tor illustrative purposes as an aid to the 
interpretation ot the results in table IV which tollow.. The summary 
table ot the results, table XVI will then be discussed with reterence 
to the industry ditterences and tinally I shall sum up the conclUsions 
that can be drawn trom this section ot the study. 
Ot primary interest in table XIV is that the paraaeter estimates 
ot the valuation ratio are negatiYe and signiticant at the ~ level 
of probability in all 9 regressions. This negative sign is in 
accordance with the theoretically antiCipated relationship between 
the valuation ratiO and the likelihood ot takeoyer. Furthermore, the 
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intercept is positive and less than 1 in all cases. Because, by 
definition, both the valuation ratio and size must be positive, the 
predicted probability of takeover from the regression equations must 
• be less than 1. This is consistent with an interpretation of the 
regression equations as linear probability functions such that the 
predicted value of the dependent variable for any given level of 
valuation ratio is an estimate of the conditional probability that 
a firm with such a valuation ratio will be taken over. The predicted 
valUe does however take on values l.ss than 0 at high levels of the 
valuation ratio and this is inconsistent with the meaning of probability. 
This is ill~strated in the figure below where regression 1 for the 
furnishing industry is plotted withl the· ftluation ratio and takeover 
input data. 
FIGURE III 
INDUSTRY 22 REGRESSION 1 - PLOTTED VALUATION RATIO TAKEOVER DATA 
1.0 ........................ - ... 
• 75 
.50 
.25 
o ........... .,. ................ .....-. ................... .. 
0.5 
VALUATION RATIO 
1.0 1.5 
•••• 
2.0 
• Since size and log size were not significant they were dropped from the 
last three regressione tor each industry. As a consequence, in the 
analysis of table XIV below we shall concentrate on the interpretation 
of the valuation takeover relationship. 
•••••• 
3.0 
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Here at valuation ratios above 2.6 the predicted values become 
negative. Without difficulty one can retain the probability fUnction 
interpretation by regarding the conditional probability of takeover 
for firms with valuation ratios greater than 2.6 as zero so that 
such firms coUld be regarded as eafe from the threat of takeover. 
This does not however mean that empirically One will never observe 
a firm being taken over whose valuation ratio is greater than that 
denoted by the intersection of the regression line and the horizontal 
axis (i.e. where the estimated conditional probability of takeover 
is less than zero) This situation does in fact occur in the tigure 
above where a firm is taken over with a pre-bid valuation ratio of 
3.0. 
With these regressions and those in the next chapter, one is 
lOOking tor signiticant intluences on the probability ot takeover, 
and, .in particular, it is theoretically anticipated that the valuation 
ratio shoUld be an important factor. This is not to say that it will 
be the only factor tor especially in cross-section analysis there 
w111 be manifold unspecified and unspecitiable intluence. aftecting 
the relationship. The existence of a small number ot tirms tor which 
the relationship fails to hold such that they get taken over when 
they would be expected to be sate, or surv!ve with persistently low 
valuation ratios only serves to indicate that other intluences exist 
• which can override valuation ratio considerations. This does not in 
• Two obvious examples ot how the tormer could arise is through the 'reverse' 
takeover whereby tirm A agrees to acquire the capital ot tirm B which is 
larger and therefore winds up controlling the jOint capital ot both. Here 
the roles ot raider and acquired tirm have been reversed. An associated 
second possibility occurs in voluntary takeovers, tor example, brought 
about by the death ot the owner ot a tamily controlled tirm. Here the 
takeover is really a sale and may have nothing to do with the tirm's past 
pertormance. As I had no data on either, except to note that they occur, 
they remain possible explanations tor 'perverse' observations. I bave 
previously considered explanations for the survival ot tirms with persis-
tently low valuation ratiOS in section 2.4 and will return to this point 
at the end ot this chapter. 
in any way detract from the theoretically postulated and empirically 
verified hypothesis. 
A comment is necessary on the meaning in this context of the 
corrected coefficient of determination (fi2). While the F statistic 
provides a test of the hypothesis that no relationship eXists between 
the valuation ratio and whether or not the firm is taken over, 12 is 
no longer to be interpreted as an indicator of the 'goodness of fit' 
of the regression line. To be sure, it is still the ratio of the sum 
of the squared deviations about the least-squares line to the total 
sum of squared deviations about the mean. Nevertheless, we can indicate 
the point with reference to figure IlI.It is obYious that were there 
no overlap (i.e. a vertical line could be drawn passing through the 
two horizontal lines corresponding to 0 and I on the vertical axis 
at a particular level of valuation ratio such that no taken over firma 
had valuation ratios less than that level, but horizontal variation 
existed within the two groups) we would have a perfect fit ot the 
hypothesis in the sense that a critical level of the valuation ratio 
existed that determined perfectly and completely whether or not a 
firm would be taken over. Nevertheless, depending upon the amount of 
horizontal variation within the non-overlapping groups, 12 could be 
considerably below its maximum ot 1. This situation i8 ot,part'u~ 
importance given the natural tendency towards skewness ot the distribution 
of valuation ratios of surviYing tirma because the distribution is 
unbounded in a positive direction (i.e. the presence ot very high 
valuation ratios tor surviving tirms). Thus the reader should bear 
in mind that the value ot 12 could severely underestimate the 'true' 
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explanatory power of the estimated regression equations •• 
The same interpretation of the results for the furnishing industry 
can be applied to the results in table XV where the two regression 
results are presented for each industry. One regression was chosen 
from the first six and ~rsecond from the last three, being those for 
which the valuation ratio takes on the correct sign and is of greatest 
significance as indicated by the F statistic. In the first six 
regressions, regression 1 proved to offer the best explanation of 
whether or not a firm woUld be taken over in 56 out of the 66 industries. 
That is, the fUnctional form which best separated the two groups was 
that where the valuation ratiO was measured with the annual low share 
price in the numerator in the year prior to the offer when the firm 
was taken over and as the average of the annual valuation ratios 
measured with the low share price in the numerator when'tt survived. 
That it shoUld prove superior to regressions 2 or 3 is not surpri8ing 
if the numerator in Vlb (the valuation ratiO with the mean share price 
in the year prior to the offer) or:Vlc.(the valuation ratio with the 
low share price in the numerator in the year of the offer) was picking 
up some pre-bid speculation as the result of rumors leaked in the City. 
What is disappointing is that attempts to improve the specification of 
the model by relating the val~ation ratios to the industry average for 
• One could construct an indicator of the goodness of fit based on the 
degree of overlap but for present purposes finding significant 
influences is sufficient to support the hypothesiS. Discriminant 
analysis provides such an indicator of the explanatory power in terms 
of the degree of misclassification based on derived coefficients 
which in fact are proportional to the parameter estimates arrived at 
with the linear probability fUnction. This indicator however requires 
that the two groups come from normal popUlations which with reference 
to both the definition of the valuation ratiO (i.e. negative values 
are precluded while the positive range is theoretically unbounded) 
and by in8pection ot figure I will not be satisfied. 
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the appropriate year if the firm was taken over, were frustrated. 
In only 10 industries did these relative valuation ratios prove a 
superior measure to the form in regression 1. However, in 8 af~tae8e 
10 industries the valuation ratio proved not to be significant ••. A 
possible explanation for this is that despite variations in the 
market and within sectors of the market there remained a fairly 
stable view of the nature of attractive takeover candidates.and thus 
the valuation ratio takeover relationship remained stable throughout 
the period. However, it is possible the relative valuation ratio 
relationship is being obscured by the presence of a number of years 
in which share prices within an industry were highly volatile resulting 
in a number of firms with temporary but quite low valuation ratios. 
By dividing the taken over firms' valuation ratios by VAOa which itself 
could be very low, one may be finding firms being taken over with 
apparently above average valuation ratios. Thus the method used to 
construct the relative valuation ratios for taken over firms may be 
introducing sufficient extraneous variation to the relationship due 
to the movements of the stock market, to have a net effect in most 
industries of detracting from the original valuation ratiO relationship 
in regressions 1 to 3. 
Nevertheless, the results demonstrate that at least in a majority 
of industries, the valuation ratio is a significant determinant of 
whether or not a firm is taken over. Furthermore, by inspection of 
table XV it can be seen that the least-squares line can be interpreted 
as a probability fUnction (with the qualification that high values of 
the valuation ratiO will yield calculated values of the conditional 
probability of takeover of less than zero). In all industries the 
intercept is less than 1 and all significant parameter estimates for 
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.-the valuation ratio are negative, so that not .aly ia the conditional 
probability 1e88 than 1, but it declines aa the valuation ratio 
increases. 
The alternative tormulation ot regressions 7 to 9 where the 
logarithm or the valuation ratio is employed aeems to otter an 
improvement on the results or regression 1. Regression 7 which 
involves an analagoua torm ot the valuation ratio to regres8ion 1 
but with aize omitted is in all but 10 indu8tri •• a aup.rior tor. 
ot the relationship as indicat.d by both the F .tatistic and 12. 
In only one indu.try is regr.ssion 7 not the be.t torm ot the 
logarithmic r.lationship and in only 7 industri •• do •• the param.t.r 
e.timate tor log valuation ratio tail to emerge a8 .igniticant. In 
all case8 it takes On the expected negative .ign. 
Because the slop. ot the titted logarithmic r.lation.hip is 
ev.rywh.re negative and d.cr.a.es in ab.olut. value a. the valuation 
ratio incr.a •• s, the sup.rior r •• ults tor r.gr.ssions 7 to g woUld 
•••• to indicate that aa the valuation ratio d.cr.as •• , the tira 
tacea an ever incr.asing probability ot tak.ov.r, reaohing a aaxi.um 
at the value ot the interc.pt with the v.rtical axis (i ••• at a 
valuation ratio ot z.ro). C.rtainly this is a pos.ibl. interpr.tation 
ot the r.sult.. It i., :'.how.v.r, .a.y to s •• how tbe improved r •• ult • 
••• rg.d. Th. contraction in the .cal •• reaultin, trom taking log. 
ot the valuation ratiOs cl.arly brought the hi,b ob.ervation. ot 
tb. valuation ratio n.ar.r the log lin.ar regr.s.ion line ther.by 
i.proving both the F value and 12. Tbu. on. should k •• p this 
.. Ind •• d in all but two indu.tri.s the param.t.r •• timate. tor r.gr ••• ion 
1 take on the antioipat.d n ... tive sign though some ot th •• e tail 
to ••• rge a. signiticant at the ~ l.v.l ot probability. 
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reservation in mind when concluding that a superior torm ot the 
relationship is logarithmic. 
The size variable emerged as significant and negative in only 
a small number ot industries. This was probably to be eXpected trom 
an examination of the aggregate grouped data on size and proportion 
of takeovers in table VIlle in the previous chapter. Thus in 
general it appeared that even very large tirms were subject to the 
same threat ot takeover with a given valuation ratio as small tirms, 
perhaps only the handfull of giants experiencing some degree ot 
safety because of their size. The constraints on finance and the 
limited supply of very large raiders that the negative expectation 
tor the size variable was based does not emerge empirically. Never-
theless, when size is measured relative to the industry average 
tor the appropriate year(s) as in regressions 4 to 6 it becomes 
significant and negative in a few more industries (see table XVI). 
In general, the ettect however is at best weak. 
It will be remembered that the reason tor running the regressions 
at the industry level was to remove the 'noise' generated through 
large inter-industry variations in the median value of various 
pertormance indicators. It was anticipated that this source of noise 
could serve to swamp the emergence ot the underlying valuation ratio 
takeover relationship. Nevertheless, it was hoped it would be possible 
to comment upon the industry ditferences in the valuation ratio, size, 
takeover relationship that have emerged. In particular I wish to 
discover whether there are any common attributes ot the 24 industries 
for which the valuation ratio in regres8ion 1 failed to emerge a8 
8ignificant and ot the 12 industries for which size proved 8ignificant 
in regression 6. To accomplish this I first ranked the industries by 
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median growth rate, size, valuation ratiO, protit rate, and proportion 
ot takeovers. I then couated the number ot non-signiticant regression 
coetticients ot the valuation ratiO and the signiticant coetticients 
tor size in each ot 6 grouped rankings. Thus the tirst group contains 
the 11 industries with the lowest growth rate, the second contains 
the next highest 11 industries and so torth. This was done tor all 
5 industry characteristics above, and the results appear in table XVII 
and table XVIII. In each case the industry characteristics were ranked 
trom lowest to highest. 
TABLE XVII 
NUMBER OF NON-SIGNIFICANT VALUATION RATIO COEFFICIENTS (REGRESSION 1) 
FOR RANKED AND GROUPED INDUSTRIES BY INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
RANKED INDUSTRIES 
IND CHARACTERISTICS 
-1::11 . .u::n 23-33 34-44 
-
~ ~ TOTAL 
GROWTH RATE 5 3 5 2 4 5 24 
SIZE 5 5 2 4 3 5 24 
VALUATION RATIO 5 5 1 3 6 4 24 
PROFIT RATE 7 2 3 3 3 6 24 
PROPORTION OF T-O's 4 6 3 3 3 5 24 
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TABLE XVIII 
NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT SIZE COEFFICIENTS (REGRESSION 6) 
FOR RANKED AND GROUPED INDUSTRIES BY INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
RANKED INDUSTRIES 
IND CHARACTERISTICS 1-11 ll=.U 23-33 34-44 45-55 ~ .mm 
-
GROWTH RATE 1 3 4 0 1 3 12 
SIZE 1 0 4 3 1 3 12 
VALUATION RATIO 1 0 3 2 2 4 12 
PROFIT RATE 2 2 1 2 1 4 12 
PROPORTION OF T-O's 1 0 1 1 2 7 12 
The most noticeable point in table XVII i8 the absence of any 
strong tendency for the 5 industry characteristics to identify a common 
factor in the industries for which the valuation ratio failed to emerge 
as significant. Thus while the median level of the valuation ratiO 
is higher in growth industries than in fairly static industries, the 
valuation ratio takeover relationship seemed to have fit equally well. 
in both. While one might have expected the struggle for market share 
in low growth industries to have suspended or at least obscured the 
valuation ratio takeover relationship to a greater degree than in the 
growth industries where inve.tment decisions whether internal or external 
via takeover would possibly be more strongly judged against expected 
rate of return. Thu8 in growth industrie8 one might have expected 
the valuation ratio to be a more conSistently significant determinant 
of the probability of takeover. The results, however, do not support 
this expectation. Similarly, the median size of the industry does not 
ap~ar to explain the failure of certain industries to fit the relationship 
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established elsewhere. Had not size in general failed to emerge as 
significant in the industry regressions one might have expected the 
industries whose median size is small to shoy the established 
relationship less clearly since a raider whether within the industry 
or outside lOOking for expansion could acquire these small firms with 
possibly less regard for their market valuation. Thus the failure 
o! this characteristic of the industry to identify any common ground 
in the industries which do not fit the valuation ratio relationship 
is in this sense some confirmation that size and hence potential 
financial constraints may play an important role in the pattern of 
takeovers. 
With the industry characteristics of median valuation ratio and 
median profit rate there is a slight tendency for the two extremes 
to embrace a greater number of industries which do not conform to the 
valuation ratio - takeover relationship. Not only could these 
marginal differences have come about by chance, but also an explanation 
of why the: extreme grouping(s) for the valuation ratio and the two 
end groups for the profit rate should display any greater tendency 
to fail to fit the relationship is not obvious. A breaking down ot 
the relationship at the lower median values could possib11 be under-
stood in terms of some other motive (e.g. takeovers occuring as an 
alternative to widespread industry bankruptcies, the firms who get 
taken over performing as well or better than those which do not) 
overriding the normal valuation ratio - takeover relationship, but 
this would not apply to both extremes. In any case, any effect is 
only at best slight. 
Finally, it was anticipated that the industries experiencing the 
highest takeover rates could be more likely to have the observed 
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takeover - valuation ratio relationship obscured. This could have 
occured if through the rapid increases in concentration that resUlted 
from approximately half the firms being acquired,· there was an upward 
shift in the threshold level of valuation ratio that signalled the 
threat of takeover. Not only could the 'bargains' of the earlier 
concentration movement have been exhausted but also market speculation 
on potential takeovers by industry and any effect on profitability 
of the increased concentration as well as a 'band wagon effect' by 
raiders not to be outdone by rivals in terms of market share, all 
could have pushed up the general level of valuation ratios over time 
and consequently obscured the relationship. This possibility does 
not appear to have occured. There appears to be virtually no ditterence 
in the failure to conform to the valuation ratio - takeover relationShip 
and the industry takeover rate. In any case, it the reasoning above 
were substantiated by table XVII one would have expected regressions 
4 through 6 (the set of regressions run with the valuation ratio 
measured as relative to the industry average for the appropriate 
year if the firm was taken over) to have performed better than they 
did. So in this sense the indecisive results in table XVII for the 
proportion of companies taken over in each industry and the failure 
of the valuation ratio - takeover relationship are at least consistent. 
In table XVIII attempts were made to discover whether there was 
any common ground between the twelve industries for which size emerged 
as significant in regression 6. The most striking feature to emerge 
is the (fairly clear) tendency for those industries with the highest 
proportion of takeovers (i.e. group 6 with the 56th to 66th ranked 
• The 6th group ranked 56th to 66th ranged from over 4~ to nearly 
61% of the firms being taken over. 
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industries) to be those in which size took on a significant negative 
sign. Thus in 7 out of the 11 industries with the highest takeover 
rates, size proved to be a significant distinguishing characteristic 
of the taken over firm. I think the explanation for this is fairly 
obvious. In those industries experiencing rapid takeover activity 
the size gap between the raider and the acquired firm would be expected 
not only to be large, but also growing as more takeovers occured. 
As regards the other 4 industry characteristics in table XVIII, no 
real clear cut pattern emerges to pOint to why in certain industries 
• s"_ze became significant. 
I have previously noted that the linear probability function has 
been criticised On two grounds as an estimational technique; it can 
yield estimates of conditional probability outside the interval 8 to 
1 and it violates the classical least-squares assumption of homo-
skedasticity. I have already dealt with the former, but some comment 
is necessary on the latter's effect on the results. While the expected 
value of the parameter extimate will be unbiased, the estimate itself 
could be biased and it will have needlessly large sample variances. 
However since its formal equivalence to discriminant analysis has 
been shown,·· the presence of bias in the parameter estimates which 
coUld reBUlt·, from- the linear probability technique does not provide 
grounds for prefering One to the other. Any bias present will appear 
in both since the parameter estimates are proportional to the 
coefficients derived using discriminant analysis. The presence of 
There is for both size and the valuation ratio an indication that in 
the lowest two groups, size is an even poorer distinguishing charact-
teristic of the acquired and non-acquired firm. As an explanation for 
this is not immediately apparent, I shall simply note this in passing • 
•• See Fisher (1944) and Ladd (1966). 
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needlessly large sample variances could only prejudice the results 
against the emergence of the valuation ratio hypothesis since at the 
margin One could be rejecting some significant parameter estimates. 
3.5 RESULTS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
The results contained in this chapter for the valuation ratio 
model of takeovers represent a departure from two of the three related 
U.K. studies in this field. The pilot study undertaken prior to this 
't 
work found a highly significant inverse relationship between the 
v~luation ratio and whether or not a firm was taken over using a 
random sample of 250 U.K. public quoted companies. The linear pro-
babi1ity function estimational technique was also employed in that 
study. 
, .... 
However, Ajit Singh's work in the area tor the period 1948.60, 
failed to uncover corresponding results as contained in the pilot study 
and this chapter. While he did not include~ the valuation ratiO in 
all stages of the analysis, he found it generally to be a poor 
discriminator between taken over and non-taken over firms. He found 
the mean values ot the valuation ratio for the two groups to be 
significantly different also its ability to usefully discriminate 
between the two groups was very small both alone and in the presence 
of other finanCial variables. 
The other related U.K. study employing the valuation ratio is 
by Gerald Newbould,'" in which he examines the 1967-68 period of 
takeovers. He examined valuation ratiOS of 74 'victim firms' in the 
Kuehn (1969) 
Singh (1971) 
....... Newbould (1970) 
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period in absolute terms and relative to the raiders'· and relatiYe 
.... 
to the industrys' average valuation ratios. He suggested that if 
a Marris type hypothesis is to be vindicated One would expect na.) 
the absence of high valuation ratiOs, and b.) the predominance of 
low valuation ratios.n'tTt He·'found a wide range of valuation ratios 
among his 74 takeovers and concluded that neither requirement a.) 
nor b.) above held. HiiKresul ts for valUation ratios relative to 
the bidding firms and industry averages showed little difference 
between victim firms and either in the proportions occupying 3 groups 
c~ valuation ratios, 0.0 - 1.0, 1.0 - 2.0, and 2.0 and over. TTTT 
It is interesting to note the differing conclusions both authors 
reached with regard to the failure of the valuation ratio to emerge 
as an important determinant of takeover activity. Newbould suggests 
that the inability of the valuation ratio to otter any explanation 
ot the inCidence of mergers and in particUlar ot indicating thoae 
firms which receive bids as, perhaps n ••• another example of the 
excess rationality imputed by economists into the actions of 
............. 
management." He instead opts for an ad hoc questionnaire approach 
to discover the managerial motivations behind mergers. Singh on the 
There is nothing in the theory which suggests that raiders' valuation 
ratiOS should be greater than those ot the tirms they acquire, only 
that the acquired firm be undervalued relative to what the raider could 
earn with its aaseta. As an approximation to this one can relate the 
acquired tirm's valuation to the industry average valuation, or treat 
the relationship as a probability function as done in this study. 
Industry averages were constructed from a sample of reports immediately 
prior to the ofter. Since the averages sometimes contained as few as 
six firms, this rough measure presents a likely source ot biaa. 
- . 
Newbould (1970); p; gg; 
It is not possible to comment on the significance ot Newbould's 
proportions since no significance teata were undertaken • 
..... Newbould (1970), p.107 
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other hand attempted to place his resUlts in the context of the ne. 
theories of the firm (e.g. Baumol (1959), Marris (1964, and Williamson 
(1964» and the stock market as a control mechanism On managerial 
actions. In finding only a weak inverse relationship between the 
valuation ratio and profitability and the likelihood of takeover, 
but a marginally clearer result for size he concluded that with 
T qualification, this provided positive support for the new theOries 
of the firm. A strong control mechanism WOuld on the other hand have 
lent support to the neo-classical theory of the firm aince whatever 
t~eir intentions, management WOuld be constrained to maximize profits 
by the desire for survival; the failure to do so woUld result in being 
taken over. His results for profitability and size suggest support 
for the new theories since these theories have variables in their 
objective functions related to size (e.g. salary power, prestige) or 
aspects of size (e.g. growth, sale8 revenue, or the volume of slack) 
and whose achievement involves the sacrifice of profits. Thus managers 
are not constrained to pursue profits since they can reduce the threat 
ot takeover by beCOming larger, " ••• the fear of takeover, rather than 
being a constraint on managerial discretion may also encourage them 
TT in the same direction." 
While the re8ults contained in this study are not identical to 
Singh's, (i.e. the valuation ratio 8eem8 to playa significant role 
in the majority of industries in the takeover process while there 
was little indication that size affected the firm'. likelihood ot 
takeover), one i8 10th to interpret the reeults at this stage ot the 
analysie in terms ot the appropriate theoretical model ot the theory 
Singh (1971), p. 145. 
Singh (1971), p. 144. 
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of the firm. A common characteristic of the new theories is the 
eXistence of some form of constraint on managerial discretion which 
prevents managers from totally sacrificing profits to the achievement 
of their poSited objective. Central to Marris's theory formUlated 
in the U.K. climate where takeovers are extremely commOn is the notion 
that the constraint becomes operational through the inverse relation-
ship between the valuation ratio and the threat of takeover. This 
is because managers have a desire for security which is therefore 
competing with the primary ingredient in their objective function. 
T~e sacrifice of profits to the objective of growth is constrained 
because of the effect the low profits (and the levels of the other 
decision variables chosen to maximize growth) had on the valuation 
ratio and hence the likelihood of takeover. Hence, the existence 
of some sort of constraint either through profits or as in Marris's 
theory as a result of a de8ire tor security from the danger of take-
over, prevents managers from pursuing unre8tricted and unprofitable 
growth. The exi8tence of an inver8e valuation ratio - takeover 
relationship is therefore a necessary condition of his theory as 
formulated. It is however, by no means 8ufficient, since one would 
also expect a profit maximizing firm to choose takeover candidates 
on the basis of expected profitability on the purchase price of the 
investment and hence ceteris paribUS cho08e the firm with the lowest 
valuation ratio. 
A8 Singh, among other8,· has noted, only if the relation8hip were 
perfect woUld the new theories be invalidated. An i.perfect but real 
relationship as contained in the results of thi8 study only satiefies 
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a necessary condition of the Marris hypothesis but does not give any 
guide to the appropriate motivational scheme to impute to managers. 
whether profit maximization, growth maximization or something else. 
However in view of the very minor role played by the valuation ratio 
contained in Singh's results, it would seem to contradict the necessary 
condition embodied in Marris's new theory rather than support such 
revisions simply because size appears marginally to increase security 
(i.e. since size is related to the objective) and the sacrifice of 
profits does not seem to reduce security (i.e. they can pursue their 
otjective semi-independently of profits). Of course, constraints 
can be imposed from directions other than the fear Of takeover. For 
example, loss of job through dismissal by owners or bankruptc) resulting 
from the excessive sacrifice of profits or limitations on growth 
imposed through the supply of managerial expertise· could provide 
the requisite constraints on the managerial objectives. What is 
important to note is that neither these results nor Singh's yield 
any clues to the nature and appropriateness of the posited objectives 
of the new theories of the firm. The difference lies in the fact that 
those contained here seem to support a necessary condition tor the 
acceptance of the Marris model while Singh's suggest the reqUisite 
constraints on managerial discretion must lie elsewhere and hence is 
in direct opposition to Marris's thesis. 
A third interpretation of the survival of unprofitable and under-
This suggestion is fully developed in Penrose (1959). One should note 
however, that this source of constraint on managerial behaviour may 
be weak where growth is achieved through takeovers since the raider 
is in a sense purchasing a supply of managerial expertise along with 
the assets of the firm. 
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valued firms is offered by Brian Hindley· in a critical analysis of 
... the results of D.C. Mueller where the latter suggests growth 
maximization as a motive behind mergers. The evidence of the survival 
ot inefficient firms however, is seen by Hindley as evidence against 
both growth maximization and present value aaximization hypotheses. 
He bases this on the view that growth maximizers should be more eager 
to acquire undervalued firms (i.e. ones with low valuation ratios) 
than present value maximizers so that presumably for undervalued firms 
to survive suggests neither objective is commonly encountered in the 
pcpulation of firms. While admitting that some of the survivors may 
be owner controlled and hence able to block an unwanted otter or that 
........ 
a less dramatic control change could have occured, he simply asserts 
these explanations have not been sutficient to explain all the survivors. 
He concludes therefore that, anemonstration ot an inetficient takeover 
system would therefore be a major step towards rejecting growth 
maximizing models in tavour ot some form ot non-aggressive 'easy-life' 
managerial model of the firm. n......... 'My arguments in this study make 
further comment on his interpretation unnecessary. If refutation or 
otherwise of the growth maximization hypothesis rests solely on defining 
at what level the takeover mechanism is agreed to be inefficient, the 
theory is unlikely ever to get much support. 
I shall no~ however, leave the discussion of the relevance of 
Hindley (1972) 
Mueller (1969) 
Hindley (1969) 
Hindley (1972) 
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of takeovers to the new theories of the firm in this rather 
unsatisfactory state. In the next chapter I shall look at takeovers 
in terms of the factors which directly affect the valuation ratio, 
these being the financial characteristics of the firm which are, 
in part, determined by manager's decisions. It is hoped that by 
dOing so, some indication ot the nature of the typical taken over 
firm will be revealed and that this will shed further light on the 
nature of the takeover mechan1am as a constraint on managerial 
discretion. Then in chapter V I shall employ an alternative 
ec~imational technique, that of probit analysis, in the investigation 
of the nature of the takeover process and its role as a constraint 
on managerial discretion. Finally, in chapter VI, I shall attempt to 
consider directly the relevance of the growth maximizing hypothesis 
whereby takeovers will be regarded as not only a constraint on the 
growth objective, but also a vehicle tor its achievement. ay 
attempting to derive predictions tor the growth maxim1zing hypothesis 
for raiders which are mutually exclusive to predictions from the 
assumption that raiders are profit maximizers, it may be possible 
to test the relevance of the theory in terms of its posited objective 
rather than simply finding that a necessary condition for its 
acce,tance has been satisfied. By dOing so it is hoped that some 
evidence will be provided on which a choice can be made between the 
two behavioral positions. In dOing so, I will be attempting to accom-
plish the third aim of this study; to relate takeovers to the new 
theories of the firm. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS OF TAKEOVERS II 
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRM'S FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I shall attempt to capture the influence the firm's 
financial characteristics - profit rate, growth rate, retention ratiO, 
and liquidity ratio - have on whether or not the firm is taken over. 
As in model I, the relationship will be estimated at the industry level 
by means of the linear probability fUnction technique. The purpose 
is not only to discover whether there are significant differences in 
the performance of taken over and surviving firms, but also to 
investigate the effect of some of the variables which might be expected 
to influence the basic valuation ratio - takeover relationship explored 
in the previous chapter. 
4.2 THE MODEL 
In chapter II was discussed the likely influence the four variables 
to be employed would have on the probability that a firm is taken over. 
It was antiCipated that the average acquired firm would be less profitable, 
have grown more slowly, tend to retain a greater proportion of after 
taz profits, and be more liquid than the average surviving firm. 
Regressions are undertaken for each of the 66 industries in order to 
remove the 'noise' attributable to large inter-industry variations 
in the levels of performance. As before, however, some comment will 
be possible regarding industry differences in the strength and character 
of the takeover - financial variable relationship based upon the 
regression results. 
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For each industry 6 regressions were run based upon various 
formulations of the four financial variables· included in each 
equation. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 0 if 
the firm survived and 1 if it was taken over~ All four variables 
were averaged over the available years if the firm survived. If it 
was taken over, the profit rate, retention ratio and liquidity ratiO 
were measured as either the annual level in the latest accounting 
period prior to the offer, or the average of the two years prior to 
the offer, and finally as the average of the three years prior to the 
ofrer, while the growth rate was measured as the average level over 
the three years preceding the offer. As before, the above variables 
were also related to the industry average for the relevant year(s) 
if the firm was taken over and the average for all years if it survived. 
For all variables the relationship is assumed to be linear in the 
estimation process. 
The definitions of the variables to be employed appear below, 
if T = 0 then 
T = a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the 
firm was taken over and 0 if it was not. 
Po = the before tax profit rate of the firm 
averaged over all available years 
/ PAO = Po divided by the average before tax profit rate of all firms in the industry 
averaged over all available years 
Go = the firms' growth rat. of net assets over 
all available years 
= GO divided by the average of all firms' 
growth rates over the period 
The definitions of these variables appear in appendix I s.otion II.G 
if T = 1 then 
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RO = the retention ratio ot the tirm averaged 
over all available years 
RO / RAo = Ro divided by the average retention 
ratio ot all firms in the industry 
averaged over all available years 
LO = the liqUidity ratio ot the firm averaged 
over all available years 
LO / LAO = Lo divided by the average liquidity 
ratio ot all firms in the industry 
averaged over all available years 
PI 
P2 
= the betore tax pro tit rate ot the tirm at 
the accounting period prior to the otter 
= the before tax protit rate of the tirm 
averaged over the two accounting periods 
prior to the otter 
= the betore tax protit rate ot the tirm 
averaged over the three accounting periods 
prior to the otter 
PI divided by the average betore tax 
protit rate ot all tirms in the 
industry for the year in which PI 
was measured 
P2 / PA2 = P2 divided by the average betore tax profit rate of all firms in the 
industry for the two years in which 
P2 was measured 
= P3 divided by the average before tax profit rate of all firms in the 
industry for the three years in which 
P3 was measured 
Gl = the firm's growth rate ot net assets over the three years prior to the otfer 
Gl / ~ = G divided by the growth rate of net a~sets ot all tirms in the industry 
over the three years in which Gl was 
measured 
Rl = the retention ratio of the firm at the 
accounting period prior to the otter 
R2 = the retention ratio ot the firm averaged 
over the two accounting periods prior to 
the otter 
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R3 = the retention ratio ot the tirm averaged 
over the three accounting periods prior 
to the otter 
= Rl divided by the average retention 
ratio ot all firms in the industry 
tor the year in which ~ was measured 
• R2 divided by the average retention 
ratio ot all firma in the industry 
tor the two years in which R2 was 
measured 
= R3 divided by the average retention 
ratio ot all firma in the industry 
tor the three years in which R3 was 
measured 
Ll = the liquidity ratio ot the tirm at the 
accounting period prior to the otter 
L2 = the liquidity ratio ot the tirm averaged 
over the two accounting periods prior to 
the otter 
L3 = the liquidity ratio ot the tirm averaged 
over the three accounting periods prior 
to the otter 
Ll / LAl = Ll divided by the average liquidity 
ratio ot all tirms in the industry 
tor the year in which Ll was measured 
= L2 divided by the average liquidity 
ratio ot all firms in the industry 
for the two years in which L2 was 
measured 
L3 / LA3 = L3 divided by the average liquidity 
- ratio ot all firms in the industry 
tor the three years in which L3 was 
measured 
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Using these variables, the following 6 regression equations were 
derived, each employing comparable measures of the four independent 
variables: 
1.) itT = 0: Po' Go' RO' La; if T = 1: PI' Gl , Rl , ~ 
2.) itT = 0: Po' Go' RO' La; itT = 1: P2, \, R2, L2 
3. ) itT = 0: Po' Go' RO' LO; if T = 1: P3, Gl , R3, L3 
4.) it T = 0: Po / PAO' Go / GAo' RO / RAo' La / LAo 
if T = 1: PI / P~, Gl / ~, ~ / ~, Ll / L~ 
5.) itT = 0: Po / PAO' Go / GAo' RO / RAo' LO / LAO 
itT = 1: P2 / PA2, Gl / G~, R2 / RA2 , L2 / LA2 
6.) itT = 0: Po / PAO' Go / GAO' RO / RAo' LO / LAo 
ifT = 1: P3 / PA3, Gl / GAl' R3 / RA3, L3 / LA3 
4.3 RESULTS 
A sample of the resul ts appear in tables XIX and XX and a summary 
of the results for all industries is contained in table XXI below. 
Table XIX gives the complete results again for the furniShing industry, 
selected purely for illustration. Table XX presents two regression 
results for each industry, one selected from regressions 1 to 3 and 
the second from regressions 4 to 6. They were chosen on the basis of 
being the equations which most clearly de ... strate the total effect of 
the financial variables on the probability of takeover. An interpretation 
of these results and conclusions are contained in section 4.4. 
~ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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TABLE XIX 
REGRESSIONS ON THE FURNISHING INDUSTRY 
DmiMY DEPENDENT VARIABLE ON THE FIRM'S FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
CONSTANT PROFIT R. GROWTH R. RETN. R. LIQ. R. 
...L ...£ 
0.49952 
-0.69500 
-0.60836 0.00093i' i' 4.,;16547 0.10702 .. -O.258~ (0.08801) (0.34156) (0.21055) (0.11498) (0.2l268) 
0.51987 
-0.74495 -0.04964 i' -0. 33861i' 5.09347 0.11883 -0.0491' (0.08796) (0.36451) (0.12419) (0.12419) (0.21254) 
0.47759 
-0.71821 -0.62406 0.03655i' -0.35887 i' 5.17025 0.12092 (0.09232) (0.35904) (0.20906) (0.12491) (0.20896) 
0.33971 -0.14494 -0.00207 i' -o.02267i' 0.01966 5.31036 0.12865 
(0.06819) (0.05457) (0.02227) (0.03257) (0.00625) 
0.25268 -0.13566 -0.00208 i' -0.00894 i' 0.03534i' 2.73786 0.05316 
(0.07721) (0.05398) (0.02254) (0.04950) (0.01904) 
0.15945 -0.11816 -0.00541 i' 0.03608 0.03994 2.88873 0.05929 
(0.07635) (0.05248) (0.02248) (0.04524) (0.01988) 
NOTE: standard errors of the associated parameter estimates appear 
below each in brackets. Also, only those parameter estimates 
marked with an asterisk (i') fail to emerge as significant at 
the :P/o level. 
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TABLE XX 
SEL§CTED REGRESSION RESULTS 
ALL INDUSTRIES - FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
m ,E!g CONSTANT PROFIT R. GROWTH R. RETN. R. LIQ, R. 
1 
2 
1 
5 
3 
4 
0.44295 -0.82366· -0.14087. 0.15589· O~\oe574· .. 2.80459 0.07049 
0.30553 -0.19047 -0.00753 0.11886 -0.02696· 3.56424 0.08449 
0.46926 0.05328: -0.73847 0.17585: 0.45360· 3.06583 0.05941 
0.29743 -0.05112 -0.15862 -0.07776 -0.00674 4.46148 0.10127 
3 3 0.48559. 0.43979: _0.03699· -0.21892· 0,45961· 0.55630· -0.06419 
5 -0.00220 0.22616 -0.01469· 0.09695· 0.01713 1.70551· 0.03810 
4 1 
6 
5 1 
4 
0.69063 -1,83605 
0.44981 -0.21939 
• • • 0.01052. -0.11517. -0.30115 5.16189 
0.00865 -0.08212 0.02125 4.91419 
0.10893 
0.10804 
0.31231 -0.15034: -0.02002: -0.00801: 0.24412· 1.99676! 0.01650 
0.17417 -0.21783 0.00010 -0.00270 -0.03047· 1.04530T -0.00467 
6 3 0.50569 0.04495: -0.52822. -0.00308: 0.13387: 6.91547. 0.09114 
5 0.31658 0.00881 -0.03956 -0.00007 -0.03329 2.02595 0.01373 
7 3 0.45931 
6 0.28161 
• •• 0.26474. -1.51487. 0.26849 0.15654 4.50062 0.13404 
0.01645 -0.03080 -0.06264· 0.00095 2.64946 0.07033 
8 1 
5 
• • 0.46162 -0.83018. -0.01229. -0.00834. -0.34491 4.23576 0.06034 
0.12768 -0.00027 -0.00537 -0.00227 0.00895 4.10944 0.05852 
9 1 0.45289 -0.39730: -0.03933: 0.02910· _0.22398· 4.19196 0.04020 
5 0.25158 -0.07833 0.00219 0.06629 0.00860 4.14449 0.04069 
10 2 0.37741 -0.18706· 0.03327· 0.17976 -0.15383· 2.96375 0.02066 
6 0.11567 0.00402· -0.00221· _0.00250· 0.01249 3.56792 0.02816 
11 1 0.51286 -1.29796 -0.36843 0.11849· _0.22140· 5.57998 0.10776 
4 0.26537 -0.17167 0.00811· 0.08686 0.00014· 3.39063 0.05882 
12 1 0.53950 -0.90567· -0.20521 _0.00087· 0.02301: 5.79040 0.06773 
4 0.38035 -0.20457 -0.07052 0.00058· -0.00312 5.49149 0.06476 
13 2 
5 
• •• 36· 8 0.07672. 1.15024. -0.31300. 0.18437 -0.09913. 2.457 • 0.1243 
0.12912 -0.04389 0.08450 0.04838 0.00562 1.77060 0.05936 
14 2 
5 
• •• 0.40918 0.00494 -0.30537 -0.00219 -0.14922. 3.00748. 0.03623 
0.22427 -0.00230· _0.00914· 0.00088· -0.01081 0.91593 -0.00744 
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TABLE XX (cont,} 
IND REG CONSTANT 
--
PROFIT R. GROWTH R,. RETN. R. LIQ. R. 
...L ~2 
15 1 0,45832 
-0,90381 ... 
-0,03173: 0,03860: 0,30363'" ... 0,01392 1.72627 ... 6 0,21774 -0,07781 
-0,00082 
-0,01250 0.00106 1,92442 0,02033 
16 1 0,58542 -0,84531 
-0,09222 ... · ... -0,01930. -0.10486 4,53753 0,05134 5 0,45097 
-0.18418 
-0.00258 0.00343 -0.00078'" 3,13163 0.03116 
17 2 0.52976 • 
-0,30148. • • -0,50697 
-0,00998. -0.07670 4,16579 ... 0.03683 
4 0,31383 
-0,09957 0.02287 -0,00339 0,00067· 1,49716 0,00332 
18 1 0,20766· 0.48607: 
-0,18663: ... 0,17092· • -0,00059 0.35614 ... 1,24511. 
4 0,28388 -0,11318 0,04147 0,03070 0,00853 2,05577 0,08898 
19 3 0,60244 • -1,45197 • • • 0,03467 0,26259. -0,25704. -0,08066. 1,65400 ... 
5 0,37298 
-0,13643 0.00710'" 
-0,03396 -0,01229 0.68694 -0,05527 
20 2 0,55800 
-1,47427 • ... . 3.78468 0,11374 -0,16400 ... -0,00276. -0,31094. 
4 0,39002 
-0.17264 0.00457 
-0.04312 -0,00748 2.57142 0,06271 
2 0.56319 ... • • ... ... 1.06997· 
-0,01215 21 0.40056. -0.67500. -0.12654 -0.03791 ... 
4 0.20367 0.07449 0.09964 . ·0.09597 -0,01625 3.46190 0.13040 
22 3 0.47759 -0.71821 
-0.62406. 0.03655· -0.35887'" 5.17025 0.12092 
4 0.33971 -0.14494 -0.00207 -0.02267'" 0,01966 5,31036 0.12865 
• ... ... 0,18799· • 0.00933 23 2 0.44761 -0.60786. -0.05075 ... -0.00211. 1.58664. 
4 0.29022 -0.08518 -0.00251 0.00026 0.02309 1.52947 -0.00787 
... ... • • • 0.09640 24 2 0,40517 -0.64795. -0.52042. 0.50366... 0.75148. 2.37020 ... 
6 0.56840 -0.12026 -0.00451 -0.11528 -0.03048 0.86082 -0.04158 
• 0.66903 ..0.23331 ... • • 4,85132 0.06225 25 1 0.60951 -0.05808. -0.15399  
4 0.49450 -0.16312 -0.00055 -0.03412 0.00006 3.22728 0.03597 
... • • 3.20877 0.05854 26 2 0.53827 -1.54688 ... 0.00042. 0,07021 0.23567. 
4 0.17857 -0.08716 -0.00068 0.08614 .0.03343 3.65751 0.07207 
... • -0.01558· ... 1.59975'" 0.02437 27 2 0,53984 -1.08908. -0.13631 ... 0,17612 ... 
4 0.20426 -0,11718 -0.02250 0.08418 0.00401 3.68028 0.15020 
• • ... • • 0.01272 28 1 0.59174 -0.56042. -0.22098. 0.04621. 0.06756. 1.50770. 
6 0.34730 0.02495 -0.01557 -0.09884 0.01819 1.10234 -0.00805 
... • 0.00120· -0.25343· 1.02631· -0.00657 29 1 0.37507 -0.20454 ... -0.14650 
6 0.22221 -0.05534 0.02840· -0.00750· 0.04479 5.72477 0.12185 
• • • • ... 0,00673 30 3 0,37701 -0.10571 -0,06574. 0,19540... 0.30552. 1.45994 ... 
5 0.38772 -0,13350 0,00090 0.04925 -0,03507 1.72879 0,01611 
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TABLE XX (cont,~ 
IND REG CONSTANT PROFIT R. GROWTH R. RETN, R, L12. R. F ~2 --
-
31 1 0,41726 1,02658· 
-0,71760 ... 
-0.87663· 1.99115'" -0.16556 0.05597 6 0.24718· 0,05299'" 0,01339· 
-0.12104'" 0.03116 2.31210'" 0.08131 
32 3 0.49612 ... ... ... 0,17977'" 0.64728: -0.05175 -0.26205 ... -0.36706 ... -0.13500 ... 4 0,24409 
-<>,05474 
-0.00338 
-0.02636 0,00983 1,15430 -0.00787 
33 2 0,56599 
-1.39140 0.10623· 0.07803'" 0.23703· 2.87950 0.13434 5 0.48262 
-0.29142 0.07252· 
-0.03837· 0.04146 4,50393 0.24096 
34 3 0,63482 
-1.14622 ... 
-0.21344: 0.01982: ... 3.98823 ... 0.08576 ... 0.09784 6 0.39409 
-0.13201 
-0.00094 
-0.03384 
-0.03339 1.68352 0.01850 
35 2 0.58941 ... :0:44132 ... • • 2.03287'" 0.04282 -0.65885. 0.11063 ... 0.22560 ... 
4 0.49288 
-0,13236 
-0.01818 0.02339 
-0.00122 1.13372· -0.00679 
36 1 0.95059 ... 
-0.11322: 
. ... 
0.49298· -1,09266 -0.39468 ... 4.26752 0.06817 
5 0.80793 -0.19816 
-0.00723 -0,09785 -0.00810'" 2.91828 0.04102 
37 2 0,58909 -1.86075 0,10329: ... 0.07100'" 3.90494 0.04585 ... 0.14232 
5 0.30945 -0.21307 0.05817 0,05641 0.03679 5.84883 0.22326 
38 1 0,62708 
-0.67870 ... ... ... • 4,43903 0.06652 -0,12923 ... -0.05576. 0,10577. 
5 0.39921 -0.08397 0.00460 
-0.02510 0.00061 1,84482'" 0,01334 
1 0.59732 ... • • ... 2.31689· 39 -0.70900 -0.13489. -0.10508. -0.08175 0.03942 
5 0.52717 -0.18510 -0.00927 -0.04543 0.00851 3.45489 0.08180 
0,60564 • 
-0.12513: ·0.38085 • 2.76784 0.07678 40 1 -0,12840. -0.16474. 
6 0,58000 -0.20290 -0.05927 -0.17231 0.11978 3.63992 0.12016 
0.66686 • ... -0.02918: 0.15668: 3.18498 ... 0,02957 41 2 -0,47011 -0.06205. 
4 0.55013 -0.12057 0,00003 -0,00115 -0.00810 2.11280 0.01378 
... 
-0.15908 ... • 5.18205 ... 0.15163 42 3 0.39143 0.44053 ... 0.21527. 0.35440 ... 
6 0.15732 0.09934 -0.07039 0.16640 0.00013 2.08009 0.03938 
... • ... 5.89940 ... 0,27512 43 3 0.72826 ... 0.78171. -1.39705 ... -0.48028. -0.61159. 
4 0.09913 0.05436 -0.11302 0.13973 0,02444 2.19320 0.07431 
... ... • 2.38836: 0.08197 44 3 0.73951 -0.33375 -0.79726 0.15288 ... -0.58441 
5 0.42935'" -0.07969'" -0.04586'" 0.15569 0,00044· 0.67665 -0.05130 
• -0,16987'" -0.69909. ... ... 0.05751 45 2 0.74091 -0.24442. -0.23881. 1.90596. 
5 0.46291 -0.01461 -0,01381· -0.18360 -0,03504 1.27813 0.00274 
... 
-0.09090'" 0.10362· • 1.65224· 0.01972 46 2 0.48496 
-0.94991 ... -0.17418 ... 
6 0,32147 -0.13771 -0.00351· 0.01066'" -0.00352 1.16915'" -0,00451 
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TABLE XX (cont,) 
~ B!2 CONSTANT PROFIT R, GROWTH R, RE'l'N' R. LI2. R. 
.L. ~2 
47 3 0.56589 • 
-0.16312. 
-0.08746: -0,42121. 
-0.22092. 3.20763. 0,'5090 5 0.35040 
-0,05358 
-0,01870 
-0.05530 
-0.00027 1.13602 -0.00324 
48 3 0.81080 
-0.95503. 
-0.26979. 0.06016· 0.18756: 3.52894 0.10968 4 0.49658 
-0.16025 
-0.01962 0.10982· 
-0,00180 1.93977· 0.03691 
49 2 0,77880 
-1.19026 
-0.24539: • 0.25882· 2.95879 
-0.10821· 
-0.21198. 0.08153 6 0.33270 
-0.10099 0.05427 
-0.05645 2.28815 0.05919 
50 1 0,76212 • 
-0.18938. • 0.16330· -0.89268. 
-0.21838. 2.77107. 0.06332 6 0.31327 
-0.08458 
-0.00572 0.10616 0.08104 2.17031 0.04679 
51 2 0.77782 
-1.29890. -0.48282. ·,0.37264 
-0.26348: 4.97837. 0.14491 
5 0.49067 -0.11210 -0.00666 0.12439 0.00349 2.21664 0.04556 
52 1 0.45497 -1.57757 • 0.31369: • -0.09662. 0.67311. 4.20212 0.23708 
4 0.22148 -0,24738 '.00315 0.18178 -0.00732 4.58830 0.26003 
53 1 0.63371 
-1.23843. 0.16028: • • 2.21207· 0.03441 -0.02277 0.31138. 
4 0.41543 -0.08924 0.00352 0.00507 -0.00440 2.76938 0.05423 
54 2 0.65693 -1.29686 • • 0.32019· 5.02213 0.06473 -0.07111. -0.02219. 
4 0.53422 -0.19245 0.00026 -0.00063 0.01169 6.85447 0.09687 
• 
-0.26832. • • 2.15565: 0.03788 55 2 0.58904 -0.08477. -0.06846. -0.43511. 
5 0.37619 0.02507 -0.01526 -0.02407 0.01866 0.54139 -0.03252 
0.56969 -0.82155 • • 0.28781· 3.36638 0.05942 56 1 -0.11168. -0.05174. 
4 0.37099 -0.1l87()' 0.02039 -0.01475 0~00574· 2.46836 0.00930 
-1.08172. -0.42403. • 0.24761· 6.29222 0.13612 57 1 0.63202 -0.03991. 
5 0.37322 -0.09013 -0.03720 -0.01787 0.00227 4.54294 0.09891 
• • • 3.05324. 0.23109 58 1 0.60155 0.86078. -1.89850. -0.29880. 0.17332. 
6 0.53237 0.05882 -0.04122 -0.35040 -0.06732 1.51234 0.04553 
• -0.18565. • -0.06283· 3.98833. 0.11658 59 1 0.54555 -0.15788. -0.14984. 
5 0.21503 -0.03229 -0.02682 -0.00532 0.01267 1,71400 1.71400 
• • 5,07489 0.05639 61 2 0.56079 -1.33212 -0.04296. -0.03795 0.12680. 
5 0,467'51 -0.12232 -0.00977 -·0.06925 0.00096 4.88924 0,05482 
• • • 4.46199. 0.10810 62 1 0,52483 -1,16741. -0.15329. 0.14532. -0.14195 
6 0,29508 -0.11123 -0.00318 -0.00105 0.00184 1.95364 0.02764 
0.28703: • 0,28448· • 1.09305: -0.01881 63 3 0.94678. -0.80527. -0.41559. 
4 0.10568 0.13310 -0.06275 0.06242 -0.00125 1,62876 0.04266 
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TABLE XX (cont,) 
~ ~ CONSTANT PROFIT R. GROWTH R. RETN. R. LIQ. R. 
...l... .J 
64 
65 
66 
67 
3 0,31805· 1,43854: • • • 0.58755: -0.0: -0.57710 -0.16486. -0.05710. 4 0.48331 
-0.19774 0.02847· 
-0.07770 0.00285 0.48057 -0.1( 
3 0.19768 • -0.56975. 0.22261. • 1.06188. -0.03325 2.93716 O.O! 4 0.15813 0.06749 
-0.04412 0.06175 0.02369 2.89579 0.01 
1 0.51533 • • ·-0.32913 -0.40605· O.OJ 0.92465. -0.59542. 1.41778. 5 0.43764 • 0.00236 0.0: 0.02364 -0.03016 -0.14861 1.64703 
1 0.66709 • • • • • O.O~ -0.62880. -0.19621. -0.26295. 0.01002. 1.48076. 
4 0.56256 
-0.20666 0.07271 
-0.19569 0.00609 1.93160 O.OE 
NOTE: parameter estimates and F statistics marked with an asterisk (.) 
fail to emerge as significant at the 5% level 
TABLE XXI 
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS REGRESSIONS - SU~{ARY 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES WITH PROPORTION OF INDUSTRIES WITH 
REG NO SIGNIFICANT CORRECT SIGNS SIGNIFICANT CORRECT §Im!§ ~2iil 
l!::R ~ l!::B !d! l!::R G-R R-R L-R 
- - -
1 22 26 3 2 33.3 39.4 4.6 3.0 
2 20 24 6 4 30.3 36.4 9.1 6.1 
3 14 27 
" 
1 21.2 40.9 6.1 1.5 
4 22 
" 
9 9 33.3 6.1 13.6 13.6 
5 19 3 10 13 28.8 4.6 15.2 19.7 
6 12 3 7 18 18.2 4.6 10.6 21.3 
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4.4 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
I shall initially discuss in this section the interpretation 
of the regression results for the furnishing industry (table XIX) 
which will serve as an introduction and guide to an analYSis of the 
results of two regressions for each industry contained in table XX. 
I shall then comment upon the summary of results for all regressions 
undertaken in all industries appearing in table XXI and attempt to 
provide an explanation tor the differing industry results with an 
industry characteristic analysis similar to that contained in 
section 3.4 of the previous chapter. Finally, I shall comment upon 
these results and how they might relate to the theory of the firm. 
It can readily be seen that the results for the furnishing 
industry are in accordance with the interpretation of the regression 
equations as linear probability functions. In all 6 regressions in 
table XIX the intercept is positive and less than 1. Since all 
parameter estimates which are significantly difter_nt from zero 
(except liquidity in regreSsions 4 to 6) are negative, the predicted 
value of the probability of takeover will never exceed 1. Thus 
the probability that a firm will get taken over is inversely related 
to both its profit rate and growth rate, although the effect of the 
latter disappears (though still retaining the theoretically antiCipated 
negative sign) when the grOwth rate is taken as relative to the 
appropriate industry average. In this industry the retention policy 
and hence dividend policy made no apparent impact on whether or not 
the firm was taken over. With liquidity in regressions 4 to 6, it 
should be pointed out that for the vast majority ot firms and tor 
all industries, the average liquidity ratio is negative. A negative 
sign for the parameter estimate for regressions 1 to 3 will imply that 
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the less liquid a firm becomes (i.e. the ratio becomes more negative), 
the greater is its chance of being taken over. For regressions 4 to 
6, a positive sign for the parameter estimate will imply the same 
thing since the value for each firm is being divided by the (negative) 
industry average. In terms of the interpretation of the equation 
as a probability function, it remains possible for the predicted 
value to take on values of greater than 1 if the firm is extremely 
burdened by debt (i.e. highly illiquid) and the industry average 
liquidity is negative and very small in absolute value. In general, 
this possibility is precluded by the size of the parameter estimate, 
it normally being very small in absolute value in regressions 4 to 6. 
For example, in regression 6 for the furnishing industry, even if 
the profit rate (the only other significant variable) were 0 it would 
require that the firm be more than 28 times less liquid than the 
industry average before the conditional probability of takeover 
exceeded unity. Similarly, for regression 4, where liquidity is 
also significant, the firm would have to be more than 35 times 
less liquid than the industry average before the probability exoeeded 
unity and the interpretation of the predicted values as conditional 
probabilities were to break down. 
Returning to the first three regressions:where the profit rate 
and growth rate are significant, it can be seen that inoreasing both 
will reduce the predioted probability of takeover. If both are 
zero, the firm haa approximately a 5oP~ chance of being taken over 
on the basis of the estimated value of the intercept. Because of 
the recognized causal correlation between prOfit. and growth, they 
will, in general, both tend to move together as they influence the 
probability of takeover. The empirical correlation is by no means 
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pertect, however, tor as Marris has argued,· high rates of growth 
may involve the sacrifice of profits so that the two can be inversely 
related. To the extent that this trade-oft between growth and 
profitability occurs, one can interpret regressions 1 to 3 as 
indicating the chOice of high growth and low profits or low growth 
and high profits as a means of reducing the probability of takeover 
and providing security. For instance, the same level of security 
could be achieved by earning an average of l~~ return on net assets 
but growing at an average rate of 6~~ per year as one could achieve 
by grOwing at 20% per year but earning 5~~ return on net assets as 
both reduce the predicted probability of takeover to zero." 
Slightly more reasonable levels of performance can be related to 
some positive but acceptable chance of takeover in the same way. 
The above interpretation is not however strictly correct in so 
far as there is a large residual variance to the estimated equations. 
It, however, this variation is attributable to either unknown or 
unalterable characteristics of the firm (such as the industry class 
or dispersion of shareholding) then perhaps the above calculations 
would take on more significance. That is, if management wished to 
avoid being taken over, they WOuld only be expected to take 
appropriate actions on the variables they can influence - profits, 
growth, retentions and liqUid1ty.TTT This is precisely why the 
equations were specified in the way they were rather than trying 
See the previous discussion on this pOint in section 2.5 chapter II 
page 60 and the related footnote. 
TT These calculations refer to the relationship estimated in regression 1. 
TTTA potentially important omitted discretionary variable is gearing but 
data were not available tor this. In any case, Singh found it not 
to be an important discriminator of the acquired and surviving firms. 
-1l5~ 
to add additional variables in order to attempt to improve the 
R2 value.· Furthermore, if a choice is available between growth 
and profitability to achieve the desired level of security as is 
apparently the case in the furnishing industry, managers may operate 
primarily on one of the variables, ensuring the other remained at 
a satisfactory level - the desired level of security possibly 
involving a trade-off between the costs (difficulties) ot reducing 
the probability of takeover to zero and the acceptance ot some small 
but positive threat ot takeover. In tact, Marris has argued that 
the managers would choose to maximize growth subject to a profits 
constraint (which operates through the valuation ratio) tor reasons 
mentioned previously as the method for achieving satisfactory levels 
of security. 
With the bulk of the industries, however, protits and growth 
do not both emerge as significant. Taking regreSSion 1, there are 
only 8 industries for which the parameter estimates for both profits 
and growth are significant, while there are 32 additional industries 
tor which either is significant. A likely explanation for this is 
that the inter-correlation between the two explanatory variables, 
resul ting in mul ticollineari ty. ukea, it TerT' 41tfio.l,t; ,if j not 
impossible, to disentangle their separate intluence. and obtain 
reasonably precise estimates of their relative ettects. The impact 
ot the jOint ettect of profitability and growth on the probability 
ot takeover emerges in either one or the other ot the two explanatory 
variables. a;!Ao8 tA8 etrect of tA. lIlulUooU.:lae .. :Uy is te 1a •• e.ae 
For example, one could have added the age of the company which was 
found in chapter I section 1.5 pp. 35-36, to be related to the 
probability ot takeover but this obviously is in no sense a 
discretionary variable at manager.' di.posal. 
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~he ee~1M&~.d eaa,l. ya.18ft88S. Thus, if it were possible to break 
the correlation between profitability and growth one could get at 
the separate effects of each in the estimated equation. If one 
estimated the relationship with profits and growth separately one 
would be likely to find that both were significant even within some 
of the 18 industries for which neither were significant. I shall, 
in the next chapter, be able to shed some light on this problem 
when the financial variables appear separately in the relationships 
estimated by meanS of the probit transformation. 
Looking at table XX in more detail, it can be seen that 
regressions 1 and 4 usually provide the best form of the relationship, 
these being the equations corresponding to the employment of the 
latest pre-bid data for the taken over firms. In the first set, 
regressions 1 to 3, the breakdown is as follows: regression 1 appears 
in table XX for 28 industries, regression 2 in 21 industries and 
regression 3 in 17 industries. In the second set where the variables 
are related to the industry average, regression 4 appears for 26 
industries, regression 5 for 24 industries and regression 6 for 16 
indUstries. It would appear from this, the performance of the firm 
immediately prior to the bid, whether in absolute terms or relative 
to the industry performance in that year, more often offers the 
't best indicator of whether or not the firm is taken over. This 
impression is confirmed by the profits variable in table XXI where 
in one-third of the industries it"emerge. as significant in regression 
1 but declines to just over one-fifth in regression 3. An even 
more dramatic decline is noticeable between regression 4 and regression 6. 
't With the qualification that in some cases these equations are not 
significant. 
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It can also be noticed that the regression equations in 
table XX can be sensibly interpreted as linear probability 
fUnctions as was illustrated with the furnishing industry. In 
all but 11 Of the 132 regressions in table XX the intercept is 
significant, positive and lees than unity. Furthermore, the 
significant parameter estimates with the exception of liquidity 
take on the theoretically anticipated sign. Increases in both 
profits and growth will reduce the chance of takeover.- ! 
The effect of retentions are, however, weak as can be seen 
from table XX. At best only in 6 industries does the retention 
ratio emerge as a significant influence on the probability of 
takeover although in each case it takes on the correct sign such 
that high retention ratios are associated with a high risk of 
takeover. This is marginally improved upon in the second .et 
where the retention ratio is measured relative to the industry 
average. ;We noted in chapter 1, section 1.5, the possibility that 
the retention ratio has its effect on the probability of takeover 
by way of a U-shaped relationship. This speculation emerged from 
an inspection of table Vlllc which contains the proportions of 
acquired firms to the total within various groups of the retention 
ratiO. What appears to be happening is that any effect of retentions 
is being obscured by extreme values at both ends of the scale. On 
the one hand, negative values of retentions can only occur when 
profits are so low that required dividend payments (i.e. on preference 
shares), result in exceeding the atter tax level of profits and 
results in the ratiO beCOming negative. On the other hand, it is 
not possible by definition to retain greater than 10Q% of after tax 
earnings. Values of the ratiO greater than 1 occuring in table Vlllc 
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therefore result from the firm making losses and paying out 80me 
required level of dividends exceeding the Talue of the losses. 
In this case, the ratio would result in positive values greater 
than 1. However, both these extreme values correspond to the same 
argument concerning the role of retentions: that the retention ratio 
for firms earning low profits or making losses is not a discretionary 
variable and its level is determined by the neceSSity of servicing 
the preferred equity. Thus these companies would faoe a high risk 
of takeover not because of either very high or negative values of 
the retention ratio, but because of their poor profit position. 
Negative values would serve to obscure the anticipated effect that 
high retentions are associated with a high threat of takeover when 
retentions act as a discretionary variable affecting the valuation 
ratio independently of profits while values greater than 1 would serve 
to support the hypothesiS for the wrong reasons. Even a-aaal.l number 
of these perverse observations oould serve to overwhelm the industry 
results where the number of observations are not great. In this .ense 
the retention ratio emerges as a poorly specified variable. A 
solution to this problem is adopted in the next ohapter where I shall 
use grouped data tor the retention ratio in the probit model and omit 
t~ese two extreme group.. In this way it may be possible to capture 
the discretionary element to retention policy and the way it m1lht 
atteot the valuation ratio and the probability ot takeover. 
With liquidity, I expected thathigbly liquid firms would be 
taken over although noting the possibility that low liquidity (i.e. 
high levels of .hort term debt) oould .ignal the firm was aotually 
or potentially in trouble and henoe a takeover oandidate who would 
not be expeoted to put up muOh re.istanoe it an ofter was .. de. 
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While undoubtedly excess liquidity has provided a motive for 
takeover, it would appear such an effect is being swamped by the 
role low liquidity plays as a symptom ot problems elsewhere in the 
firm. This is demonstrated by the tact that when the parameter 
estimate tor liquidity.is significant it is negative in regressions 
1 to 3 and positive in regressions 4 to 6.T From table XXI it can 
be noted, however, liquidity is seldom Significant in regressions 
1 to 3 although when measured relative to the industry average it 
improves as an indicator of whether or not the tirm is taken over. 
A somewhat surprising result emerges here. While a liquidity crisis 
might have been expected to occur immediately prior to the bid and 
hence liquidity in regression 4 to be more important than in regressions 
5 or 6 (where liquidity is measured as the average at the 2 and 3 
years prior to the otter respectivel~ divided by the appropriate 
industry averages), the OPPOSite appears to occur. Liquidity is 
significant most frequently when it is measured as a 3 year average 
in regression 6, declining in frequency by over halt to regression 
3. Thus it would appear that in a number of industries a liquidity 
crisiS preceded the otfer by a tew years, the typical acquired firm 
appearing to have made progress in imprOving its liquidity up to 
the time it was taken over. This usually would involve reducing 
its short term debt, either voluntarily or perhaps more usually at 
the request of the lending agencies. It is reasonable that this 
etfect should emerge only in the second set of 3 regressions since 
there undoubtedly exist quite large variations in the average liquidity 
pOSition ot companies stemming not only trom changes on the demand 
side over'.the. trade cycle but also on the supply side resulting 
See the interpretation otfered tor the sign ot liquidity with respect 
to the turnishing industry in section 4.4, pages 112-113 above. 
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from changes in governmental credit control policy over the period. 
What presumably is happening is that these variations Over time are 
swamping the effect of liquidity in the first 3 regressions while the 
attempt to remove the variations over time by relating the liquidity 
poSition of the acquired firm to the appropriate industry average 
has allowed the liquidity position to emerge as a significant 
influence on the probability of takeoTer. Nevertheless, this 
effect is still confined to a minority of industries and is not 
as common as the recent profit record or growth record as an industry 
influence on takeover. 
In table XXI, the effect of the growth rate virtually disappears 
when it is measured relative to the industry average. It will be 
remembered that the growth rate is alway. measured over the three 
years prior to the offer if the firm is taken over, so no significance 
should be attached to the marginal increase in the number of industries 
for which it is significant _etween regression 2 and regression 3. 
Presumably the reason why the relative growth rate. in regressions 
4 to 6 performed so poorly i8 that as a long-term measure of past 
performance, it operated reasonably well as an indicator of whether 
or not the firm would be taken over but when it was taken relative 
to the industry average in the second set of regressions, the ettect 
was swamped by the indlusion in the denominator ot large variations 
in industry growth rate8 over time. This did not 8eem to happen to 
the profit rate as the 8econd 8et ot regressions performed only 
slightly worse thaa the first. It will be remembered that profits 
here were mea8ured before tax. I a180 tried after tax prOfit8 and 
ca8h flow in place ot pre-tax profit8 which involved running 12 
additional regressions tor each industry. These results are not 
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included in this chapter since they were basically similar and 
if anything worse performers than pre-tax profits as an indicator 
of takeover. 
To summarise the results in this chapter, it would appear that 
while either profits or growth (or both) emerged as significant and 
with the theoretically antiCipated sign in a majority of industries, 
the firm~s retention policy as estimated seemed to have little effect 
on whether or not it was taken over. Liquidity seemed to play a role 
in the takeover process such that the less liquid relative to the 
industrial average were taken over, but it appeared that the liquidity 
crisis tended to occur some time prior to the offer. An explanation 
for this was not immediately apparent. By comparison with the results 
in the previous chapter, it would appear that the valuation ratio 
provides a slightly more consistent indicator of whether or not a 
firm will be taken over. Although it was noted in the previous 
chapter that the coefficient of determination corrected for degrees 
of freedom (~2) will understate the 'true' goodness Of fit in the 
sense described there, this statistic will be comparable for the 
results of the two models as will the F statistic. By comparison 
of the two summary tables (XVI and XXI) it can be seen that even 
ignoring the logarithmic formulation of the valuation ratiO, there 
are 39 industries where the valuation ratio proved to be significant 
but only at best, 22 where profits and 21 where growth emerged as 
significant. However, the previous discussion of the effects of 
multicollinearity in the equations of model II should be kept in 
mind for it was noted there that 40 industries had either prOfits 
or growth (or both) as significant, the multicollinearity leading 
to a high degree of indeterminacy in the estimated equations. 
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Comparing ft2 between the two models, I find that in 33 
industries, the regressions in table XV with the valuation ratio 
in a linear form have the best fit, while for the same number 
of industries, the financial characteristics ot the firm provide 
the best tit ot the relationship. With the F statistiC, the 
valuation ratio model pertorms slightly better with 36 industries 
having higher F values for the equations in table XVI as compared 
to the equations in table XXI, while only 30 industries had higher 
F values tor the tinancial characteristics model •. 'fllu the 'valuation 
ratio model appears to perform only slightly better than model II. 
What does emerge a. interesting trom a comparison ot the two models 
is that 24 industries have both signiticant valuation ratio coetficients 
and either significant profit rate or growth rate (or both) coefficients 
when regression 1 is compared for both modele, and 10 industries 
have none ot these Significant. 
I have already attempted to discover whether there were any 
shared characteristics ot the industries for whioh the valuation 
ratio failed to emerge as Significant. I shall now present the 
results for a similar analysis ot the 26 industries tor which 
neither profits nor growth were signifioant. In dOing .0 I .hall 
also see if there are any oharaoteri.tios in oommon of the 24 indu.trie. 
for which both models performed well a. well a. the 10 indu.trie. 
for whioh neither model oould produoe e1gn1fioant influlnoe. on 
the probability ot takeover in terms of the valuation ratio, profits 
or growth. In table XXII appear the number ot industrie. for whioh 
neither the protit rate nor the growth rate in model II emerged a. 
significant in ranked group. of indu.try oharaoteristics. Table XXIII 
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offers a similar analysis for the 10 industries for which neither 
the valuation ratio in model I nor either the profit rate or 
growth rate emerged as significant. Finally, table XXIV presents 
a similar breakdown tor the 24 industries for which both the 
valuation ratio in model I and either the profit rate or the 
growth rate (or both) in model II were significant.· In each 
caee the industry characteristics were ranked trom lowest to highest. 
TABLE XXII 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES !HERE NEITHER DE PROFIT RATE 
NOR :mE GROWTH R~E WERE SIGNIDCANT ~REGRESS10N ;I.) 
: 
FOR RANKED AND GROUPED INDUSTR1ES BY INDYSTRY CHARACTIjRISTICS 
RANKED INDUSTRIES· 
lID CHARACTERISTICS l::ll. l1:U ~ ~ ~ 56-66 
GROWTH RATE 5 2 3 6 5 5 
SIZE 6 4 3 :5 4 4 
V ALUA'lION RATIO 3 6 5 2 4 6 
PROFIT RATE 4 4 4 3 7 4 
PROPORTION OF T-o's 5 1 5 6 6 3 
• Thi8 i8 the 8ame procedure adopted in the prev10ue chapter for the 
analy.is of industry patterns in the non-.ignificant valuation ratio 
coefficient. in table XVII 
TOTAl 
26 
26 
26 
26 
26 
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TABLE XXIII 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES WHERE NEITHER THE VALUATION RATIO NOR 
EITHER THE PROFIT RATE OR GROWTH RATE WERE SIGNIFICANT (REGRESSION 1) 
FOR RANKED AND GROUPED INDUSTRIES BY INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
RANKED INDUSTRIES 
IND CHARACTERISTICS 1-11 12-22 ~ ~ .i?::ll ~ TOTAL 
GROWTH RATE 2 1 2 0 2 3 10 
SIZE 3 3 0 3 1 0 10 
VALUATION RATIO 2 3 0 1 1 3 10 
P'WFIT RATE 2 1 2 1 2 2 10 
PROPORTION OF T-O's 3 1 1 2 2 1 10 
TABLE XXIV 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES WHERE BOTH THE VALUATION RATIO AND EITHER (OR BOTH) 
THE PROFIT RATE AND/OR THE GROWTH RATE ARE SIGNIFICANT (REGRESSION 11 
FOR RANKED AND GROUPED INDUSTRIES BY INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTIC 
RANKED INDUSTRIES 
Inn CHARACTERISTICS l::li .u.::n 23-33 34-44 .i?::ll ~ ~ 
-
GROWTH RATE 3 7 4 3 4 3 24 
SIZE 2 5 6 4 5 2 24 
VALUATION RATIO 5 3 5 7 2 2 24 
PROFIT RATE 2 6 6 6 3 1 24 
PROPORTION OF T-0'8 4 5 4 4 4 3 24 
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The most striking feature to emerge from the industry aaalyais 
contain.d in the above thr.e tables is the failure of any of the 
industry characteristics to indicate any sort of appar.nt similarities 
in a.) the 26 industries for which neither profits ner growth were 
significant, or b.) the 10 industries for which neither the valUation 
ratio nor eith.r profits or growth were Significant, or c.) the 24 
industries for which both the valUation ratio and either (or both) 
the profit rate and/or the growth rate were significant. In the 
analys1s of the corr.sponding table for the non-.ignificant valuation 
r~tio coefficients (table XVII) in the previous chapter I ii.cu •• ed 
a numb.r ot .xpectations concerning the pattern. wh1ch could have 
e.erg.d from the analysia of the indu.try charact.ri.tics. Many of 
the aame exp.ctationa would have held h.re because of the eftect 
the protit rate and growth rate have On the valuation ratio. There, 
as h.re, non. of the previous expectations appear to have e •• rg.d. 
The only t.ntative pattern app.aring is in table XXIV where there is 
a slight tend.ncy tor the industries with the low •• t •• dian protit 
rat •• and the high.st median protit rates to perform 1 ••• w.ll acoording 
to the hypoth •• is than the middle group.. Unfortunately, an .xplanation 
ot wby both .xtr •••• ahould p.rtorm in tbia way (a. with the alight 
tend.ncy for the extr ••• s in protit rate in table XVII in the previou8 
chapt.r to .how a gr.ater proportion of induatrie. witb non-aignificant 
• valuation ratio coefficients) ia not immediat.ly apparent. 
• The reader may wi.h to r.mind hims.lt ot the pr.vioua discua.ion 
ot table XVII in chapter III a.ction 3.4, page. QO-92 wh.re, .s 
h.re, nO strong indu.try pattern .merged. We ahall not however, 
devote any additional discu.aion to these result. becauae of their 
appar.nt random natur •• 
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The results contained in this chapter are, on the whole, similar 
to those found by the only other major researcher in the field, Ajit 
Singh. It is not possible to comment upon whether or not the results 
for the earlier period contained in his study more strongly suggest 
influences On the probability of takeover because of the differing 
statistical techniques employed. Nevertheless, Singh found, U8ing 
univariate analysis, profits to be the best discriminator of the: 
acquired and non-acquired firms although growth also emerges as a 
significant discriminator. With retentions 'and liquidity h.e is not 
8~le to reject his null hypothesis that the two groups of firms are 
distinguishable. With multivariate analysis, he was frustrated by 
the intercorrelations between the variables in improving the 
discrimination above that achieveable by profits on their own. 
In this sense, the results achieved here show some improvement on 
Singh's. This is undoubtedly due to the way in which the industry 
variations were removed through the specification of much finer 
industry classes. Unfortunately, attempts to discover patterns in 
the industry analysis were almost completely frustrated. Even with 
the best of Singh's results, as in the results contained in this 
chapter, there remains a high degree of indeterminacy in the financial 
characteristics equations. 
Neither the financial variables nor even the valUation ratio 
provided a complete picture of the characteristics of acquired as 
opposed to non-acquired firms. Nevertheless, profits, growth and 
the valuation ratio have here emerged quite consistently as significant 
influences on whether or not the firm is taken over. Thus not only 
is it demonstrated that the stock market has an important influence 
on the probability that a firm will be taken over, but so also does 
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the firm's financial performance and hence to some degree the financial 
decision policies of the management. It appears as though the firm can 
go some way towards avoiding being taken over by achieving high growth 
rates or high profit rates or both. These results by themselves offer 
little towards an understanding of the appropriate theoretical model 
of the firm. • I previously indicated that the empirical demonstration 
Of the valuation ratio takeover relationship provided only a necessary 
condition for the acceptance of the Marris growth maximization revision 
to the theory of the firm. Similarly with the results contained here, 
I cannot say that because it appears a firm can avoid being taken ,over 
by seeking high profits Or high growth (or both) that they are attempting 
to do one or the other (or both). It i8 hoped to shed 80me light on 
this question in chapter 6, but first I shall explore the impact of 
the variables which influenoe whether or not a firm is taken over 
individually by means of an alternative statistical eetimational 
technique, that of probit analysie. 
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C~T~ V 
THE PROBIT MODEL OF TAKEOV~S - AGGREGATE ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I shall attempt to examine some of the variables 
previously employed in models I and II in a univariate context with 
all the 3566 firms taken together so that industry classes are ignored. 
There are several reaSOns why I choose to examine takeovers in this 
way'which stem from the earlier results. First, I shall look at the 
i~pact of each of the variables by themselves because of the multi-
collinearity problem discussed in the previous chapter with respect 
to profitability and growth. Furthermore, the causal ... relation 
between the financial variables and the valuation ratio indicated 
treatment in separate models which will be continued here. Second, 
while the employment of fine industry classifications was indicated by 
the large inter-industry variations in pertormance, the results showed 
neither any general improvement when variables were related to 
appropriate industry averages nor any indication ot patterns in 
whether an industry would tit. or fatl to fit the theoretically anti-
Cipated relationship. Ignoring the industry classes by taking all 
firms together into a univariate analysie will undoubtedly have the 
ettect of --reintroducing considerable 'noise' into the analysis. 
This should not lead to biased reeults because ot the apparently 
random character of the industry results as to whether or not the 
anticipated relationship would hold in a given industry. The nature 
of the probit transformation will tend to counteract the effect of 
the reintroduction of inter-industry variation since it involves 
using grouped data. 
-129-
I shall first in section 5.2 describe the probit technique of 
estimation and its interpretation with respect to the theory of 
takeovers put forward by Marris. In section 5.3 I shall present 
the results and conclusions stemming from this alternative analytical 
process. 
5.2 THE PROBIT TRANSFORMATION AND THE THEORY OF TAKEOVERS 
The probit transformation has a long history in biometrics and 
has recently been applied to economic prOblems.· For simplicity of 
exposition, consider the two main variables in the analysis, the 
dummy variable representing the occurance or non-occurance of a 
takeover and the valuation ratiO. At a given level of valuation ratio 
a certain proportion of companies will be taken over while others will 
survive. This implies there are variations between firms in their 
ability to resist a takeover bid. These variations may stem from 
a number of sources such as the dispersion of share ownership or 
factors involved in the industrial setting. The ,ssential point is 
that for every firm there exists a lethal level of valuation ratiO, 
below which it is bound to be taken over and above which it is safe. 
(The lethal level of valuation ratio is given for firms which are 
taken over by that level which prompted the Offer.) For a number of 
unspecifiable, unknown or random reasons, however, there will exist 
variations between firms in their, lethal level of valuation ratio. 
One may interpret this as a strong form of the MarriS valuation ratio 
constraint while in the previous analysis of chapters III and IV, I 
The major work in this field is Finney (1952). For a step by step 
account of this method see Mather (1965). Two economic examples 
using the probit technique may be found in Warner (1962) and Cramer 
(1962). 
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was dealing with the hypothesis in a weak form, i.e. the lower the 
valuation ratio the greater the probability of takeover. 
Assuming the frequencies of lethal levels of valuation ratios 
are normally distributed, then for a given level of valuation ratio, 
the normal curve will be divided into two parts. The two areas 
underneath the curve are determined by the distance of the valuation 
ratio from the mean when expressed in terms of the standard deviation. 
The area to the left of this given valuation ratio gives the proportion 
of firms whose lethal level of valuation ratio is below the given level 
pnd the area to the right gives the proportion of firma which will 
survive with a given ratio. 
Plotting the proportion of firms taken over against the valuation 
ratio yields a sigmoid. But plotting the normal deviates which 
correspond to the proportion of firms taken over, a straight line 
in relation to the valuation ratio is obtained. It often turns out 
that the frequency distribution of individual reactions is not normally 
distributed. When, however, the logarithm of the stimulus (in this 
case, the valuation ratio) is used, the frequencies of the reaction 
(takeover) becomes approximately normal. A double transformation then 
yields the desired linear relationship. To remove the negative sign, 
S is normally added to the normal deviates and the resulting values 
called probits. Thus a probit less than S corresponds to a probability 
of less than 0.5. Regression analysis can then be used on the 
transformed data. A problem of this technique as it stands is that 
the variance of the proportion is dependent on the proportion itself. 
A system of weighting each proportion must be employed before regressing 
the probit value on the log valuation ratio. The derivation of the 
proper system of weighting eaoh proportion uses the methods of maximum 
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lik.lihoOd .... 
An iterative method is used to fit the regreasion line in the 
calculation of the best fit. A provisional set of expected values 
is obtained from a visual fit of a straight line to the tranaformed 
data. These expected values are then uaed with regreasion analysia 
to generate expected values for the calculation ot a more exact line. 
It the visual tit was reaaonably good, additional approximation ot 
the best tit with turther rounda ot regresaion analys1. is otten 
unnecessary, two rounda usually prOving to be .utticient .0 that no 
f~ther improvement in the tit occurs. In tact, the limit to which 
th •••• stimat •• tend aa the cycle ot d.t.ra1n1ng a new 111'1. with the 
aid ot that last calculat.d i. indetinit.ly r.p.ated is the maximum 
lik.lihood estimate. This proc.dur. i. illu.trat.d in the n.xt •• otion 
prior to the r •• ult. b.ing pr.s.nted. Standard .rror. may b. caloulat.d 
tor the paraa.t.r •• timate. and • oX. 2 te.t u.ed ••• te.t of aip1t1oano •• 
The probit tran.tormat1on sutter. trom none ot the deteot. ot the 
l1n.ar probability funotion .mployed pr.viou.ly. The prOblem of 
h.t.ro.kedaet1oity ba. been r.moved by the .yetem ot weisht1ns and 
it 1. obvious that the oaloulated value, by det1nit1on, 1. kept within 
the 1nt.rval .ero to one .0 that 1'1' anomal1e. are senerated in it. 
1nt.rpretat1on a. wa. po •• 1ble previoully. One i., however, deal1ns 
with srouped data and 11'1 thil .en.e 10.1ns information by the prooe •• 
of sroupin,. Th •• xt.nt of th11 '10 •• ' oan be m1nimi •• d if .uffio1ently 
... 11 srOUPI are oonltruoted. I .hall .xplore the lenl1t1vity of the 
r.sultl to chan,'1 1D ,roup .i.e and nuaber 11'1 the n.xt leot1on. 
I have lillit.d ayillf to a Wlivar1ate analyl11 (althou,h it 11 
• Jor thi. derivation .e. Goldber,er (1004), pp. 248-2SS. 
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possible to extend the technique to handle any number of independent 
't 
variables) because of the number of firms necessary to get a 
satisfactory number of groups, each with a satisfactory number of 
firms, would exceed the size of the population of public quoted 
companies. For instance, if one wished to look at two independent 
variables, e.g. profits and growth, and One wished 15 groups each 
comprised of at least 50 firms, it would require a minimum of 12,250 
companies in the sample (i.e. 15 by 15 by 50) while one is limited 
to the 3566 firms actually in the population of public quoted companies. 
I~ any case, I argued earlier that not only should the valuation ratio 
't't be treated on its own, but also that univariate analysis is 
appropriate to break the correlation between the other financial 
't't't " i~ ~ variables. ~,~ ~ AI" o;t= 
~'IM ~ .q. <;l~£c.+'~ ~~ 
5.3 ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
I shall first illustrate the probit technique of estimation with 
an examination of the valuation ratio - takeover relationship. The 
results for all variables employed in the probit analysis will follow 
and finally I shall offer some concluding remarks on the impact of 
these results on the analysis in the preceding chapters. This will 
serve to summarise the results of the examination of the acquired firms 
concluded with in this chapter. 
The first step is to categorise all the firma into groups by 
valuation ratio and to count the number of firms in each group and 
For an exposition of this see Finney (1952), p. 105. 
See chapter III, section 3.2 
't't't See chapter IV, section 4.4 
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and the number of these which were taken over. A procedure of 
trial and error is necessary in order to construct the groupings 
so that there is a reasonable number of firms in each group so that 
the proportions are not easily distorted by one or two unusual 
observations and also that the observations are spread over a 
reasonably large number of groups. I aimed at achieving around 
15 groups each containing approximately 50 firms at the minimum •• 
The proportions of firms taken over to the group total (Q) and 
P = (1 - Q) are constructed and the log of the mid-point of each 
group found. The proportion surviving, (P), is then used to find 
from tables" the 8~p1rical probits (i.e. 5 added to the values of 
the normal deviates corresponding to the proportions). These empirical 
probits are then plotted against the log of the valuation ratiO group 
mid-points and a prOvisional regression line fitted by eye. Expected 
probits (Y) are now read off from the visually fitted regression line 
corresponding to the log valuation ratio. These are used to calculate 
working probits (Y.) which will be used in regression analysis. The 
working probit is found from tables which usually need interpolation 
and are based on the expected probits (Y) and the proportion ot take-
overs in each group (Q). Weighting coefficients (W) are constructed 
from tables to weight each working probit which may be regarded as 
••• equivalent to saying that each pOint has been observed W times. 
Weighted regression is then used as the provisional line in the 
The data contained in chapter I, tables VIlla through VIlle are 
of the torm required for this analysis. 
Tables are available in a number of sources including Fisher and 
Y~te8 (1943) and Finney (1952) 
't'H' A G'>"plete description of the calculation of working probits and 
th, a.ppropriate weighting coefficients are to be found in Finney 
(F.,?) chapters 3 and 4. 
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calculation of a second and presumably better fitting regreSSion 
line. This second or any subsequent round of calculation is often 
unnecessary if the visually fitted line was reasonably good. Table 
XXV offers an illustration of the calculations involved in 2 rounds 
of regressions of the probit transformation on regression 1 data in 
chapter III for the valuation ratio. The figure below it shows the 
plotted data with the visually fitted regression line and the first 
probit regression line. 
The first probit regression line is: 
y = 2.9836 + 2.2059X where X is the log valuation 
ratio 
using theX2 test I find this line accounts for 87.~ of the variation 
in the probit value. 
The second round probit regression line is: 
y = 2.93980 + 2.25210X 
(0.04266) (0.01042) 
This line sccounts for 92.~/o of the variation in the probit value 
and ,.1, tl' an F value of 162.312 decisively rejects the null hnlothesis 
that no relation exists between the two variables. 
F"~rn table XXV and the Ugure below it, one can see that the 
logarithmic transformation of the valuation ratiO was appropriate in 
that the scatter of probit values lies very close to a straight line. 
The second fitted regression line showed some slight improvement on 
the first since the visually fitted line overestimated the true 
slope. It can also be seen that the calculated values from the 
second prc'Jit regression differ only slightly from the first indicating 
that the first resression line was a reasonably accurate representation 
~U! 
PROB1T REGRESSION CALCULATICj S FOR THE VALUATION RATIO 
.1::R log V-R No, of Co's No, or T-O L ..JL ...L .!...fv1sual) --tL ..1L y (calc) ..l.!.... ..1L I _(c~lc) 
0,10 0 40 37 0,075 0,925 3,5605 2.55 5,9637 2,2536 2,9836 4.0061 5,1080 2,9398 
0.25 0.3979 98 89 0,092 0.908 3.6715 ~'.60 3.6751 29.5950 3,8613 3,6925 38.3592 3.8359 
0.35 0.5441 135 116 0.141 0.859 3,9242 ~ 400 3.9270 59,2151 4.1838 3,9526 67,1693 4.1652 
0.45 0,6532 220 172 0,218 0.782 4,2210 4.24 4.2217 112.1032 4.4245 4.2340 123.9788 4,4109 
0,55 0.7404 264 187 0,292 0.708 4.4524 4~52 4.4552 156.0636 4.6168 4,4583 159.2395 4,6073 
0,65 0.8129 235 135 0.426 0.574 4.8134 4,71 4,8140 146,6706 4.7768 4.8139 146.8233 4.7705 
0.75 0,8751 279 139 0,502 0.498 5.0050 4,88 5.0056 176,7409 4.9140 5,0053 177.0618 4.9106 
0.85 0,9294 252 116 0,540 0.460 5.1004 5.02 5.1003 160.4156 5.0338 5.1004 160.2317 5,0329 
1.00 1,0000 447 160 0,642 0.358 5.3638 5,20 5.3604 280.4567 5.1895 5.3601 280,7786 5,1919 
1.20 1,0792 373 133 0,643 0.357 5,3665 5,42 5,3647 220,9354 5,3642 5,3660 226,0716 5,3703 
1.40 1.1461 277 76 0.726 0.274 5.6008 5.60 5,6007 154,5328 5,5118 5.5984 160.1780 5.5209 
1.60 1.2041 212 46 0,783 0.217 5.7824 5.76 5.7817 108.0267 5,6397 5.7751 116.1209 5.6516 
1.85 1,2672 231 . 50 0,784 0.216 5,7858 5.90 5,7799 108.9026 5,7789 5.7852 117.5143 5.7937 
2,50 1.3979 306 66 0.784 0.216 5,7858 6.27 5.6571 110.4721 6.0672 5.7416 127.2532 6,0880 
3.50 1.5441 79 7 0,911 0.089 6.3469 6,66 6.2494 17.2117 6.3897 6.3451 24.1329 6.4173 
PRO ITS 
6.6 
6.2 
5.8 
5.4 
5.0 
4.6 
3.8 
3.4 
3.0 
YALU!'rIC'N 
~ 
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FIGURE IV·. 
VISUAL FIT AND FIRST ROUND PROBIT REGRESSION LINE 
VALUATION RATIO (REGRESSION 1) 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1 .. 4 
NOTE: Broken line is visually fitted regression line and the 
solid line is the first approximation of the fit by 
regression. 
o~ the probit relationship. USing these calculated values one can 
generate expected proportions of firms which will be taken over for 
given levels of valuation ratiO. These appear in table XXVI belOW 
along with the actual proportions of firms taken over. 
It can be seen that one can use the calculated probit regression 
line t~ predict the proportion of firms which will get taken over at 
any given level of valUation ratiO and in this sense consider the 
additional risk that a firm undertakes if it allows its valuation 
ratiO to fall. I shall discuss this further follOwing the presentation 
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TABLE XXVI 
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL PROPORTIONS OF TAKEOVERS 
FOR GIVEN LEVELS OF VALUATION RATIO 
EXPECTED PROBIT V ALOE LOG V-R V-R EXPECTED Q (T-O/N) ACTUAL 
-
2.9398 0 0.10 0.980 0.925 
3.8359 0.3979 0.25 0.878 0.908 
4.1652 0.5441 0.35 0.798 0.859 
4.4109 0.6532 0.45 0.722 0.782 
4.6073 0.7404 0.55 0.653 0.708 
4.7705 0.8129 0.65 0.591 0.574 
4.9106 0.8751 0.75 0.536 0.498 
5.0329 0.9294 0.85 0.487 0.460 
5.1919 1.0000 1.00 0.424 0.358 
5.3703 1.0792 1.20 0.356 O. :~57 
5.5209 1.1461 1.40 0.301 0.274 
5.6516 1.2041 1.60 0.257 0.217 
5.7937 1.2672 1.85 0.214 0.216 
6.0880 1.3979 2.50 0.138 0.216 
6.4173 1.5441 3.50 0.078 0.089 
NOTE: The values in table XXVI refer to the valuation ratio as 
measured in regression 1 in chapter III. 
Q 
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of the full results for the financial variables of profits, growth 
and retentions and an analysis of the sensitivity of this technique 
to group sizes. 
Table XXVII gives the results for the probit regressions On the 
valuation ratio (measured as in regression 1 chapter III), profits 
before tax (measured as in regressions I, 2, and 3 in chapter IV), 
growth (measured as in regression 1 chapter IV), and retentions 
(measured as in regressions 1,2, and 3 in chapter IV). The,extreme 
groups of the retention ratio (i.e. negative values and values exceeding 
1) were excluded in the three regressions run with retentions because 
of the problems arieing out of the interpretation of these extreme 
values previously discussed in section 4.4.· This reduces the number 
of groups for retentions but improves the specification of the variable. 
Size and liquidity have not been included because an inspection of 
TT 
the probit groups showed little relationship to exist and also with 
liquidity, problems would have been created in attempts to impose 
the logarithmic transformation because of negative values. Regressio~, 
lines for profits after tax and cash flow were also calculated but 
proved to perform marginally worse than pre-tax profits, and so are 
not shown. In all cases, two rounds of regressions were undertaken, 
the results of the final round shown in the table. 
The most noticeable point from these results is the great 
improvement over the results from the linear probability function 
employed in chapters III and IV. On their own the valuation ratio, 
See chapter IV, section 4.4, pages 117-118. 
TT Table VIlle in chapter I shows the probit groups for size. It was 
noted in section 1.5, page 31 that no relationship emerged from 
an inspection of the probit groups for liquidity. 
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TABLE XXVII 
PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CONSTANT PARAMETER EST 
.L L NO OF GROUPS 
VALUATION RATIO (REG 1) 2.9398 2.2521 162.312 0.9250 15 (0.0427) (0.0104) 
PRE-TAX PROFITS (REG 1) 4.2254 0.8400 124.192 0.9324 11 (0.0880) (0.0745) 
PRE-TAX PROFITS (REG 2) 4.3000 0.7852 363.597 0.9762 11 (0.0479) (0.0409) 
PRE-TAX PROFITS (REG 3) 4.3703 0.7137 169.024 0.9494 11 (0.0646) (0.0549) 
GROWTH RATE (REG 1) 4.4263 0.8372 186.106 0.9539 11 (0.0616) (0.0754) 
RETENTION RATIO (REG 1) 4.6865 0.3643 23.651 0.7472 10 
(0.1160) (0.0749) 
RETENTION RATIO (REG 2) 4.7020 0.3412 18.454 0.6976 10 
(0.1233) (0.0794) 
RETENTION RATIO (REG 3) 4.7894 0.2762 10.971 0.6105 9 
(0.1294) (0.0834) 
NOTE: standard errors appear below the parameter extimates in brackets. 
pre-tax profits and the growth rate each accounted for over 9q% of 
the variation in the probit value representing the proportion of firms 
surviving at various values of each variable. As indicated from the 
standard errors, all variables are significant at the ~ level. 
Retentions performed less well than the other variables, but 
remarkably better than in the linear probability model where they 
were significant in only a handful of industries in regressions 1 to 3. 
Thes~ results are the more surprising since any industry effect on 
the levels of the variables and the chance of takeover has been 
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ignored in this analysis. These results suggest one can place a 
high degree of confidence in the predicted values of the proportion 
of firms likely to get taken over with various valuation ratios, 
profit rates and growth rates although it must be remembered that 
the actual proportions are the result of examining takeovers over 
a 13 year period. In this sense the intercept is time dependent 
since the proportions will increase as the time period is increased. 
Nevertheless, for taken over firms these results can be interpreted 
in terms of short-term values of the variables since they were measured 
at the pre-bid levels. The proportions themselves in table XXVI 
no doubt overstate the actual danger of letting the valuation ratio 
fall since not only are the proportions time dependent, but also for 
surviving firms the valuation ratio is measured as the average over 
all available years. Thus, returning to table XXV, the three firms 
whose average valuation ratio was between 0.0 and 0.2 (i.e. the first 
group' whose mid-point is 0.1) but who were not taken over, maintained 
that average for a long period· of time. Others may have dipped into 
that class but managed to recover so a8 to be classed in a higher group 
and survive. Nevertheless, the clear indication from the results of 
the probit valuation ratio model is that a falling valuation ratiO 
will increase the chance of a firm being taken over.without placing 
a numerical value to the likelihood. This is firm support for Harris's 
theory of takeover and the valuation ratio constraint in its weak form: 
that the valuation ratiO is inversely related to the probability of 
takeover. Because of the nature of the probit technique, it is also 
support for a strong form of the constraint. The interpretation of 
the probit transformation is that there are variations between firm's 
abilities to resist or avoid a takeover bid whioh may stem from 
-141-
unspecifiable or unalterable factors. T For all firms, however, there 
eXists a lethal level of valuation ratio although there are variations 
between firms in this lethal level. Thus, any given firm in given 
circumstances will be likely to treat this lethal level as a constraint 
in the sense of the strong form of Marris's hypotheAs, that if the 
firm allows its valuation ratiO to fall below a certain level it is 
almost bound to be taken over, but above this level it is virtually 
safe from the threat of takeover. As previously noted, however, I 
can say nothing from the verification of the existence of the constraint 
(strong or weak) about the nature of the managerial motivation8.~ 
With regard to the financial variables results in table XXVII, 
both profits and growth are highly significant in explaining whether 
or not firms get taken over. As with the valuation ratiO, both take 
on the expected positive sign such that the greater is the profit 
rate or growth rate, the greater is the proportion of firms which 
survive. Consequently, as One moves down the groupings for each 
variable the greater will be the proportion of firms whose lethal 
level of profits and growth ia reached. Furthermore, it appears 
the two and three year average pre-bid profit rate for firms 
taken over provides a slightly better explanation of the differences 
in the proportions that survive at various levels of profit rates 
than does the profit rate immediately prior to the offer. That is, 
the probit value associated with the proportion of firms that survive 
is slightly more closely linearly related to the log of pre-tax profits 
two and three years prior to the bid if the firm was taken over than 
it was to the log of pre-tax profits in the year prior to the offer. 
This point was made previously with respect to the large residual 
variance to the linear probability equations; see chapter IV, section 
4.4, page 114. 
~ See chapter III, section 3.5. 
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This is a somewhat different result to that found previously where 
profits immediately prior to the offer in regression 1 were 
significant in more industries than either profits in regression 2 
or regression 3. It is possible to interpret the extremely good 
fit of both profits and growth in the manner suggested in the prev1o~s 
chapter with regard to these two variables. That is, to the extent 
that the profit rate and growth rate are independent such that 
management has some freedom to maximize one or the other, they can 
achieve satisfactory levels of security by choosing a satisfacto~; 
level of profits (i.e. one which exceeds their lethal level) and • 
seeking a maximum growth rate or vice versa, or high levels of both. 
Unfortunately, the analysis can shed no further light on the question 
nf mana~erial motivations and the optimum chOice of theoretical 
model of the firm. I shall return to this question in the next chapter. 
With regard to the retention ratiO, again the results show a highly 
significant positive logarithmic relationship with the probit value 
associated with the proportion of firms which survive. The explanatory 
power, however, is in no case as impressive as with the previous 
three variables conSidered, it accounting at best for just under 7~ 
of the variation in the probit value. It appears from the results 
that the retention ratio in the year prior to the offer for firms 
taken over (regression 1) is more closely log linearly related to the 
probit value than either the two or three year average prior to the 
offer (regressions 2 and 3 respectively). The positive sign to the 
relationship between the log retention ratiO and the probit value 
associated with the proportion of firms which survive goes contrary to 
expectations developed previously in chapter 2 section 2.6. There 
I anticipated that a~igh'divtdend ratio (low retention ratto) would 
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be pro-survival not only because it would, in general, be expected to 
positively affect the valuation ratio but also it would be a sign of 
management's expected improvement in future earnings. On the other 
hand it was argued, a high retention ratiO would tend to be required 
by firms earning low profits to undertake replacement investment and 
a low dividend ratio would be taken by the market as a Sign of 
pessimistic management. The opposite is suggested by the results, i.e. 
high retentions are associated with high chances of survival. One 
explanation for this is that the market favours growth in earnings 
• rather than dividends and thus prefers the capital gains that would 
result from the high earnings generated from the investment under-
taken with retained profits. Thus high retentions would tend to be 
associated with growing and/or profitable companies which previously 
have been shown as survival prone. High dividends would therefore 
be 
tend tQ/associated with companies which have few possibilities for 
growth or profitable investments and who therefore payout 'excess' 
earnings. It must be stressed that this analYSis is only tentative. 
One would need additional evidence to support it as an explanation 
of the results for the retention ratiO contained here. 
One possible explanation for the remarkably good fit achieved 
by using probit analysis for the financial variables and the valuation 
ratiO is that the procedure of classing the firms into a small number 
of groups has resulted in remOving much of the variation so as to 
give a misleading impression of the strength of the true relationship. 
While remOving random variation to expose an underlying relationship 
is usually desirable .apecially in cross-section investigations, the 
• This suggestion has been made and verified with regard to growth 
industries by Puckett and Friend (1964). 
-144-
strength of the probit model, in addition to its interpretive relevance 
to the takeover hypothesis, is that it overtly recognizes and takes 
into account the obvious fact that firms (as do individuals) vary 
in their resistance to a given stimulus(in this case the threat of 
takeover). The assumption that there are variations between individual 
firms in the threshold level of stimulus which will induce the response, 
that these variations stem from random, unknown or unquantifiable 
sources, and that the variations are normally distributed are precisely 
the assumptions used to justify the inclusion of the stochastic error 
term in regression analysis. By incorporating these variations in 
the analytical technique ~ne can discover directly the otherwise 
partially obscured causes of takeover. Nevertheless, I decided to 
explore the effect that group sizes and numbers had on the results in 
order to discover whether the almost perfect fit uncovered with respect 
to the explanatory variables would markedly be reduced by increasing 
the number of groups specified in the analysis. If the residUal 
variation increased dramatically with increasing the number of gro~ps, 
one would obviously not be able to place the same confidence in the 
results as is possible at present. Since the valuation ratiO is of 
primary interest to the analysis of takeovers, I decided to use it as 
the variable to examine the effects of increasing the group numbers. 
The results previously offered for this variable involved 15 groups. 
I decided to subdivide this into 30 and then 60 groups, but when the 
results came out had to settle for 29 and 56 groups as the extreme· 
groups had to be combined because there were too few observations. 
The results are shown below in table XXVIII along with the previous 
regression for 15 groups tor comparison. In all cases, two rounds of 
regressions were undertaken to arrive at the equations shown in the table. 
NO. OF GROuPS 
15 
29 
56 
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TABLE XXVIII 
PROBIT REGRESSIONS ON THE VALUATION RATIO 
AND THE EFFECT OF CHANGING GROUP SIZES 
CONSTANT VALUATION RATIO 
.L. L 
2.9398 2.2521 162.312 0.9250 (0.04266) 
-(0.01042) 
2.93732 2.26231 208.875 0.8855 (0.15758) (0.15653) 
2.94195 2.25450 337.496 0.8621 (0.12345) (0.12272) 
L 
0.8633 
0.8771 
0.8570 
NOTE: the standard errors of the associated parameter estimates 
appear below each in brackets. 
It is clear from this table that the earlier results are not 
dependent on, or in any way the result of the relatively few subdivisions 
of the explanatory variable employed. Both the slope and the intercept 
terms remain virtually unchanged. The F value showing the significance 
of the equation more than doubled as the gronp~'numbers increase from 
15 to 56. The residual variation increased somewhat as indicated by 
2 the R value but when corrected for degrees of freedom, the effect of 
increased group sizes actually served to improve the goodness of fit 
when the group numbers were increased from 15 to 29. Thus I conclude 
from this type of sensitivity analysis of variable subdivisions that 
the initial results presented were an accurate representation ot the 
probit valuation ratio - takeover relationship and were in no way 
dependent upon the group sizes chosen. In terms of their use as 
a description of the relationship, the initial results are perfectly ~~ 
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since the subdivisions can be deemed to be sufficiently fine relative 
to the observable variations in the firm's performance to provide 
sufficient scope for discussing the result of movements of the 
variables and the chance of takeover. 
The results contained in this chapter reinforce those established 
in chapters III and IV. Of central interest to this investigation 
is the valuation ratio - takeover relationship first put forward by 
Robin Marris. Both at the industry level where it was found to be 
significant in a majority of industries and at the aggregate level in 
t.le analysis in the present chapter, the inverse relationship between 
the valuation ratio and the likelihood of takeover (or in the probit 
model, the positive relationship between the proportion surviving and 
the log valUation ratio) has emerged. The profit rate and the growth 
rate Similarly emerge as indicators of whether or not the firm will be 
taken over. Separate analyses were undertaken for the valuation ratio 
and the financial indicators of performance since following Marris, 
it was expected that the impact of the firm's past performance and 
present state would be felt via the valuation ratio. It is for this 
reason he concentrates his attention on the valUation ratiO as the 
primary constraint on managerial behaviour. Having established the 
existence of this constraint both in its weak form (as a probability 
function) and in a strong form (as a threshold value which varies 
normally between firms as in the probit transformation), a necessary 
condition of the growth maximization h1pothesis with the valuation 
ratio constraint has been demonstrated. I stressed earlier, however, 
that these results can do no.more in terms of the chOice of appropriate 
theoretical model of the firm. In this sense I'have yet to accomplish 
the third aim of this study, i.e. to relate the takeover phenomenon 
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to the theory of the firm. For this I shall have to examine the 
raider's rather than the acquired firm's role in the takeover process. 
This will be done in the next and final chapter. 
As noted earlier, had I found perfect separation of the two 
groups in terms of profits (i.e. no overlap between the taken over 
and surviving firms), I could have concluded that such a strong 
control mechanism existed that managers were constrained to seek 
profits in order to survive. As Singh and others have indicated, 
poSiting other objectives to managers if such a strong mechanism 
~~s apparent would be trivial for whatever their desires, they would 
be forced to regard profits as their primary objective. Even in the 
results in this chapter, no such strong mechanism emerges. Firms 
can and do survive with low profits and indeed low valuation ratios 
for reaSOns outside those the limited data can uncover. In any case, 
the functional relationShips were established not to attempt to 
isolate all conceivable causes of takeovers, but to examine those 
aspects of the firm over which management had some degree of control 
and hence choice: size, profit rate, growth rate, retention ratiO, 
liquidity ratiO, and hence to some extent the valuation ratio. 
Thus, for example, even though there appeared to be an observable 
• relationship between the age of the firm and its chance of takeover 
it was not included as an explanatory variable in the foregOing 
analytical sections because it can tell us nothing about behaviour. 
Only if the object was to maximize the discrimination between the 
two groups would its inclusion be appropriate. 
Nevertheless, as indicated in the introduction of this study, 
the results contained here for the valuation ratiO, profits and 
growth can be used as a basis for discussing the causes of individual 
• See chapter I, section 1.5, pp. 35-36 
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takeovers which seems to be the primary objective of many observers 
of the U.K. takeover activity. One can undertake descriptions either 
in terms of their correspondence to the underlying relationships 
established here or seek emplanations of the individual cases if 
they deviate from the relationships in terms of the extent of the 
departure and why. Thus the second aim of this thesis, to uncover 
the underlying causes of takeovers with respect to the firm's 
performance, has been accomplished. 
With regard to the growth rate, both here and in Singh's study 
ic emerged that fast growth can lower the chances of takeover and 
hence provide a source of managerial security. However, growth has 
been put forward by Marris as a managerial objective as well. I 
was not able to get at the precise form of the relationship between 
objective and constraint because in mUltivariate analysis I was 
confounded by the correlation between profits and growth resulting 
in a high degree of indeterminacy in the estimated equations. The 
univariate analysis in the present chapter can give no clues to the 
interactions between the two. An explanation offered is that despite 
the observed correlation between profits and growth, if management 
has a choice between achieving high rates of one and a satisfactory 
level of the other to achieve a given level of security, then 
Marris's theory provides grounds for suspecting th,y will choose 
to maximize the growth rate. Some minimum or satisfactory level 
of profits is still necessary to avoid depressing the valuation ratio 
to an 'unsafe' level or at the extreme to avoid bankruptcy and 
hence affect the desired level of managerial security. 
With regard to the results for the retention ratio, when a·., ., 
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comparatively weak relationship finally did emerge in the probit 
model it took on a sign unanticipated in the earlier theoretical 
development in chapter II and one for which I had no firm explanation 
to offer. Neither liquidity nor size, the final two variables examined, 
proved to offer any basis for separating the two groups and in fact 
were dropped in the analysis in this chapter. Both as discretionary 
variables and as potential influences on the valuation ratio, retentions 
and liquidity fail to emerge as significant influences on whether or 
not a firm will be taken over. 
The influence of the indu8try setting was of interest in this 
study since it was anticipated that the large variations between 
industries in terms of the variables employed could serve to obscure 
the underlying relation8hips. A comparison of the results e.~·th., 
aggregate analY8is in this chapter and the stratified analY8is in 
the two previou8 chapters, however, does not support the initial 
concern. Variables significant in the linear probability function 
models continue to be significant when the industry cla8ses are 
ignored in the probit models. Furthermore, the industry differences 
in performance, in general, fail to indicate the reasons why in 
the previous chapters'some industries seem to fit the anticipated 
relationships while others do not. Thus, where I expected to be 
able to attribute the differences in the industry results to industry 
characteristics, no such relationships emerged. Either additional 
industry characteristics would be required but for the identification 
of which the data were not available, or the variations could be 
regarded as random, It is this second possibility which for convenience 
was adopted when employing the probit model. for it assumes random 
differences between firms (some of which could be due to unspecified 
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1ndu8tr~ cbaracter1sti~s) in the1r lethal levels of the variables 
wh1ch will prompt a raid upon thea. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TAKEOVER RAIDERS AND THE GROWTH MAXIMIZATION HYPOTHESIS. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is the purpose of this chapter and the final aim ef this 
study to see if it is possible for an examination of the raider's 
role within the takeover phenomenon to shed some light on the 
appropriateness of Harris's growth maximization hypothesis to the 
theory of the firm. Previously we found that little could be 
e~tablished with regard to the theory of the firm from an analysis 
of the acquired firms except to empirically establish the yaluation 
constraint in the form envisaged by Marris. This, however, did not 
provide grounds for choosing this revision to the theory of the firm 
in preference to either the neo-classical formulation or other posited 
objectives imputed to managers. 
In what follows I shall empirically examine some of the derivable 
predictions from the growth maximizing model with reference to a 
subset of the population of firms which have overtly demonstrated a 
"' desire to expand externally. In fairness to Robin Marris, what 
follows is not strictly an explicit application of the functional form 
of his model for in his own words, "through most of what follows we 
shall write as if internal expansion were the only method of growth ••• 
and merger possibilities are subsumed in specifying the functional 
• The basis of this chapter was presented at the Warwick Symposium 
in Industrial EconOmiCs, the preceedings of which appear in Cowling 
ed. (1972) • 
•• For this we shall use the 117 takeover raiders analyzed in chapter 1 
who have undertaken three or successful raids within the sample period. 
It will be remembered, we found there that-neither the number or T8.lue 
of their raids were related to various indicators of their performance. 
We shall use this in what follows aa a justification for treating these 
firma as a reasonably homogeneous group of companies. 
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forms. Alternatively, the reader may regard our theory as representing 
an account of the limits on growth rates among firms which do not 
• merge." The development in this chapter nevertheless remains an 
application which he implies would not be contrary to his thesis. 
I ahall take as my starting point the likelihood that those firms 
which are observed to be actively striving for external growth via 
takeovers are a subset of firms whoae managers include the firm's 
growth rate as a major component in their objective function. In the 
U.K. industrial climate where takeovers are common and auch external 
expansion i8 a significant proportion of the total growth of firms, 
takeovers can be seen as a feasible way for many firms to supple.ent, 
or even provide an alternative to, internal growth. If, by this 
reasoning, raiders are firms whoae managers view growth as a primary 
objective, then the predictions from a Marris type growth maximization 
hypothesis should be verified by empirical tests made with respect to 
this subset of possible growth maximizers. Moreover, in the context 
of the preceeding discussion, if the growth maximizing theory is to 
have any relevance it ought to be possible to observe some significant 
departure from the behaviour of the owner controlled profit maximizing 
firm." The general procedure adopted in this chapter is, in section 
• Marris (1964) p. 124. 
In what follows I shall only consider the effect of attributing these 
two possible managerial motivations to raiders. However, much of what 
is argued with reapect to the maximization of the growth rate would 
hold for the sales revenue maximization model (Bauaol (1959» and with-
out too much conceptual difficulty would fit into Williamson's (1964) 
diacretionary model where the growth rate plays an important role in 
determining the amount of alack available within the system. Moreover 
profit maximization is not contrasted with growth maximization simply to 
put up a straw man to be knocked down. It is rather seen as an alter-
native and not unreasonable motivational sche.e having as its basis 
strong owner control over managerial behaviour. We are not directly 
concerned with an examination of the predictions of the classical long-
run profit maximization model since nearly all behaviour ia conaiatent 
with thiS. Instead in order to make the notion of profit maximization 
operational we will view profit maximization in a shorter run .ense, 
stemming from owner'. uncertainty of the lon~-run and conseauently 
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6.2, to derive predictions concerning the proportion of raiders 
expected to achieve values of various stock market and financial 
variables greater or less than that achieved by firms in a comparable 
industrial setting· for the two alternative behaTioural assumptions 
of profit maximization and growth maximization." In section 6.3 
these predictions are then examined with respect to the actual 
proportions found empirically. 
It can readily be seen that not only are the two objectives 
imputed to raiders crucial in aetermin1ng the predictions, but so 
also are the objectives attributed to the group of non-raiding 
comparable firma. That is, the derived performance predictions tor 
raiders as growth maximizers compared with the pertormance of tirms 
in the raider's own industry may change, depending on the sort ot 
assumptions made concerning these comparable f1rm~s motivational 
objectives. In what to110ws I shall consider the etfect of imputing 
four possible motivational schemes to the non-raiding firms: Tiewing 
them as growth maximizers, profit maximizers, easy lite maximizers 
(resulting in a high preference for security), and finally as sleep7 
firms dittering only in their degree of inefficiency. In fact the 
body of non-raiding companies may ~ncorporate firms with all the above 
• Relating raiders' performance to their respective industry median 
values is done to normalize the performance indicators and thereby 
remove ditterences which are solely attributable to market conditions • 
.. An extremely interesting approach to answering a similar question has 
been adopted by Reid (1968) where he examine. for U.S. data various 
manager's interest variables and sharehoUera" interest variables of 
non-acquirers, OCCAsional acquirers, moderate acquirers, and active 
acquirers. He finds that c.~pan1es. growing by merger tend to be more 
oriented to manager's interests than sharekD1nera' interests while in 
non-merging companies the opposite appears to be the case. One can 
interpret theae results that raiders (aa fast growing firms) tend to 
sacritice owner'a (sharelUla..4.r.~ .. }~ interests in favour of their own 
interests which i8 in accordance with the predictions from a growth 
maximization hypotheais. 
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objectives and probably companies with others as well. The purpose 
of specifying the objectives is not to test their general validity 
but rather to introduce a greater degree of rigour into the analysis 
than would be possible in the absence of any discussion of the group 
of companies to be compared with raiders. If one finds general 
agreement between the predictions derived employing the four schemes 
of categorizing non-raiding firms when raiders are assumed to be 
maximizing their growth rate as contrasted with the predictions derived 
under the assumption that raiders are profit maximizers, then greater 
confidence can be placed upon the analyais than would be possible had 
not this specificat10n of motives been undertaken. Poss1b1y. drawback 
of such an approach is that the anount of a priori theorising must 
necessarily increase in proportion to the detail of the analysis. It 
1s nevertheless hoped that a picture of the raider as a growth 
maximizer which is distinct from the raider aa a profit maximizer 
will emerge trom section 6.2 and at least a majority of the analysis 
on which the predictions are based will be broadly acceptable. For 
clarity, the predictions are summarised in table XXIX. A positive 
sign is given where the prediotion is that a significant majority of 
raiders are expected to exceed their respeotive industry median tor 
• partiou1ar variable. A negative sign i. given for the opposite 
prediction and a zero indicate. there is not .xpeoted to be any 
.ignificant difference betw.en the two groups. 
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6.2 DERIVED PREDICTIONS FROM THE GROWTH MAXIMIZATION HYPOTHESIS 
A. GROWTH RATE 
The primary prediction to emerge from the hypothesis is that 
a significant majority of raiders (firms observed to be actively 
seeking growth) should in fact demonstrate growth rates higher 
than non-raiding firms in a comparable industrial setting. Were 
this not substantiated empirically, doubt would be cast on the 
applicability of a theory which postu~~ growth maximization as 
a general managerial objective but failed to fit a set ot firms 
extraneously observable as seeking expansion. It is argued below 
that this is a general prediction from the growth maximization 
hypothesis in the sense that it does not depend upon the four 
possible motives which will be attributed to the non-raiding firms. 
As profit maximizers, comparable firms would be expected to 
achieve rates of growth consistent with the availability of profit-
able investment opportunities. Identifying this availability with 
a normal declining marginal efficiency of capital schedule appropriate 
to the opportunities available within the industrial setting, net 
investment would cease when the rate of return equalled the cost 
of borrowing. The raider as a growth maximizer on the other hand 
would be expected to undertake raids in excess of that warranted by 
profitability.· Assuming a limited supply of potentially profitable 
takeover opportunities, this would involve the raider growing 
faster that firms which were assumed to be maximizing profits. By 
defining raiders as firms which have undertaken three or more raids 
within the sample period we have allowed the set of comparable firms 
See section 6.2.B where profitability is integrated into the model. 
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to undertake expansion by takeover as well as internal investment. 
Thus considerations of profitability can result in eOme raiding 
but in terms of~thie prediction active raiding is seen as primarily 
growth motivated. 
If comparable firms are themselves growth maximizers, raiders 
would still be expected to demonstrate faster growth rates since, 
as Marris points out, raiding is subject to fewer constraints than 
is internal expansion. The raider must only consider the market-
ability (acceptability) of his equity or his ability to service his 
loan stock as these form the majority of the payments made for 
acquired firms. The internal growth maximizer is constrained not 
only by the above when he seeks funds for expan8ion but also by 
the difficulties and costs involved in borrowing elsewhere and the 
constraints imposed on internal growth by retentions and the supply 
of technical and managerial expertise which the raider is in a 
sense purchasing along with the assets of the firm. Firms with 
growth orientated managers may be seen as the raiders of the future, 
trying to extablish themselves and their firms so as to alleviate 
these constraints and eventually become 'high flyers' in the stock 
market. 
A third assumption about the comparable firms is that they are 
easy life maximizers and possess managers who have a high priority 
for survival and generally undertake satisfiCing behaviour. Their 
aim is seen as the achievement of 'safe' levels of performance which 
i8 an attempt to insulate themselves on the one hand from the 
likelihood of bankruptcy or dismissal by the shareholders and on 
the other hand from the possibility of financial disaster or being 
taken over themselves resulting from undertaking excessive risk by 
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attempting to grow too fast. Here again, the prediction is that 
raiders woUld grow faster than these comparable firms with this 
survival motivation, as only a satisfactory level of expansion 
would be necessary to keep their market valuation sufficiently 
high to discourage raids or a shareholder revolt and maintain their 
market share while avoiding high risk investment projects. 
Finally, one could envisage the comparable firms as simply 
sleepy firma which are a range of companies differing only in their 
degree of inefficiency. The majority either go bankrupt or are 
taken over. Some surTive through favourable market conditioDS 
or fortuitous decisions made in the past, but in general seldom 
perform consistently well over a period of time. Here one would 
again predict that such firms WOuld demonstrate possibly an erratic 
but on average low growth rate so that the raiders would be expected 
to grow faster than the industry average were tae industry made up 
of sleepy firms. 
The predictions derived by assuming raiders are growth maximizers 
consistently view raiders as growing faster than comparable firms 
under the w.rious assumptions concerning the nature of the objectives 
of these firms. This prediction differs trom that derived by aSsuming 
all firms including raiders are profit maximizers in that in general 
the profit maximizing raider would not be expected to demonstrate 
a fa.ter long-run average growth rate as compared with the firms 
in their respective industrial settings. Investment projects under-
taken solely on the basis of expected profitability would not be 
likely to result in significant differences between firma' growth 
rates simply due to the chosen mix between internal and external 
expansion. Of course, some raiders as profit maximizers would grow 
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faster than firms in their industry as a result of extraneous 
variations between firms in, for example, the quality of manage-
ment but not as a result of differing motivations which are by 
assumption identical. Since there is no reason to suppose that 
managerial expertise which would necessarily result in fast growth 
is concentrated in the hands of raiding firms, we would not expect 
to observe a pervasive tendency for raiders to grow faster than 
firms in their own industry, if one assumes raiders as well as 
comparable firms are profit maximizers. 
~e implications of assuming raiders are profit maximizers 
and comparable firms are growth maximizers will not be examined 
in this section or in those that follow as such an assumption 
bears no likely relationship to reality of the theme of this 
chapter and remains only a conceptual possibility. 
If the comparable firms are assumed to be easy life maximizers 
or sleepy firms, imputing profit maximiZing behaviour to raiders 
would be likely to result in predicting that raiders would grow 
faster than such firms. Neither of these posited situations are 
pursued here because of the direct and necessary implications 
such predictions have on the derived predictions for profitability 
which are considered in the next section. 
B. PROFIT RATE 
A second and theoretically associated prediction is that a 
significant majority of raiders as growth maximizers should earn 
lower than average profit rates than comparable firms. This is a 
necessary condition for acceptability of a growth maximization 
hypotheSis in preference to profit maximization for two reasons. 
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First, 1n specifying managerial discretion in terms of the growth 
rate instead of profits, Marris correctly envisaged a trade-off 
between growth and profitability whereby firms sought ezpansion 
in excess of the level wa~nted by profitability considerations. 
Profits only enter the managerial objective function by way of a 
constraint on the primary growth obhective to maintain SOme minimum 
level. Second, both predictions of a faster average growth rate 
and a lower average profit rate are a lOgical necessity in order 
to dist1nguish empirically the two theoretical structure.. After 
all, if raiders tended to achieve above average profit rates aa 
well as faster growth rates, it could be argued that raiders were 
not attempting to maximize their growth rate but rather were success-
ful profit maximizers achieving gast growth as a consequence. This 
prediction of a lower average profit rate for raiders as growth 
max1 m1 zers is not, however, general, in that it does depend upon 
the nature of the particular motives specified for the comparable 
firms. 
If the co.parable fir.s are assumed to be .eeking mazimum 
profits it is likely that our derived prediction would hold since, 
as argued above, raiders were seen as sacrificing profits in favour 
of fast growth. 
Comparable firms as growth max1mizers, however, would also 
be sacrificing profits in favour of growth. Theoretically we 
have no grounds on which to distinguish whether the raidiag growth 
maz1m1zers would have sacrificed more or leas of their profits to 
achieve fast growth than the comparable firms as growth maximizers. 
As ... y life maximizers, the comparable firms would achieve 
their desired security partly through the mainteD&nce of a satisfactory 
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profit rate. ~he easy life maximijCers would not earn the maximum 
achievable level of profits since the easy life would involve 
putting up with some inefficiency and incurring some slack. But 
since security forms a major part of the easy life he would not 
be expected to allow his profits to fall to the eztent of the 
growth maximizer .here security enters the function not as an 
objective but as a constraint. Thus by comparison, raiders as 
gro.th maximizers who have sacrificed profits would be likely to 
demonstrate lower than average profit rat •••• hen compared to firms 
in their industry made up of easy life maximizers. 
Were the comparable firms typified by the sleepy inefficient 
firm described in the section above, we again have little a priori 
basis on .hich to distinguish the average profit performance of 
the growth maximizing raider, with his minimum profits constraint, 
and the sleepy firm who typically gets taken over due to a poor 
profit record. Some insight may be gained, ~sed upon the empirical 
evidence in this study but that still w11l u;tt1matelY depend upon 
one's personal assessment of the commonness of sleepy firma in the 
industrial population. 
~e derived profit predictions for raiders as growth maximizers 
when compared with firms in their re.pectiv. industries under various 
assumptions about the nature of the motivations of the comparable 
firm. do not yi.ld as clear a picture as 41d the growth rate predic-
tions. No d.finite pr.dictions could be made with regard to the 
relative performance of gro.th maximizing raiders when comparable 
firms are assumed to be typified by sleepy firms or growth maximizers. 
Ho.ever, the definite prediction emerges that a ~jority of raiders 
.ill demonstrate lower average profit rate. when the comparable firms 
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are assumed to be profit maximizers or easy life maximizers. We 
shall argue below that aSsuming raiders to be profit maximizers 
results in the oPPOsite prediction. That is, profit maximizing 
raiders would be expected to be observed earning higher profit 
rates than the firms in their respective industries and thereby 
the two theoretical predictions remain mutually exclusive. 
To assume all firms including raiders are profit maximizers 
would, on general equ1libruim principles, appear to imply identical 
or at least aot significantly different rates of return earned 
within an industry.regardless of the chosen mix betweea,internal 
and external expansion. If, however, profit max1m1zing raiders 
were simply less risk averse than their counterparts who seldom 
if ever undertook raids, significant differences in rates of return 
coUld result. By assumption, raids are only undertaken on the 
basis of expected profitability. Even if profit maximizing raiders 
were unable to maintain a higher rate of return in the long-run, 
or came to grief in the medium term as the result of too much 
expansion, so that the profit expectations were not fulfilled in 
the long-run, there would be a tendency for such firms to demon-
strate higher short-run rates of return. This is especially likely 
to emerge when the period over which the performance is examined 
contains a much higher level of raiding activity towards the end, 
so that one woUld be observing the majority of profit maximizing 
raiders during their short-run period of super normal profits. 
Furthermore, if one believes that the population of companies 
comprises a range of firms with profit making potential based 
either upon the degree of risk aversion or upon differences in 
managerial talent it woUld not be unreasonable to accept the widely 
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held vi." that raiders are dynamic firms with good quality 
management. Here again, the expectation is that raiders superior 
managerial talent, assuming it is directed at maximizing profits, 
would tend to result in a significant ~ority actually exceeding 
the median rate of return for their respective industries. If 
one assumes the comparable firms are easy life maximizers or sleepy 
firms instead of profit maximizers, this conclusion is all the 
stronger as these alternative modes of beha~our result in non-
optimal profit performance. 
c. VALUATION RATIO 
An integral part of the Marris growth maximizing hypothesis 
concerns the trade-off between the growth rate and the firm's 
valuation ratio. Just as it was argued earlier the growth maximizer 
would tend to sacrifice prof1ts for growth, he also would be trading 
off the valuation ratio against hi. growth rate. He 1s re.trained, 
however, in his attempts to maximize growth by a security constraint 
imposed through the valuation ratio. This security constraint is 
seen as operating because of the previously established inver.e 
relationship between the valuation ratiO and the probab11ity of 
takeover. To the extent that a firm's profit performance affects 
its market valuation, the trade-ott between growth and profits and 
growth and valuation ratiO will amount to the same thing and there-
tore will 1n.ol.e manager. adopting po1icie. designed to maintain 
some minimum value of both variables for reasons of security. This 
would imply that internal growth maximizers would tend to have lower 
valuation ratio. than the median of firma in their respective 
industries. I .hall argue below ho.ever, that becaus8 growth 
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maximizing raiders achieve their growth objectives wxternally, 
a significant number would, for various reasons, tend to display 
valuation ratios above their respective industry medians. 
Not only would growth maximizing raiders wish to keep their 
valuation ratio Bafe, but also they would wish to keep it high 
thereby effectively lowering the cost of the acquisition to the 
extent that it is financed by a share issue. The desire however, 
is not sufficient to explain why the market would be expected to 
favour the growth maximizing raiders' shares. Part of the 
y 
explanation lies in the role retentions pl~ in the determination 
of market valuation. This will be discussed in detail in section 
6.2.D. Briefly, I shall argue that raiders would be expected to 
retain a smaller proportion of after tax earnings (i.e. payout 
higher diT1dends) in an attempt to raise the valuation ratio _ 
high dividends would tend to be valued by the owners and hence the 
market.~ Additionally, to the extent the market is as Keynes 
described, a beauty contest, raiding would tend to make the firm 
known and superficially attractive; thus desired by investors ae 
part of their portfolio~ Further, any conglomerate element in 
the expansion will be recognized a8 risk spreading and thus 
desired by investors, in 80 far as the raider will be less 
affected by unexpected contractions in demand in one sector. On 
the other hand, raider's shares would be in demand by risk takers 
in so far as some raider do very well in terms of profits. Finally, 
to the extent that raiding is financed by loan stock or even 
convertible loan stock (which we previously noted had come into 
See chapter II section 2.6 where the role of retentions of the 
acquired firm was discussed in relation to its affect On the 
valuation ratio. 
-164-
prominence as a method of payment in the recent takeover boom), and 
the rate ot retllrn earned by the raider exceeds the cost of 
servicing the loan stock, the share of profits from the acquisitions 
will tend over time to be diverted to the pre-acquisition owners; 
though with convertibles this time span will be limited. Thus, 
despite the fact that the growth maximizing raider is sacrificing 
profits which would normally depress the valuation ratio, the 
method of expansion by takeover would ,enerally result in the 
enhancement of raiders' valuation ratios. The security constraint 
may only be operable when raiders as growth maximizers fail to 
maintain their growth rate or fail to satisty their minimum profits 
constraint, the latter likely causing the tormer. This explanation 
is consistent with the observations Harris made that firms are 
reported to be taken over tor attempting to grow too fast and 
losing control; the poor profit po8ition having caused the firm 
to retrench and therefore lower its growth target. 
In terms of the method of analY8is of this chapter, aSSuming 
raiders are growth maximizers and the set of comparable firms are 
typified by either profit maximizers or easy lite maximizers does 
not allow us to derive definite predictions. Comparable firma as 
profit maximizers would be able to maintain healthy valuation 
ratios be~ause of the effect profit. have on the valuation ratio. 
Similarly the ea.y life maximizer. in their desire for security 
would be forced to keep up the valuation ratio by adopting policies 
which avoided the threat ot takeover or shareholder intervention. 
Despite the basis tor believing that the.e two motivational schemes 
would result in high valuation ratiOS, we have nO basis on which to 
derive predictions in terms of relative levela of the valuation ratiO. 
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If comparable firms are assumed to be growth maximizers, it 
is likely a significant majority of raiders as growth maximizers 
would have greater than average valuation ratios. This follows 
from what was argued in sections 6.2.A an'd 6.2.B. Raiders could 
grow faster than their internal growth maximizing counterparts 
because they faced fewer external and internal constraints. They 
need not, however, have had to sacrifice their profit rate anymore 
than the internal growth maximizer to achieve the faster growth. 
Thus raiders' valuation ratios .eter1s paribUS would tend to be 
higher than the set of growth maximizing comparable firme. 
If the comparable firms are typified by the sleepy inefficient 
firms, it is also likely that a significant majority of growth 
maximizing raiders would have greater valuation ratios. There is 
nothing in the sleepy firm's performance to cause the market to 
favour its valuation of such a firm. Also, this sort of firm is 
typically taken over because of its low valuation ratio and the 
fact that alternative management could earn a greater rate of 
return with the given assets. The sleepy firms that survive 
raiding most likely are inauaated by voting control being in the 
hands of owner managers or taailies sympathetic to existing 
management. Thus one would expect the raider with it. healthy 
growth rate to command a better market valuation than the sleepy 
inefficient firm. 
If it is nOW assumed that raiders are profit maximizers the 
prediction for the majority of raiders' valuation ratiOS depends 
upon the accuracy of the argument put forward in aection 6.2.B 
concerning the profit maximizing raiders' short-run and long-run 
profit pertormance ~ the time horizon of the .tock market. If, 
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because of a lower risk aversion th&i." their profit maximizing 
non-raiding counterparts, profit maximizing raiders manage to 
earn short-run super normal profits but tend in the longer run 
to be forced to retrench; and if the market's time horizon is 
long enough to incorporate the effect of this likelihood into 
its evaluation of the firm's shares, then the market will tend 
to discount the present ahort-run profits in its evaluation of 
the profit maximizing raiders' shares. Thus one could expect 
a significant majority of raiders as profit maximizers to have 
valuation ratios below that of profit maximizing comparable 
firms. This is another way of suggesting that the stock market 
rewards long-run success and stability and tends to be rather 
cool towards short-run risky behaviour.· 
If the comparable firms are easy life maximizers and raiders 
are profit maximizers, it is likely a significant proportion of 
raiders would demonstrate lower average valuation ratios than 
the set of comparable firms. Easy life maximizing managers would 
be expected to maintain healthy market valuations by adjusting 
their financial indicators so as to gain market (and shareholder) 
approval. Safe valuation ratios for such managers would then 
be that level which minimised the threat of takeover and satis-
fied shareholders so that their job security was guaranteed in so 
far as was possible. This safe level would be expected to be 
greater in a significant number of cases than that demonstrated 
• This argument would not apply to growth maximizing raiders because 
their profit rates have not been enhanced in the short-run but 
rather sacrificed. It is their fast growth which is affecting 
their valuation ratiO and thus a longer term measure of performance 
than annual profits. 
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by the raider were he to be maximizing profits in that, as argued 
in the previous paragraph, raiders with a short-run profit objective 
would not be likely to be able to maintain this in the longer run. 
This we argued would be reflected in the market's valuation of its 
shares since the market was seen as being interested in a long-run 
view of performance. Even if the profit maximizing raiders do not 
suffer a fall in profits as a result of raiding but Simply display 
a greater variance, as would be expected from undertaking a risky 
method of achieving profits, the market again might well be expected 
to downgrade the value of such firms' shares. Finally, the market 
does not necessarily reward firms only on the basis of profitability. 
Thus, firms earning above average profit rates will not necessarily 
have above average valuation ratios.· For these reasons, a signif-
icant majority of raiders would be expected to have lower average 
valuation ratios than comparable firms typified by easy life 
maximizers, whose main vehicle to the easy life is a 'safe' valuation 
ratio. 
If comparable firms were sleepy firms, no definite prediction 
can be made with regard to their market valuation relative to that 
of profit maximizing raiders. Both categories WOuld tend to possess 
low average valuation ratiOS, and there is little basis on which to 
assert that one group's would be lower than the other. 
To summarize, the pattern of the derived predictions concerning 
the valuation ratio for raiders versus comparable firms, while some-
• Regressions run on each of the 66 industries with average profit 
rates of the firms as the independent variable and their valuation 
ratiO as the dependent variable showed profits to be significant 
and take on a positive sign in only 26 industries. Moreover, the 
explanatory power of the industry equations was in most ca.e. quite 
low. 
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what tentative and dependent upon the various assumptions made 
concerning the objectives of comparable firms, yields a reasonably 
clear cut division between the two posited managerial objectives 
of growth maximization and profit maximization. In the former 
case, we expected either no significant difference between raiders' 
valuation ratios and the median value tor their respective industries, 
or that raiders would be likely to possess higher valuation ratios 
when compared with their b4ustry median values. In the latter case, 
assuming raiders to be primarily motivated 'y profitability resulted, 
in general, in predicting a significant majority of raiders to have 
their shares valued lower in the market than the median value for 
their respective industries. 
D. RETENTION RATIO 
tu The ratio of retained to total after/earninss in addition to 
being a variable determined as the discretion of managers, will also 
attect the level of the firm's valuation ratio. As with the valuation 
ratio predictions, the predictions tor the retention ratio ditfers 
from that postulated by Marris where growth was limited to that 
financed internally out of retentions.and debt. Internal tinancing 
ot investment iaplied that to maximize srowth, earnings would need 
to be ploughed back sO that the dividend p&7out ratio was low -
consequently the retention ratiO high. Inoorporating external Crowth 
via takeovers in the growth maximizing hypothesis gives us the 
opposite prediction tor the retention ratio. Retentions no loncer 
act as a constraint on growth since most takeovers are financed 
wholly or in the greatest part by the issue ot new shares in exchange 
"/ ._ ........... :-
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... for the raided company. 
The choice of retention ratio would then depend upon the 
dispersion of ownership and control within the firm, or in other 
words, the degree to which owners are able to impose their own 
aims on managers. With growth maximizing raiders, this dispersion 
is likely to be great, as indicated by their ability to seek an 
objective which is not likely to be directly in the shareholders' 
interests, The choice of retention ratio for growth maximizing 
raiders is more likely to be determined by it. role as an influence 
On the valuation ratio. From the argument. in section 6.2.C in 
terms of the valuation ratio's role as a .ecurity constraint, 
managers WOuld be expected to feel that low retentions (high dividends) 
threat of loss of job through takeover. Additionally, high dividends 
in themselves coUld add to security by removing the likelihood of 
owners using their alternate sanction on managerial polioie.; that 
of dismissal. This prediction that a significant majority ot growth 
maximizing raiders will have low average retention ratios when 
compared to firm's in their respective industrial settings i. general 
in the sense that I shall argue that its application to the growth 
maximizing raiders does not depend upon the tour alternat1ve 
mot1vatiohal schemes applied to the rest of the comparable tirms. 
It the comparable firms are assumed to be profit maximizers, 
their retention ratio would depend upon the availability of profit-
able investment opportunities and the ease and cost ot acqUiring 
... Where takeovers are financed by the issue ot loan stock no great 
additional demand will be made on retentions providing the raider 
does not allow itself to become too highly geared, 1 ••• the ratiO 
of new shares to new loan stock does not change significantly. 
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tunds elsewhere. Even though owners (who are by assumption able 
to assert their intluence over managers to •• yjm1ze prot1ts) are 
likely to have a positive preterence tor current dividends. it is 
more likely that they would preter-the gain. and higher tuture 
dividends that could result trom tunds being ploughed back into 
protitable investment project.. Thus protit aax1a1zation i. likely 
to result in high retentions. Theretore by coaparison with the 
growth maximizing raider with low retention., the prediction 
emerges that a 81gn1ticant I118.jor1ty ot raider. will han lower 
average retention. wh.n comparable tirma are assumed to be maximising 
Pl'Of1t •• 
Similarly, it comparable tirma are ...... d to be growth 
maximizer., raider. would, in g.n.ral. b. lik.ly to retain le •• , 
a. tirms maximizing th.ir growth rate but for tbe-ao.t part oonfiD1Ag 
tbeir expan.ion to that tinanced iDtenally. would require high 
retention. and beno. payout low dividend •• • Raider. by coapari.on 
••• king to .nhanc. tbeir valuation ratio by higb dividends would 
tend to r.tain 1 •••• 
It ooaparabl. fira. are .a.y lite aaxiaiz.r. tb.y would oboo •• 
their dividend ratio and b.nc. ret.ntion ratio to en.ure .. ti.faotory 
••• urity. All di.cr.tionary variable. whioh aft.ct (or are beli.ved 
to att.ot) the valuation ratio w.r •••• n a. b.iDS cho •• n witb thi. 
aim in mind. Bow.v.r, manag.r. would not bav. to rai •• divid.nd. 
to ott •• t the .ff.ct On the valuation ratiO ot tb. d.liberat. 
8&oritio. of .oa. oth.r fiD&Do1al variable. Th.y would b. likely 
to ohoo ••• ome level of retention. wbich save th.a suffioient 
• Thi. corr •• ponds to the arsua.nt Marri. put forward with resard 
to r.tention. in apport of hi. growtb lI&Z1aising bypoth.a1 •• 
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finance for growth but which did not adversely affect the valuation 
ratio. Growth maximizing raiders, however, were seen earlier 
as having to offset their sacrificed profits by high dividends 
in order to raise their valuation ratios. !hus the prediction 
emerges that a significant majority of raiders as growth maximizers 
would be likely to have low average retention ratios when compared 
with firms in their respective industries which are assumed to be 
easy life maximizers. 
Finally, if the set of comparable firms is typified by sleepy 
inefficient firms, growth maximizing raiders would again tend to 
retain les8. Since the sleepy firm's profit performance was poor, 
it would require a large proportion of its meagre earnings simply 
to invest in replacement capital in order to stay in operation. 
To the extent that they engage in any positive net investment the 
demands placed upon retentions from earnings are all the greater. 
Alternative sources of borrowing to finance replaoement investment 
would usually be either fully exploited or unrespon.ive aince such 
companies had demonstrated by past performance they were poor risks. 
Further, it is unlikely that the managers of sleepy firm. would 
have the awareness to attempt to increase their market valuation 
by raising dividends even if it were po •• ible given their poor 
record of return On capital employed, since such firms typically 
are among those taken over because of low market valuation. Growth 
maxilllizing raidera, it has been argued, would typically have a low 
retention ratio so that by compari.on a signifioant majority would 
probably have lower average retention ratio. when compared with a 
set of comparable fir •• as.u.ed to be sleepy firms. 
By examining the alternative motivational sche.e of raiders 
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as profit maximizers, a contrasting view of the relative size 
of the retention ratio as compared with firms in raiders' respective 
industries results. If all firms are profit aazimizers and even 
if raiders do manage to earn short-run super normal profits, there 
is little basis on which to argue that there would be a pervasive 
tendency for raiders to retain a greater or lesser proportion of 
earnings than firms in their respective industrie.. As argued 
earlier, the retention ratio does to some extent reflect the degree 
of owner control within the firm, Since by a.auapt1on all aanager. 
are seeking to maximize profits for the owners and thus are a •• umed 
to be quite direotly owner controlled .0 that retention. are 
generally kept high, there 1. no reason to bel1eTe that d1tterence. 
in the average retention ratio. for the two group. .hould e.erge 
simply as a re.ult of difterence. in the mode of inve.tment aotivity 
(i.e. whether internal or external via raid.). 
Imputing ea.y life max1m1zat1on to comparable firm. and 
prot1t maz1mization to raider. give. the oppo.ite .ien prediotion 
than when growth maximization was attributed to raider.. maar 
life maximizer. were .een earlier a. paying out dividend. at a 
level which would ensure the valuation ratiO .a •• ufficiently hi,h 
to minimi.e the likelihood of takeover. Profit aax1m1s1n, raider., 
however. were .een a. pa7in, out a low ratiO Of dividend. to total 
earning. beoau.e of owner.' preterence. tor oapital gains and 
futUre dividend. over pre.ent dividend.. Thu. one would expeot 
a signifioant majority of profit maxim1zina raider. to di.play 
greater retention ratio. (lower dividend PAyout ratio.) than tirm. 
in their re.pective indu.tri •• a •• uaed to be ... y lite maximi.er •• 
Finally, .. sumina comparable firm. are 81ee»1 firm. and raider. 
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are profit maximizers does not allow us to differentiate between 
the two groups. We have argued that both classes would tend to 
have high retention ratios but there is no basis on which a 
comparison can be made in terms of which group would be likely 
to have a significant majority of greater or lesser retention 
ratios. 
The picture that emerges in terms of the retention ratio is 
that by imputing growth maximization to raiders we would expect 
to observe a significant majority of them with average retention 
ratios below their industry median. This prediction was not 
dependent upon the various imputed motives of the managers of the 
set of comparable firms. Alternatively, by assuming raiders are 
profit maximizers, we predicted either no difference, or that a 
significant majority of raiders would be expected to show greater 
average retention ratios than firms in their comparable industrial 
settings. Thus, two distinct predictions for the retention ratio 
have emerged from the starting point of alternative behavioral 
assumptions imputed to the managers of raiding firms. A fUrther 
basis then is offered on which the appropriateness of these 
alternative theoretical models may be judged. 
In the arguments in this section, the attempt has been to 
derive logical implications or predictions from a starting point of 
assuming firms which can be extraneously identified as seeking 
expansion externally by takeovers are firms whose managers possess 
some positive desire for growth in excess of or in place of that 
which would result from assuming profit maximization to be their 
primary behavioral objective. The next section contains a description 
of the statistical procedure adopted to test the two sets of 
predictions against reality. 
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6.3 EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DERIVED PREDICTIONS 
Initially what was desired was to compare each of the four 
indices of performance of the 117 raiders individually with a 
group of comparable firms so that variations attributable to 
the industrial setting would be removed. This was accomplished 
by relating each of the values of the raiders' variables to their 
Own respective industrial medians. This process was repeated 
omitting the non-raiding firms which were taken over. Thus, for 
example, in the case of a raider having a major interest in three 
industries, the overall median for each variable for this combined 
'industry' was compared with the calculated value of each of the 
raider's performance indices. • Finally, the sign test is employed 
in order to examine any pervasive tendencies for raiders to 
demonstrate either higher or lower values of the performance 
variables than their respective industries and to relate these 
tendencies to the alternative sets of behavorial predictions 
derived in section 6.2. The sign test is used in preference to 
parametric teats because it is untenable to assume that the 
differences between raiders' performance and the performance ot 
companies belonging to the same industrial setting will have the 
same variances. The null hypothesis we wish to test is that each 
ditference has a probability distribution (which need not be the 
same for all ditterences as required by the t-test) with median 
equal to zero. We will reject the null hypothesis it the number 
For a description ot the use of the sign test see Dixon and 
Massey (1957), p 280. 
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of positive and negative sign differences differ significantly 
from equality.· Of ti lit t par cu ar n eres is whether the Significant 
proportions of Sign differences are in accordance with the 
theoretical predictions developed in terms of the growth 
maximization hypothesis or alternatively, whether the proportions 
tend to favour the predictions derived on the basis of assuming 
raiders to be profit maximizers. 
6.4 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Table XXIX gives in brackets the actual proportions for the 
most often occurring Sign of the difference between raider's 
performance and their respective industry median value for each 
•• of the four variables. Taking the level of significance at 
which we reject the null hypothesis that no difference exi.ts 
between the two groups at the ~ level of probability, signs 
are included corresponding to the most often occurring difference. 
Zeros indicate that the derived proportions of positive signs to 
total are not statistically significant. 
The overall impression to be derived from these results is 
The further assumption is required that the differences between 
raiders' performance and their industry medians are independent. 
Even though the existence of a raider in one industry might possibly 
affect the performance of firms in that industry it is exceedingly 
unlikely that such a raider would affect the performance of firms in 
other industries. Since the 117 raiders cover 65 of the 67 industries 
and because of the procedure of multiple industry classes for each 
firm, only resulting in four industries where there are more than one 
raider, the independence condition is likely to be satisfied • 
.. Profit rates used were before tax while the valuation ratio was 
measured using the annual mean share price in the numerator. When 
after tax profit rates and annual low share price were used in the 
numerator of the valuation ratio there was nO significant change 
in the proportions for each variable given in the results. 
ASSUMPTION 
RAIDERS: G.M. 
OTfIERS: P. M. 
RAIDERS:' }G~ •• 
OTHERS: G.M. 
HAIDERS: G.M. 
OTHERS: E.L.M. 
RAIDERS: G.M. 
O'l'HERS: S.F. 
RAIDERS: P.M. 
OTHERS: P.M. 
RAIDERS: P.M. 
OTHERS: E.L.M. 
RAIDERS: P.M. 
OTHERS: S.F. 
ACTUAL SIGN OF 
PROPORTION OF 
RAIDERS EXCEED-
ING MEDIAN IND. 
VALUE 
ALL FIRMS 
ALL RAIDERS & 
SURVIVING FIRMS 
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TABLE XXIX 
SUMMARY TABLE OF DERIVED PREDICTIONS 
GROW'l'H RATE PROFIT RATE VALUATION RATIO RETN RATIO 
+ 0 
+ 0 + 
+ 0 
+ 0 + 
0 + 0 
+ + + 
+ + 0 0 
+ (111/117) o (60/117) + (87/117) - (70/117) 
+ (97/117) - (67/117) o (63/117) - (78/117) 
NOTE: Proportions greater than 67/117 or less than 48/117 are significant at 
the SO;b level. 
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that they are more consistent with the predictions derived from 
the assumption that raiders are growth maximizers than with those 
derived from imputed profit maximization. That is, raiders tend 
to be faster growing than firms in their respective industries 
but yet this growth has not generated significantly higher profits 
and indeed when compared with only the surviving firms in their 
industry, raiders actually earned a lower rate of return on assets. 
Raiders nevertheless were able to maintain their valuation ratios 
at healthy levels despite their profit performance. Thus 87 of 
the 117 raiders had ratios above their respective industry medians 
when compared to all firms. This fell to 63 when only surviving 
firms were used in the comparison. The results for retentions 
possibly indicate how they were able to outweigh the negative 
influence of their poor profitability on the valuation ratio. Both 
for comparisons with all firms and surviving firms, raiders had 
lower retention ratios and thus higher dividend payout ratios than 
the median of the firms in their respective industries. LOgically, 
One would further expect that if low retentions are playing the 
role of offsetting the dampening effect sacrificed profits have 
on the valuation ratio, the raiders with below average profits 
would tend to be the firms which had the significantly lower 
retention ratios. By splitting the raiders into two groups comprised 
of those which exceeded their industry m.dian in profit rates and 
those which fell short of the industry median, it is found that 
just under 80% of these latter companies payed out more, (i.e, 43 
of the 67 raiders with below their industry median in profit ~ates 
using all firms in the comparison and 53 of the 67 using only 
surviving firms in the comparison). With the raiders which earned 
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above their industry median profits, there was no significant 
difference in retention ratios. The most plausible explanation 
is that this is consistent with attempts to raise the valuation 
ratio by paying out high dividends for raiders whose low profits 
were negatively affecting their market valuation, but this 
diversion of funds for expansion being unnecessary for raiders 
with healthy profits. - Thus not only were they playing on share-
holders preferences for diVidends (as well as capital gains) in 
high payouts when necessary to keep their share prices healthy 
but also their past growth record made them appear to be an 
attractive to the market. In general they were allowed to pursue 
their policies towards growth without interference from share-
holders or incurring any severe threat of being taken over them-
't 
selves due to their healthy market valUation. And as a consequence, 
in seeking growth they were permitted to trade-off profits without 
Obviously incurring any additional threats to security. By 
inspection of table XXIX it can be seen that the alternative 
view of raiders as profit maximizers (or firms which are significantly 
owner controlled and thus induced to regard profits to owners as 
important) does not correspond as closely to the picture of the 
raider which has emerged from the results. On certain assumptions, 
the profit maximizing raider may be faster grOwing, but it 1s 
difficult to see how they could emerge as less profitable. Even 
though ,.'When considering all firms in the industry comparisons 
there is no significant difference in profitability at the ~fo 
level, it must be remembered that within this group are a large 
'" Only 16 of the 117 raiders, or 14% were themselves taken over as 
compared with the average of over 43% of all firms taken over. (See 
table IV chapter I). 
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number of firms taken over due to poor profit records. Further-
more, since raiding i8 ri8ky and does not necessarily result in 
super normal profits it is difficult to see how the profit 
maximizing raider would tend to keep the high valuation ratios 
observed, especially since he is not distributing significantly 
higher diTidends and may on certain a8sumptions about the comparable 
firms even be distributing less (i.e. retaining more). 
It is left to the reader to draw conclusions ~oncerning which 
assumptions about the nature of the comparable firms are most 
appropriate based upon his own judgement of the commonness of 
each type of firm in the population. Nevertheless, one further 
stage in the analysis can be made, based upon the assumption that 
the easy life maximizer has a strong desire for survival. Taking 
it that this group of comparable firms will arrange their affairs 
in order to achieve this stated goal it is likely that a majority 
of such firms will actually be successful and survive. By examining 
the alternative predictions for growth maximizing raiders and 
profit maximizing raiders when comparable firms are easy life 
maximizers and comparing each with the results for raiders and 
the group of surviving firms a clear contrast of the two motivational 
schemes becomes apparent. In this case, it can be seen that the 
assumption of growth maximization for raiders clearly is more in 
line with the results than are the predictions based upon the 
assumption of profit maximization. That is, when comparable firms 
were assumed to be easy life maximizers, the assumption of growth 
maximization imputed to raiders yielded the predictions that raiders 
would grow faster, have lower profit rates and retain less - the 
prediction for the valuation ratiO comparisons was uncertain and 
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could have gone either way depending on the strength of counter 
arguments. On the other hand, assuming raiders to be profit 
maximizers while the comparable firms were assumed to be easy 
life maximizers resulted in predicting raiders would grow faster, 
have higher profit rates, a lower valuation ratio and retain more. 
Examining the results for the comparisons of raiders with 
surviving firms shows the predictions based on the assumption of 
growth maximization to be more closely in line with reality than 
the predictions based on assuming raiders to be profit maximizers. 
In this chapter, the attempt has been made to formalise the 
growth maximization hypothesis with respect to a subset of the 
population of firms. Some of the theorizing in section 6.2 
represents a departure from Marris, though much of what is argued 
is in accordance with his hypothesis, at least in spirit. This 
fragmented approach to the examination of the relevance of this 
theoretical revision to the theory of the firm was necessary in 
order to avoid the circularity of assuming the fastest grOwing 
firms are growth maximizers, the most profitable, profit maximizers 
and so forth. At the extreme, had not the derived predictions 
been supported, then serious doubt would have been cast on the 
applicability of the growth maximization hypothesis as a basis 
for revision to the theory of the firm. 
In the pre8ent economic climate, takeovers are extremely 
common, often recently occuring at a rate of around 25 per month 
of public quoted companies. Raiding i8 by no means limited to the 
117 firms examined in sections 6.3 and 6.4 since not less than 
20% of the population of 3566 companies have undertaken at least 
one takeover at 80me time during the sample period and that percentage 
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is increasing aa raiding activity apreads to other industries 
previously relatively untouched. The motivations and predictions 
analysed in section 6.2 could be extended to incorporate these 
minor raiders as well. Furthermore, it may be the case that raiding 
itself is limited to relatively large firms, and small concerns 
must overcome some threshold size in order to indulge in takeover 
activity. They WOUld, in this case, be forced to adopt policies 
of internal growth maximization possibly in preparation for the 
time when they can also jOin the takeover scene - in addition to 
the numerous reasons offered by Marris why they might do so anyway. 
That to become a 'high flying' raider i8 desired by firms, I think, 
is demonstrated by the results; raiding leads to growth, security 
through safe levels of the valuation ratiO and size, all of wh1~~ 
are valued for themselves by managers and also for the emolUments, 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary associated with growth and size. 
Thus, rather than the results contained in this chapter being 
valid only for a limited number of tspecia~ firms, the implications 
of the analysis and results are likely to be far more general, and 
consequently add to the grOWing body of evidence supporting the 
appropriatenesa of the managerial and behavioral revisions to the 
theory of the firm. 
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APPENDIX I 
CENSUS poPULATION AND DATA COLLECTION 
PROCEDURES AND DESCRIPl'ION 
I. Census Population 
The initial population ot tirms comprises all U.K. quoted coapanies 
exclusive of the tollowing industry groups: toreign mining, rubber and 
tea plantations, water works companies and electrical and gas suppliers, 
investment trusts, banks and discount houses, and insurance companies. 
Firms which were incorparated outside the U.K. have been excluded 
although Irish companies which were re-incorporated in Northern Ireland 
in 1920 have been retained. In addition, companies which were subsid-
iaries ot other companies betore January 1st, 1957 (the beginning ot the 
time period examined) have been excluded, as have companies which went 
public or had their shares first quoted after June 30th, 1966. Included 
in this initial ot 4057 companies is what roughly can be termed 
'domestic comaercial and industrial companies' whose control was at 
80a. time in private handa and whose equity is quoted on the London 
Stock Exchange or any ot the U.K. Associated Stock Exchanges. 
From this initial population, several categories ot companies have 
been omitted betore arriving at the tinal population of 3566 compani8s. 
Th~se categories are set out in Table I along with the number of 
companies and the number of takeovers in each. Table II provides the 
.... &1 distribution ot takeovers for the .. 18 omitted cat.aories and 
the total annual distribution ot t~eovers of all omitted tirma. 
For this study it was necessary to have a population ot companies 
which had their voting equity quoted on any of the U.K. exchanges and 
which it they disappeared, did so because of takeover and tor no other 
reason. This is the general explanation for the omission of categories 
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TABLE I 
ANALYSIS OF OMI'l"l'ED COMPANIES 
CATEGORY NUMBER OF FIRMS NUMBER OF TAKEOVERS 
1. Companies .hich .ent public after 
1957 as subsidiaries of another 
cOlllpany 
2. COlllpanies .hich .ere nationalized 
sources: Transport Holding Co. - 9 
British Steel Corp. - 9 
National Coal Board -_1 
British Sugar Corp. --1-
3. COlllpanies converted private 
,. COlllpanies for .hich no accounts 
.ere aade before they .ere taken-
over 
5. Control.transfered outside U.K. 
6. Quotation only on Provincial 
Brokers Stock Exchange 
7. Voluntary Liquidations and 
COlllpulsory Wound-up 
Distribution by year 
1957 - 4 
1958 - 8 
1959 - 10 
1960 - 19 
1961 - 8 
1962 - 11 
1963 - 14 
1964 - 21 
1965 - 15 
1966 - 18 
1967 - 20 
1968 - 9 
1969 - 11 
8. Non-quoted cOlllpanies and companies 
.hose quotation is granted in non-
voting equity only 
9. Companies for .hich there .ere 
insufficient markings of their ':".:.t -,-,,-,; 
votj.ng shares on the stock 
exchange 
24 o 
20 o 
2 o 
2 2 
1 o 
17 2 
163 o 
247 116 
185 98 
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TABLE II 
DISTRIBUTION OF OMITTED TAKEOVERS BY YEAR AND CAtEGORY 
YEAR NONt9U01'ED COMPANIES INSUFFICIENT MARKINGS TO'l'AL * -
-
1957 8 1. 18 
1958 13 9 22 
1959 13 13 26 
1968 13 9 23 
1961 9 7 16 
1962 19 7 27 
1963 14 11 25 
1964 2 5 7 
1.965 8 8 16 
1966 7 9 1" 
1967 6 6 13 
1968 4 2 6 
1969 0 2 .~ 
116 98 218 
1: these totals include other categories 
1. through 9., though some elaboration 18 given below. 
Category 1. includes 24 companies which came into the population 
part-way through the period but were previously private and wholly 
owned subsidiaries of other quoted companies. In these cases, the 
parent company sought a stock exchange quotation tor their subsidiaries 
in order to expand the company's finance but did not release voting 
control into public hands. For this reason, it was impossible to 
takeover these subsidiaries without the parent company's deciding to 
sell and consequently they have not been retained. 
-185-
Nationalized companies in category 2. have been omitted as have 
the two companies in categort 3. which were converted to private 
companies, since the reasons for these disappearances from the list 
of quoted companies are extraneous to the process of takeover and, as 
such, are irrelevant to the present theSis. The two companies in 4. 
were omitted because no accounts were published before they were taken 
over. In both cases, these were new companies, formed as the result 
of a merger, The single company in 5. had its control tranafered to 
J~ca and was reincorporated in that coWLtn. It is therefore 
treated as a foreign company and not retained. The 11 companies in 
category 6. had their quotation only on the Provincial Brokers Stock 
Exchange. The markings of companies quoted on this exchange are 
infrequent and not recorded in the Off1c1al List. All the companies 
are very small and often do not close their books at the end of an 
accounting year. As stock market and accounting data are required in 
this investigation, these companies were Omitted. Category 1. contains 
163 companies; wh1ch have gone into voluntary liquidat10n, have been 
compulsory wound-Up or have had their quotation cancelled by the 
Stock Exchange and hence have disappeared tor reasons other than 
takeover. 
As the process ot takeover concerns a change ot control via the 
stock market, companies which posess no quotation tor their voting 
share. are not retained in the final population. The 241 companies 
in category 8. are therefore omitted. In category 9. are 185 
companies which have been omitted because there were too infrequent 
markings recorded for the1r voting shares. For 80me of these companies 
no markings have been recorded tor the last 13 years while for others 
there only exists a few annual markings and no share price ruge wi thin 
the year. The existence of one price for both the annaal h1gh and low 
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usually indicates that the shares had only been traded once in that year. 
Typically such firma are family businesses in which the directors control 
a majority of the voting equity. 
II. Data Collection Procedures and Description 
Haying arrived at the final population, the data was then compiled 
on 8" X 5" cards, one card corre.ponding to each company. The primary 
sources are The Exchange Telegraph (EXTEL) Daily Statistical Service 
and Auxiliary Service, The Stock EXChange Official Year Book, and 
Who Oms Whom. In eome cases these sources have been suppl.mented by 
the published company accounts and share prices from the Financial 
Times, both of which were made available by EXTEL at their London office. 
A. Identification of Takeoyers 
Once the 1B1t1al population ot 4057 companies had been noted, the 
most recent volume. of the Stock ExchenSe Yearbogl and Who Owns Whom 
were consulted to discover which firms had disappeared and whether the 
disappearance was due to takeover. As set out in Section I above, a 
number of companies diaappeared due to reasons other than takeover and 
.ere not retained. The balance were takeovers and mergers. 
B. Treatment of Mergers 
The distinction between takeovers and mergers is that with a take-
over, an eXisting company or individual(s) acquire. the capital of 
another company, while with a merger, a new company is formed to 
acquire the capital of two or three existing companies. The identifi-
cation of raider and acqUired firm which is obviOUS when takeover occurs 
is not obvious in the case of mergers. Some .pecial treatment is 
necessary if the 3g mergers which have occured are to be categorized 
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as tak.o •• rs. Thr.. ..thods ot distinguishing b.tw •• n the raid.r and 
the acqUired firm were employed, the results ot which are set out in 
lab1e III below. In each case the tirst tirm list.d was d •••• d to be 
the raid.r. 
TABLE III 
MERGERS - CHOICE OF RAIDER 
~ MAKE-UP OF BOARD (NO.) 
1. Ald.rs (Tamworth) Ltd. 4 
Allianc. Box Co. Ltd. 3 
TO FORM: Al1ianc. Ald.rs Paper 
and Packagin~~td. 
2. Allen (W.H.) Sona and Co. Ltd. 
B.llis and Morcom Ltd. 
Te FORM: Amalgamat.d Pow.r hg. Ltd. 
3. Algr.y Holdings Ltd. 
TJeecla Fireclay Ltd. 
TO FORM: Le.ds Assets Ltd. 
4. Allied Land and Investment Co. Ltd. 
Lambton Close Holdings Ltd. 
TO FORM: Alli.d Land Holdings Ltd. 
5. Ind Coope Ltd. 
Ans.lls Br.wery Ltd. 
Mm~"A1ka' Lt •• 
TO FORM: Allied Breweries Ltd. 
6. Ellio~Bro8. (London) Ltd. 
Associat.d Automation Ltd. 
TO FO!!M: Ell1ott-Auation Ltd 
7. Balfour (AJrthur) and Co. Ltd. 
~naGroup Ltd. 
TO FORM: Balfour and Darwina Ltd. 
••. Ba1'fos Ltd. 
Dawson Bros. Ltd. 
TO FORM: Dawson and Bartos Ltd. 
9. Charr1ngton Utd. Br.w.ri.s Ltd. 
Bass, Mitchells and Butlers Ltd. 
TO FORM: Bass Charrington Ltd. 
+N.t assets p.r share • nil (i.e. e.a!) 
++ Not available - no accounts made up 
6 
5 
5 
o 
6 
2 
8 
4 
5 
8 
3 
7 
3 
6 
4 
7 
8 
SIZE (MV) 
6.691 
4.366 
+08.952 
0.722 
11.231 
1.486 
119.277 
55.312 
+ + 
1.910 
3.682 
2.856 
4.853 
2.112 
1.636 
217.274 
146.610 
SIZE(BV) 
2.281 
1.776 
8.513 
4.577 
0.744 
8.863 
9.534 
2.874 
58.884 
18.936 
+ + 
3.055 
2.864 
1.827 
1.188 
139.278 
81.905 
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TABLE III (cont.) 
MAKE-UP OF BOARD 
10. Mitchells and Butlers Ltd. 
Baas Ratcliff and Gretton Ltd. 
TO FORM: Baas , Mitchells & Butlers 
Ltd. 
7 
3 
11. Bell and Nicholson Ltd. 6 
Lunt (Richard) Ltd. 3 
TO FORM: Bell Nicholson & R. Lunt Ltd. 
12. Block and Anderson Ltd. 6 
Kolok Mfg. Co. Ltd. 3 
TO FORM: Block Anderson & Kolok Ltd. 
13. Charrington and Co. Ltd 8 
United Breweries Ltd. 5 
TO FORM: Charrington Utd. Breweries Ltd. 
14. ~l.r,lfah.difte (Elect. Engrg.) Ltd. 7 
Ball er.' I,Ltd. ~; (, '--. ~:;. " 5 
TO FORM: Allied Insulators Ltd. 
15. Bury Felt Mfg. Co. Ltd. 7 
Mitchells Ashworth & Stansfield Ltd. 4 
~ FORM: Bury Maaco Ltd. 
16. Foulkes (A.D.) Ltd. 7 
Cleaver (A.R.&W.) Ltd. 4 
TO FORM: Mercian Builders Merchants Ltd. 
17. Coats (J.P.) Ltd. 18 
Patons and Baldwina Ltd. 5 
TO FORM: Coats Patons Ltd. 
18. Pye Ltd. 5 
Cole (E.K.) Ltd. 3 
TO FORM: British Electronic Inde. Ltd. 
19. Un! ted Dairies Ltd. 9 
Cow and Gate Ltd. 6 
'lO FORM: Unigate Ltd. 
2e. Crittall Mfg. Co. Ltd. 5 
Hope (Henry) Ltd. 6 
TO FORM: Crittall-Hope Ltd. 
21. Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd. 9 
Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd. 6 
TO FORM~ International Publishing Co. Ltd. 
22. Devon Trading Co Ltd. 
Harvey and Co. Ltd. 
TO FORM: Devon !rading and Harveys Ltd. 
4 
5 
SIZE (MY) 
59.627 
54.949 
3.018 
'.771 
3.955 
1.458 
48.214 
64.259 
3.152 
1.207 
1.491 
0.956 
1.559 
1.593 
105.413 
45.036 
21.833 
12.621 
22.612 
14.878 
9.806 
5.832 
158.903 
9.769 
SIZE (BV) 
27.103 
26.342 
4.867 
1.131 
1.197 
0.741 
35.060 
40.162 
1.821 
1.551 
12.900 
30.033 
16.925 
1.640 
18.384 
11.212 
8.&42 
8.180 
64.406 
8.754 
1.558 
1.360 
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TABLE III (cont,) 
MAKE-UP OF BOARD 
23. Metal Agencies Co Ltd. 6 
Dibben (William) and Son Ltd. 2 
TO FORM: United Builders Merchants Ltd, 
24. Dickinson (John) Ltd. 6 
Robinson (E.S.&A.) Ltd. 5 
TO FORM: Dickinson Ro~inson Group Lt •• 
25. Dobson Hardwick Ltd. 9 
Park (W •• ) & Co. (Forgemasters) Ltd. 6 
TO FORM: Dobson Park Industries Ltd. 
26. Datay Ltd 7 
Wailes Dove Bitumastic Ltd. 0 
TO FORM: Dufay Bi tUJllUtic Ltd. 
27. Hackbridge & Hewitt Electric Co.Ltd. 8 
Switchgear & Iowans Ltd. 8 
TO FORM: Combined ~ectriCa1 Mtrs. Ltd. 
28. Hall and Co. Ltd. 10 
Thames Grit and Aggrigates Ltd. 3 
TO FORM: Hall & Ham River Ltd. 
29. Hammonds United Breweries Ltd. 6 
Hope & Anchor Breweries Ltd. 3 
Jeffrey (John) & Co, Ltd. 0 
TO FORM: United Breweries Ltd. 
30. Holloway's Properties Ltd. 7 
Sackvi11e Estates Ltd. 4 
TO FORM: Holloway Sackvil1e Props. Ltd. 
31. Leyland Motor Corp. Ltd. 9 
British Motor Holdings Ltd. 4 
TO FORM: British Leyland Motor Corp. Ltd. 
32. Redfern (Holdings) Ltd. 8 
Miles (H.G.) (Holdings) Ltd. 4 
!O FORM: Miles Redfern Ltd. 
33. Paul (R.&W.) Ltd. 7 
White, Tomkins and Courage Ltd. 5 
TO FORM: Pauls & Whites Ltd. 
34. Pratt (J. Alfred) & Co. (1928) Ltd. 7 
35. 
Standard Range & Foundary Ltd. 4 
TO FORM: Pratt Standard Range Ltd. 
Vine Products Ltd. 
Showerings Ltd. 
Whiteways Cider Co. Ltd, 
TO FORM: Showerings,Vine Prods. &Whit. Ltd. 
5 
4 
2 
SIZE (MY) 
'1,"2 
2.834 
73.596 
69.384 
12.308 
11.249 
3.296 
2.~ 
3.825 
1.534 
8.530 
2.931 
15.936 
2.796 
0.887 
4.903 
2.838 
284,661 
310.159 
1.005 
1.449 
5.330 
3.890 
1.492 
1.'52 
10.725 
9.420 
2.075 
SIZE (BV) 
2.551 
2.113 
22.764 
43.311 
5.497 
6.567 
0.501 
1.130 
2.311 
0.961 
4.459 
2.047 
10.189 
3.082 
1.262 
8.255 
2.823 
158.145 
183.526 
0.990 
1.188 
4.750 
2.526 
0.699 
'.650 
4.733 
4.799 
1.316 
-190-
TABLE III (cont.) 
MAKE-UP OF BOARD 
9 
SIZE (MY) SIZE (BV) 
36. Wadham Holdings Ltd. 
Stringer Motor. Ltd. 6 
TO FORM: Wadham Stringer Ltd. 
6.221 
3,866 
5.414 
3.032 
37. Tetley (Joshua) & Son Ltd. 6 35.753 15.890 
Walker Cain Ltd. 4 18.578 14.934 
TO FORM: Tetley Walker Ltd. 
38. Albion Securities Ltd. 
Bank & Commercial Pr.eJliil~8 Truet Ltd. 
TO FORM: Bank & Commercial Holdings Ltd. 
39, Id. •• ~pe.l' C.atral~OU_aa.l;t4.. : .• 
Radcliffe's Edible Products Ltd. 
TO FORM: Oriel Foods Ltd. 
8 
4 
5 
2 
+++ Not available as not public quoted company 
Note: figures in last two columns are in £m. 
1.557 
+++ 
',173 
+++ 
By the first method, the composition of the board of directors of 
1.759 
+++ 
0.085 
+++ 
the new company was compared with that of the two or three merged companies 
in order to ascertain which had the strongest bargaining power when the 
new company was formed and which therefore gained control of the new 
company. A system of weighting was employed in which a merged company 
would receiVe 3 points if a member of its board became chairman of 
the new company, 2 points of a me .. ber was appointed to any of the 
follOwing posts: deputy chairman, managing director, jOint managing 
director, or general manager, and one point tor each member appointed 
to a non-titled position on the board of the new company. In 31 caseB 
this method of classification proved conclusive leaving a balance of 
8 mergers for which the point total. were the same or differed by one 
point. Two other methods of classification were to compare the relative 
size. of the merged companies in terms of market value and book value. 
The first of the.e measure. shows which of the .. erged companie. would 
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have voting control of the new company atter the shares of the merged 
companies were exchanged for shares in the new compan~ (In every case, 
the aerger was accomplished by means of a share exchange). There was 
substantial agreement registered between all three methods and USing 
the second and third .ethods made it possible to cl&8sify those compani" 
for which the make-up of the new board proyed inconclusive in classifying 
the companies. 
C, Time Period 
Annual Data was collected tor all 3566 companies in the final 
population for a 13 year period 1957 to 1969 incluaiye, with the 
following exceptions: 
.1. Data for companies which have gone public or had their voting 
shares first quoted as from a year Since 1957 is excluded prior 
to the quotation ot the shares, 
2. Co~panies which were taken OYer or merged within the cen8US 
period bave a minimum of 3 years observations prior to the bid 
but none atter the takeoyer. That is, for a company taken over 
between 1957 and 1950, the observations 3 years prior to the 
bid has been collected. For a company taken over atter 1960, 
data has been collected tor all years between 1957 and the ofter. 
D, Companies Which Have Gone Public Or 'ere First Quoted After 1957 
It is a normal practice for newly public companies to have their 
voting capital quoted on a stock exchange within seyeral months of 
gOing public. If the granting ot their quotation occurs in the second 
halt of the year, that set of annual observations has been omitted on 
the grounds that the shares have not had sufficient exposure to the 
market and that the balance sheet data refers predOminantly to a period 
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in which the company was privately controlled. If the quotation was 
granted between January and June, the observations are retained. • 
parallel practice is e.ployed with companies which first received a 
quotation atter 1957 or whose shares have been reintroduced atter 
the quotation had been suspended for more thaa a year. 
Similarl,; companies whose activities were o .. uide the industrial _ 
commercial population described in .ectionI above, but which changed 
to an activity included within the population definilion have been 
collected only after that change. Typically the.e companies were 
previously inTolved in tea or rubber plantations and their estates 
were sold in the late 1951's. Such companies ofter retained their 
quotation and this shell was used as a vehicle for difterent manage. 
ment to absorb companies in another line of business. 
E, Company Reorganisation and ChanSe of Name 
The identification of takeovers and the collection of data was 
made more difficult because a.number of companies changed their name 
during the time period. Most changes of name fall into the follOwing 
categories: 
1. Change to a holding company - e.g. Fordham Pressings Ud. to 
Fordham Holdings Ltd. 
2. Shortening of the name - e.g. British Plaster Board Holdings Ltd. to 
B P B Industries Ltd. 
3. Change in the nature of business - e.g. Bowlona Tea Estates Ltd. to 
Grampian Holdings Ltd. 
4. Change following a takeover - e.g. Amalgamated Cotton Milla Trust Ltd. to 
British Van HeuseR Corp. Ltd. 
when it took over British Van Heusen Co. Ltd. 
When a company is reorganiaed it i8 either to alter the character 
of its share capital or to change the company to a holding compan),. In 
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such caees, a new company is formed to acquire the capital of the old 
one and there is no change in management or cOntrol. For the purposes 
of this study, company reorganisat10n is treated as a change of name 
and consequently ignored, excepting as it affects the number and 
nOminal value of the voting equity. 
r. Accounting Practices and Accounting Year End. 
Accounting practices vary from company to company on such items 
as depreciation rates, definitions ot profits and the valuation of 
aBsets. In addition to the standardisation of accounting techniques 
required for tax purposes and under the ainimum disclosure required 
under the Companies Acts, EXTEL have made comparable, in so far as is 
POssible, the financial variables which are examined in this study. 
Specifically, companies supply their accounts to vary1.ng levels of 
breakdown and detail so that a column of data supplied by EXTEL for, 
for example, profits after tax has th ..... components as the other 
companies for this variable. 
The accounting year is always a period of twelve months except when 
there is a change in the date on which the company closes 1ts books. 
In many cases, however, it does not correspond to the calta4ar year. 
Any system of adjustment which attempts to relate all fir'" accounts 
to the calendar year 1s arbitrary by neceSSity. It was decided that 
for companies whose accounting year does not end on December 31st, 
their financial data would be counted as referring to that year in 
which a majority of their business activity occurs. That is, a company 
whose account1ng year ends on September 30th is treated as if it ended 
3 months later on December 31st wh1le an accounting year ending on 
March 31st 1s treated as 1t it ended 3 months earlier on the preTious 
December 31st. For accounting years ending on June 30th, it was 
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d.cided to have the financial data refer to the curr.nt year end (i.e. a 
June 31th 1965 ending refers to the year 1965). A difficulty arises 
when compani.s chang. their accounting year end so that under the 
above system there·;are no annual observations available (e.g. a change 
from March 31st to Septemb.r 30th wh.reby the accounts are made up for 
an 18 month period). Rather than regard accounting years ending in 
March for auch compani.s as if th.y ended on December 31st of the same 
y.ar, the resulting blaBk ,..ar was made up b,. averaging a 12 month level 
for the previOUS and following years for the r.l.vant variables. 
G. Definition. of the Annual Data Collected 
All the following data has been coll.cted annually for .ach fir. 
and is record.d on magnetic computer tape. 
1. Share Prices - Both the annual high and low share pric. for each 
year haa be.n coll.cted for the voting ahar.s of .ach company. 
For aeveral companies no markings w.r. recorded in particular 
years. Where this was so, the average high share price for the 
prececl1a,:~ and following year was placed as the high for the 
missing ,..ar. Similarl,., for the low ahare price the average of 
the prec.4u, ,_ and following years low was ins.rted. Share prices 
have b.en adjusted to r.flect any chang.s in the numb.r of issued 
... ::',~ shares during that y.ar. Th. figure used is accurat. to the 
nearest Told p.nny. 
2. N.t Assets Per Share - !his figur. is d.fin.d a8 the book value 
of the company divid.d by the numb.r of issued voting ahares. 
It has been adjust.d in the same way as ahare prices for changes 
in the number of issu.d shares so that it corresponds to the 
calendar year. Th. accuracy h.re is to the nearest T old penny. 
3. N.t Alsets (Size) w This is the book value of the company def;l.ned 
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as fiXed assets net of depreciation plus current assets minus 
current liabilities. Intangible. including goodwill have been 
excluded. Accuracy is to the nearest £1 .... 
4. Net Profits Before Interest PaYments and Tax _ This is defined 
as profits net of depreciation and amortisation and directors 
emoluments but taken before debenture interest, bank and loan 
interest, preference dividends and tax have been subtracted. 
Accuracy is to the nearest £1000. 
5. Net PrOfits After Tax - This figure is equal to 4. above minus 
payments for tax, interest and minority interest. Accuracy is to 
the nearest £lOIQ. 
6. Retained Profits - This is equal to net profits after tax (number 
5 above) minus preference and ordinary dividends and is accurate 
to the nearest £1.00. 
7. Depreciation plus Amortisation - !his is the amount allocated to 
costs by the firm for capital consumption and will depend on the 
life expectancy of the company's capital stock. For property 
companies (where a figure for amortisation is applicable by the 
nature of their business) the company accounts lump depreciation 
and amortisation together so that this was by necesaity the 
figure collected. It was not unusual to find a company changing 
its methods of depreciation during the time period ezam1ned. 
Accuracy of the annual figure is to the nearest £108 •• 
8. Liquidity - !his is defined aa cas., tax reserve certificates and 
marketable securities minus bank overdrafts and short term loans, 
dividend and interest liabilities and current tax liabilities. 
Adcuracy again is to the nearest £1 •••• 
The above 9 rows of data, collected for each firm for each available 
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year, have been punched onto cards and stored on -gnatic tape for use 
in the statistical analysis in this study. In addition, there are 7 
turther rows of data on magnetic tape for each f1rlll. These are as 
follows: 
1. Annual valuation ratios with the low share price in the numerator 
2. Annual valuation ratios USing the .adian share price (average of 
the annual high and low) in the nUlllerato~ 
3. Annual ratios of profits betore tax divided by the opening size 
(net &Ssets) of the company (i.e. the ratio of profit. earned 
throughout the year divided by the capital available at the 
beginning of the year). 
4. Annual ratios of liquid assets to the clOSing size of the company 
(i.e. the ratio of liquid assets at the end of the accounting 
year to the total net assets at the end ot the accounting year). 
5. Annual ratios of profits atter tax to opening size ot the firm. 
6. Annual ratios of retained profits to prOfits atter tax. 
7. Annual cash flow which is the sum of depreciation plus net profits 
after tax divided by the opening size of the tirm. 
Thus for each tirm there exists on magnetic tape 16 rows of annual data. 
H. Error Detection 
Errors in the data may have crept in at several stages of collection. 
Assuming the published company accounts are accurate and that EXTEL was 
able to reproduce these without error, there remains two .tages at which 
errors could have occured; the extraction of data from EXTEL cards to 
the 8" x 5" company cards and the punching of the data from the.e cards. 
Errors which might have emerged in the compiling stage have been minimized 
in the following way. First, data tor companies taken over was double-
checked tor the three year. prior to the otfer. Second, since it required 
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Ii year8 to collect the data, the latest observationa needed " be 
added as they became available. When this was done, the figure for 
the previous year was checked thereby remoYing any possibility of an 
erroneous transposition of rows. Con8equently errors that do remain 
are either a wrong decimal point or a wrong digit. Decimal point 
placement was checked at the programming stage Since all figures in 
each row were carried out to the same degree ot accuracy. A wrong 
digit still might occur in the data but major errors have been 
minimized by cheCking in the program that for each year the following 
relationships hold: 
1. Size> Pre-tax PrOfits> Profits After Tax :> Retentions 
2. Size > Depreciation 
3. Size> Liquidity 
Also, if the above relationship8 hold, any errors are likely to be 
relatively small and since all data except for three years prior to 
a takeover (which was double-checked) will be averaged over a number 
of years betore it i8 used in 8tatistical analYSiS, the eftect of a 
numerical error will be diminished. With regard to punching errors, 
these were avoided by 1ndepen4ently punching all data twice and only 
accepting the punched cards for entry onto the magnetic tape where the 
two agree. 
I. Additional Data Collected lor Each Company 
1. Indu8trial Classifications - All firms have been clas8itied as 
belonging to one or more industry groups. Sixty seven indu8try 
classification8 have been derived essentially from the ~ 
Exchange Official Year Book. In some ca8es small clas8es have 
been grouped and very large classes have been subdivided if a 
natural subdivision exi8ted. Change. were also made in . 
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classifying a company if there: had been a sufficient change in 
the nature of its business 80 as to totally change its industry 
group. Expansion of companies' activities into new industries 
has been included as sucessive volumes of the Year Book were 
examined and changes in the industry classes of each firm noted. 
Table IV below gives the percentage number of firms beloDging 
to one and aore industry classes and Table V gives the full 
description of each of the 67 industry classes. 
NUX8ER OF INDUSTRY CLASSES 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
TABLE IV 
%AGE OF COHPAlfIU WIfB EACH NUMBER 
47.el 
23.47 
12.88 
7.21 
4.72 
2.37 
1.40 
0.2. 
1.03 
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TABLE V 
DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
INDUSTRY NUMBER DESCRIPTION 
1. Agricultural & ~ Machinery & Equipment 
2. Aircraft & Aero Engines, Accesaories & Components 
3. Asbestos, Asphalte, Bitumen & Tar 
4. Bricke, Tiles, Fireclay, Cement, Concrete & Concrete Products, Refactories 
5. Builders & Contractors, Decorators & Shopfitters, Prefabricated Buildings 
6. Builders' Merchants, Building Materials, Timber, Plant Hire 
7. Cable Manufacturers, Rope, Twine, Belting, Nettings, Wire & Wire Ropes 
8. Engineers - Civil & Constructional, Public Worke Contractors 
9. Engineers - Electrical & Electronics 
18. Engineers - General 
11. Engineers - Marine Mining Railway 
12. Engineers - Metal Manufacturers & Refining, Founders, Forgers, GalTanizing 
13. Engineers - Textile Machinery 
14. Engineers - Heating, Lighting, Cooking, Ventilating 
15. Ironfounders & Engineera, Steel Manufacturers 
16. Machine Tools, Small Tools, Instruments & Sundries 
17. Miscellaneous Machinery, Plant & Boiler Makers 
18. Refrigeration, Coldstores, Ice 
19. Shipbuilders & Repairers, Shipbreakera, Canals & Docks 
20. Carpeta, Ruga, Felt, Linoleum, Floorcloth 
21. China, Glass, Pottery 
22. Furnishers, Furniture Makera & Furniture Stores 
23. Hardware & Ironaongery 
24. Motor Vehicle & Cycle Manufacturers 
25. Motor Vehicle & Cycle Accessories & Components 
26. Motor Vehicle & Cycle Dealers & Repairera, Garage Propreitors 
27. Office Equipment 
28. Paints, polishea, Varnishes, Enamels, Printing Inks 
29. Plastics • Plastic Goods 
30. RadiO & Television, Musical Instruments, Records, Photographic Equipment & 
Film Production 
31. Rubber Products 
32. Leather & Leather Goods 
33. Toys, Perambulators, Sports Goods, Nursery Equipment 
-200-
34. Timber, Plywood, Veneer Cutters, Woodworkers 
35. Animal Feeding Stuffs, Millers, Grain Merchants, Seed Merchants, Nurserymen 
36. Breweries & Distilleries, Ha1sters, Wines, Spirits & Beers, Bottlers 
37. Boots & Shoes 
38. Clothing Manufacturers & Merchants 
39. Containers & Packing Hateria1 
48. Entertainments - Cinemas, Concert Halls, Exhibitions, Greyhounds, 
Racecourses, Sports Arenas, Holiday Camps, Piers, Theatres 
41. Food, Bakers, Confectioners, Dairy Products, Butchers, Grocers, Fruit, 
Patent Foods, Canners 
42. Hotels, Caterers, Restaurants 
43. Medical, Dental, Optical & Surgical Equipment 
44. Mineral Waters, Soft Drinks, Cider, Cordials 
45. Newspapers, Periodicals 
46, Paper & Pulp, Paper Goods, Wallpapers 
47. Printers, Bookbindera, Publishers, Stationers, Advertising Agents 
48. Chemiats & Druggists, Soap, Candles, Perfumery, Toilet Articles 
49. Stores - Depart.enta1 & Mail Order 
59. Stores - Drapers, Glovers, Hattera, Milliners, Furr1ers, Outf1tters, Taylor 
51. Stores - General Merchants, Warehousemen, Importera & Experters 
52. Stores - Jewellers, Cutlers, Silver, Clocks, Watches 
53. Textiles - Cotton 
54. Textiles - General, Bleachers & Dyers, Wholesalers & Distribution 
55. Textiles - Hosiery & Underwear 
56. Textiles - Rayon, Nylon & Art1ficia1 Fabrics 
57. Textiles - Wool, Worsted, Woolen Goods 
58. Tobacco, Matches, Smokers Requisites 
59. F1nancia1 Trusts, Finance, Hire Purchase,& Mortgage Companies 
60. Insurance Brokers 
61. Property Companies, Markets, Exchanges, Office Buildings 
62. Chemicals 
63. Laundries, D,rers & Cleaners 
64. Oil Production, Refining & Distribution 
85. Shipping Companies, Tabkers, Trawlers, Whalers 
68. Wharves & Warehouses 
87. Tramways, Omnibus, Road Haulage Contractors 
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2. Accosntins Year End - The month in which the accounting year ot 
the company ends is included aa data in the torm ot-a decimal 
(i.e. Dece.ber as 1.00, March as 0.75, June as 0.51, and ao 
forth). Almost without exception, the accounts are aade up 
!Ql!!!! 
January 
February 
March 
April 
Kay 
June 
to the last day of the month in which the year enda. When there 
are changes in the accounting year end, the deciaal chosen refers 
either to the most often occuring year end or, if there are 
an equal number of years ending in, tor example, Septe.ber and 
December, the most recent ia choaen. If a firm is taken over, 
the decimal always refers to the latest accounting year end 
prior to the takeover. Table VI below gives the percentase 
distribution of accounting year endings by month. 
TABLE VI 
MONTHLY DISTRIBYAION OF ACCOUNTING YEAR ENDS 
% OF COMPANIES !ITH ACCOlJN'1'ING YEARS ENDING 
4.51 
2.21 
July 
August 
Septe.ber 
October 
November 
December 
25.29 
3.24 
1.51 
7.82 
3.69 
1.76 
11;'11~ 
3.16 
1.87 
33.53 
-202-
3. Date OR !hich the Company lent Public - This is given as a 
continuous variable counting backward trem Dece.ber 31st 197. 
which is set at e.t'. That is, it a tirm went public in June 
1965, the tigure used would be 5.50 as June 1965 i. 5t years 
prior to December 1971. Sim11arily, it a tirm went public in 
September 1931, the tigure u.ed i. 39.25. For companies which 
went public prior to 1930, only the year i8 available and not 
the month so that a company which went public in 1901 is given 
69.00. Thus by this transtormation, a variable is available 
for the age ot each company. 
4. Company Identitication - ~he name ot each company does not 
appear on the magnetic tape input. A company may however be 
identitied by a code letter and number which appears with the 
other input data. 
J. Additional Intormation Collected lor Companies Taken Over 
1. Identitication of !aider - Ra1de~ identification codes are 
given it "the raider is among the population ot firma involved 
in this study. The following means ot olas8ification of 
raider8 outside the population is used. Table VII presents 
the 9 alternative clasaitications of raiders outside the 
population and the number ot raiders in each class. 
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~ABLE VII 
CLASSES & DISTRIBUTION OF RAIDERS OU~SIDE POPULATION 
CLASSIFICATION 
1. Raiders which have gone into 
liquidation after the takeover 
2. American oompanies as raiders 
3. Other foreign companies as raiders 
4. Non-quoted companies as raiders 
5. Raiders too new to be in population 
6. Investment trusts or banks as raiders 
7. Commodity group raiders such as 
mining and plantations 
8. Private individual(s) as raiders 
9. Raiders Which have been nationalized 
NUMBER OF RAIDERS II! EACH 
18 
47 
12 
128 
18 
18 
11 
28 
1 
2. Industrial Classes of Raiders - These are available on the 
computer input tape for raiders within the census population 
in the data block of the acquired firms. 
3. Takeover Date - !his is given a value iD the same way as the 
date the firm weat public (section J.3 above). Thus a company 
taken over in June 1957 is given 13.58. Subtracting this 
number from the number associated with the date the firm went 
public yields a new variable for the age of the company when 
it was taken over. Normally several months are required to 
finalise a bid (though there have been instances of offers 
requiring a year or more to be declared unconditional), so 
the date given is that of the first mention of a bid. This 
means that a aucessful offer made at the end of 1956 but not 
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declared unconditional until early 1957 is not included. 
4. Offer Terms - Details of the way in which the takeover was 
paid for are given by having the conditions of the otfer fall 
into one of the following 5 categories: 
a. Cash including market purchases and payment by debenture stock 
b. Cash p1us shares; cash plus convertible unsecured loan stock; 
cash plU8 8hares plus convertible loan stock 
c. Share exchange 
d. Convertible loan stock or shares plus convertible loan stock 
e. Sale by the raider of on. of its subsidiaries to the acquired 
firm which issues its voting shares as payment thereby giving 
the raid.r voting control 
5. Pre and Post Off.r Share Prices - The share price before any 
mention of a bid and the share price after the final bid has 
b •• n made has been collect.d for each firm taken over. 
6. Unsuccessful Raids - In addition to the collection of the details 
(in sections J.l to J.5 above) for succe •• ful takeov.rs, the s&me 
information has been gath.r.d for unsucce •• ful attempts at 
takeov.r. It wa., howev.r, only possible to compile a compl.te 
list of th... ainoe the b.ginning of lQee. 
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APPENDIX II 
SUPPORTING DATA 
Table Ia - Monthly distribution of takeovers - 1957-1969 
Table Ib - Monthly value of takeovers (net assets) - 1957-1969 
Table Ie - Monthly market value of takeovers - 1957-1969 
Table Id - EXTEL Security Values Index - 1957-1969 
Table IIa - Mean values of industry performance 
TaUe IIb - Median values of industry performance 
Table III - Ranked industry numbers by proportion of takeovers; 
number of takeovers; number of raiders 
~EIa 
MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF TAKEOVERS - 1957-1969 
.wE ill ~ l:!!!! ~ l!ll l!lli ~ !ill! .ill. .QZ: !QY MQ ROW TOTAL 
1957 6 8 4 5 4 5 15 4 6 4 11 4 76 
1958 6 5 3 4 4 2 8 8 8 11 10 14 83 
1959 8 11 11 14 16 14 14 7 3 10 16 14 138 
1960 5 13 8 6 7 7 10 13 8 15 4 11 107 
1961 10 14 8 6 11 9 8 5 8 8 12 14 113 I 
N 
1962 7 9 6 8 7 8 8 9 7 14 6 9 98 g I 
1963 4 9 7 9 7 3 8 3 7 12 10 11 90 
1964 8 13 3 4 8 14 16 13 6 9 6 12 112 
1965 5 12 10 14 4 8 5 6 9 3 9 15 100 
1966 7 11 10 4 7 3 14 8 2 6 9 8 89 
1967 6 6 12 8 17 18 9 18 15 9 17 9 144 
1968 15 18 17 14 20 15 28 24 15 24 23 27 240 
1969 23 19 13 13 11 6 14 9 17 12 13 14 ~4 
1554 
TABLE Ib 
MONTIU.Y VALUE OF TAKEOVERS (NET ASSETS) - 1957-1969 (£m) 
~ ~ !!!! ~ !EE !l£: ~ 1!!b lli ~ .QQ:! liQ! MQ ROW TOTAL 
1957 2.423 13.748 3.216 49.799 2.326 6.336 17.939 6.456 4.884 5.392 9.171 5.783 127.509 
1958 4.811 4.840 1.742 6.076 4.706 1.883 16.666 8.811 6.392 26.195 29.713 82.446 194.281 
1959 21.887 12.141 12.031 23.432 22.868 41.822 20.620 7.318 1.020 10.296 12.339 67.406 253.180 
1960 17.335 24.152 16.491 19.434 34.476 15.194 19.700 29.518 12.647 36.842 10.076 62.690 298.555 
1961 23.466 49.719 37.707 21.429 41.182 20.265 11.018 26.074 12.642 28.011 27.520 36.139 335.172 I 
N 
0 
1962 30.316 7.596 5.865 73.970 13.239 14.622 10.141 28.570 9.113 38.113 5.255 7.860 244.660 '-J I 
1963 2.177 19.762 9.270 20.143 19.634 4.676 30.360 2.595 8.414 22.771 40.052 36.242 216.096 
1964 9.240 32.345 11.218 5.218 13.759 22.260 58.823 67.267 13.404 28.571 16.261 11.117 290.032 
1965 7.334 47.705 90.694 33.332 35.491 13.721 3.142 100.004 32.224 5.318 59.550 38.067 466~582 
1966 26.883 31.077 17.798 53.141 24.410 25.623 64.790 43.856 3.360 7.559 52.454 35.710 386.832 
1967 138.194 38.336 46.256 94.852 54.804 118.047 111.204 61.090 30.637 237.996 70.662 59.014 1060.992 
1968 349.141 88.134 90.775 92.974 92.483 32.891 251.772 99.543 422.068 160.099 179.838 100.802 1960.520 
1969 333.238 69.444 74.026 36.682 75.461 20.578 56.123 69.743 56.016 38.098 125.387 48.648 1003.444 
6837.855 
TABLE Ie 
MONTHLY MARKET VALUE OF TAKEOVERS (£m) - 1957-1969 
1m .8!i !!!! !1AE Af1i M!! !l!lli. .lli !!ill .m .QQ.'I liQY ~ ROW TOTAL 
1957 1.689 19.951 3.544 28.451 2.960 4.382 25.996 5.112 5.203 5.497 10.321 4.460 117.556 
1958 4.255 3.641 1.549 5.009 6.488 1.764 14.408 12.635 7.479 19.809 27.358 86.301 190.696 
1959 24.443 10.015 21.229 28.385 27.551 71.640 33.095 10.251 0.956 33.606 21.173 80~912 363.256 
1960 35.010 33.526 41.073 19.925 58.515 19.013 42.644 60.695 26.908 44.341 16.616 75.693 473.959 
1961 56.474 132.472 45.729 62.121 97.804 36.019 25.481 34.560 27.275 33.198 39.820 87.711 678.711 I 
N 
0 
1962 50.013 17.379 14.069 126.925 18.594 30.207 14.245 32.447 17.876 55.802 6.567 15.521 399.645 <Xl I 
1963 3.992 34.631 18.745 22.554 30.860 9.425 69.507 3.108 18.638 58.465 63.192 59.669 392.768 
1964 20.042 43.636 19.787 5.810 26.660 43.023 107.599 74.988 28.162 36.895 20.223 11.516 438.341 
1965 13.900 73.377 144.107 81.449 15.767 21.034 5.309 93.903 76.596 7.227 104.396 73.331 710.396 
1966 37.634 57.146 19.205 75.420 28.747 28.623 110.228 57.777 4.649 10.185 89.616 47.641 566.871 
1967 180.992 48.332 168.197 148.658 83.401 191.175 224.141 116.046 32.353 269.938 110.358 127.973 1701.564 
1968 995.784 147.710 109.792 164.155 220.446 62.147 800.428 246.708 906.025 499.223 410.996 189.139 4752.553 
1969 903.507 113.535 153.677 70.378 138.777 33.815 173.312 214.840 194.339 70.758 218.271 82.902 2368.111 
13154.398 
TABLE Id 
EXTEL SECURITY VALUES INDEX DEC 1956 = 100 - 1957-1969 CALCULATED ON MID-MONTH PRICES OF 176 VARIABLE DIYIDEND SECURITIES 
.!!!R i!!! m !!!!! !!!!! l1!! ~ ~ !!ill £!f Qg 1!Q.Y M£ ROW TOTAL / 12 
1957 ··10'~0 106.5 106.0 112.0 116.0 117.0 117.5 115.5 110.0 97.0 95.0 96.0 107.7 
1958 93.0 91.5 93.0 96.5 96.5 101.5 101.5 107.5 112.0 118.5 121.0 123.0 104.6 
1959 129.5 129.5 130.5 133.5 141.0 145.5 144.0 149.0 154.0 165.0 178.0 182.0 148.4 
1960 191.0 185.0 174.5 177.5 172.0 178.5 175.0 184.0 185.5 185.5 185.5 177.0 180.9 
1~1 186.0 190.0 198.5 206.5 218.5 204.0 187.0 190.0 186.5 183.0 194.5 193.5 194.8 I 
N 
0 
1962 197.5 197.5 195.5 202.0 205.5 182.5 181.0 193.5 188.5 190.0 197.0 198.0 194.0 to I 
1963 197.0 200.0 205.0 206.0 208.0 205.0 209.0 213.5 215.0 217.5 220.5 223.5 210.0 
1964 218.5 217.0 221.5 227.0 222.5 220.5 228.0 231.0 228.5 227.0 222.0 211.5 222.9 
1965 214.5 220.0 210.5 210.0 219.5 212.0 206.0 211.5 213.0 221.5 224.0 222.5 215.4 
1966 227.0 236.5 228.5 229.0 238.0 239.0 236.0 212.0 207.0 204.0 199.5 205.0 221.8 
1967 212.5 213.0 214.0 225.0 229.5 230.0 234.0 235.0 244.0 255.0 273.0 279.5 237.0 
1968 278.5 294.5 293.0 316.5 330.0 346.0 361.0 365.0 373.0 362.5 372.0 385.5 339.8 
1969 402.0 396.5 372.5 365.0 347.0 310.0 295.0 294.0 299.0 304.0 300.0 301.5 332.2 
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TABLE IIa 
MEAN VALUES OF INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE 
.nm PROFIT R GROWTH R RETN R LIQ R VAL RATIO m! 
1 0.16511 0.33827 0.43457 
-0.12559 1.10618 3.93688 
2 0.17891 0.50635 0.50047 
-0.06638 1.21501 11.20502 
3 0.22077 0.57064 0.46728 
-0.05541 1.70234 4.62229 
4 0.17804 0.38924 0.43267 
-0.05138 1.36460 4.19586 
5 0.22605 0.54906 0.73539 
-0.16123 2.43713 3.68776 
6 0.18139 0.22653 0.43712 
-0.13449 2.19641 4.08901 
7 0.16371 0.13202 0.44972 
-0.00479 1.07800 13.86076 
8 0.18746 0.35662 0.71426 
-0.10198 2.61389 4.08254 
9 0.20277 0.29364 0.51317 
-0.06054 2.45183 8.18898 
10 0.18301 0.36176 0.45409 -0.06832 1.87616 6.86178 
11 0.15299 0.16443 0.43961 -0.01805 1.12276 7.93655 
12 0.17957 0.30993 0.41557 -0.04176 1.44265 6.03485 
13 0.19107 0.18694 0.44245 -0.02942 1.34193 6.16152 
14 0.29513 0.20282 0.63978 -0.05853 1.46503 5.44537 
15 0.17405 0.15432 0.44997 -0.03213 1.12373 10.33107 
16 0.18857 0.28106 0.43697 -0.04736 1.27832 4.04924 
17 0.17840 0.18986 0.58441 -0.01983 1.40713 5.30835 
18 0.24318 0.44917 0.47998 -0.06641 2.02754 6.12573 
19 0.09375 0.09137 0.51531 -0.08181 0.97945 12.81922 
20 0.16694 0.19257 0.45236 -0.09741 1.16068 4.08477 
21 0.16704 0.18589 0.45589 -0.02850 1.17499 2.81951 
22 0.18717 0.19024 0.43439 -0.10895 1.44747 5.56775 
23 0.16619 0.22378 0.10320 -0.09760 1.87400 5.06720 
24 0.15985 0.11768 0.51754 -0.09197 1.17298 18.02194 
25 0.18722 0.22758 0.48382 -0.05576 1.02990 7.51837 
26 0.15904 0.03890 0.43821 -0.21523 1.45775 3.85180 
27 0.19677 0.32941 0.45987 -0.03757 1.52232 4.06426 
28 0.20041 0.25466 0.39612 -0.05257 1.59525 17.91071 
29 0.18765 0.23330 0.47845 -0.07278 1.69425 13.18534 
30 0.20105 0.32214 0.50349 -0.11413 1.57112 5.81216 
31 0.19053 0.21257 0.42015 -0.06333 1.52465 8.68756 
32 0.12944 0.10630 0.44164 -0.06232 1.02033 1.68344 
1HQ PROFIT R GROWTH R 
~ 0.23633 0.54526 
34 0.15770 0.21512 
35 0.15365 0.27503 
36 0.14820 0.19900 
37 0.16697 0.19551 
38 0.19910 0.24657 
39 0.17320 0.29796 
40 0.14580 0.28549 
41 0.18629 0.30088 
42 0.18899 0.66224 
43 0.22295 0.22316 
44 0.17135 0.18085 
45 0.23336 0.24249 
46 0.17218 0.23579 
47 0.13959 0.15278 
48 0.21262 0.22607 
49 0.17497 0.22786 
50 0.16837 0.08954 
51 0.13266 0.16995 
52 0.20796 0.21896 
53 0.11672 0.09064 
54 0.09380 0.11947 
55 0.18598 0.23011 
56 0.13905 0.16552 
57 0.14461 0.13802 
58 0.16792 0.05726 
59 0.13144 0.58670 
60 0.47877 0.97371 
61 0.10321 0.08641 
62 0.19044 0.25358 
63 0.15215 0.17616 
64 0.i9341 0.19909 
65 0.08250 0.13915 
66 0.14112 0.22648 
67 0.19438 0.35961 
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TABLE IIa (cont.) 
RETN R LIQ R VAL RATIO SIZE 
-, 
0.39774 -0.08949 2.10113 2.09003 
0.41232 -0.15086 1.06569 2.03602 
0.36283 -0.07194 1.54832 16.80899 
0.43440 -0.03287 1.30680 14.84290 
0.43073 -0.07505 1.35909 4.20459 
0.42934 -0.08159 1.19565 2.71945 
0.40755 -0.04326 1.24739 5.49196 
0.31885 -0.10746 3.35608 2.34141 
0.42078 -0.04492 2.35917 9.92919 
0.43132 -0.01080 2.26327 4.27108 
0.42938 -0.04622 1.54774 9.90528 
0.44234 -0.02397 1.49933 8.35993 
0.38458 -0.08085 5.17634 7.56093 
0.45810 -0.00680 1.14421 37.63106 
0.29033 -0.00417 3.08969 5.02790 
0.44162 -0.00283 3.24798 34.86340 
0.37770 -0.08767 1.72291 12.11963 
0.17164 -0.20147 2.39074 8.87085 
0.41200 -0.11614 0.98210 7.58861 
0.45471 -0.03819 1.46457 4.97147 
0.27827 -0.02531 0.85911 7.43464 
0.33701 -0.03043 0.69236 5.86356 
0.39958 -0.05439 1.32471 5.79074 
0.41265 -0.07525 1.11451 15.23870 
0.31656 -0.07289 1.17240 4.57074 
0.37938 -0.16944 1.57632 16.57101 
0.52692 -0.07481 4.39320 11.64548 
0.43848 ·-iL.06688 6.58708 4.09584 
0.26279 -0.08609 2.37657 5.27804 
0.85356 -0.01065 1.71565 27.97367 
0.39344 -0.01455 1.10451 4.92182 
0.44386 -0.01760 1.15824 134.67148 
0.44309 -0.07726 0.82426 15.4978' 
0.40076 -0.07169 1.47793 3.48627 
0.44232 -0.07457 1.38319 6.14598 
NOTE: the profit rate is taken before tax and size is in £m. All other 
,c-~~ .~r:~ 1:::!! .~'cr;'!l l,,~.t:l~r9,~ The valuation ratio is measured as in regression 
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TABLE IIb 
MEDIAN VALUES OF INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE 
m PROFIT R GROWTH R RE'rN R LIQ R VAL RATIO §lg 
1 0.14671 0.09679 0.43996 
-0.13641 0.92513 1.90479 
2 0.15902 0.10655 0.50000 
-0.09859 1.01062 2.48600 
3 0.16979 0.13630 0.48123 
-0.07264 1.49652 1.07834 
4 0.15837 0.11810 0.42948 
-0.05016 1.07716 1.52589 
5 0.18550 0.18244 0.48000 
-0.17292 1.44983 1.78140 
6 0.15987 0.11812 0.46165 
-0.14165 1.09492 1.60169 
7 0.14486 0.08678 0.47729 
-0.05085 0.90577 2.05308 
8 0.16449 0.14121 0.50430 -0.12605 1.17572 1.68985 
9. 0.16862 0.11905 0.50000 -0.09303 1.14873 2.04415 
10 0.15940 0.10981 0.46464 -0.08700 1.01650 1.91923 
11 0.13469 0.08393 0.47542 -0.06938 0.86231 2.54400 
12 0.16190 0.09769 0.46679 -0.06371 0.96643 1.68985 
13 0.18294 0.12733 0.49461 -0.09061 1.14375 1.85123 
14 0.15373 0.10874 0.47016 -0.08679 1.10731 1.85300 
15 0.15508 0.09818 0.47529 -0.04195 0.89996 2.31160 
16 0.16563 0.09633 0.46712 -0.07794 1.02609 1.71000 
17 0.15972 0.09069 0.47256 -0.06282 0.96380 2.04342 
18 0.153:'13 0.12005 0.48630 -0.11935 1.23733 1.64000 
19 0.08816 0.03611 0.50430 0.02851 0.61518 2.90700 
20 0.14319 0.08084 0.45833 -0.09503 0.91290 1.53739 
21 0.15650 0.11161 0.47120 -0.09091 0.92715 1.47031 
22 0.16055 0.08799 0.44703 -0.12569 1.07977 1.10962 
23 0.14934 0.09443 0.46224 -0.11907 0.89951 1.40600 
24 0.12725 0.11748 0.51910 -0.12960 0.93458 2.69500 
25 0.15972 0.11639 0.46464 -0.09105 1.01716 1.60223 
26 0.14808 0.15689 0.44668 -0.20500 1.00279 1.47475 
27 0.16451 0.11536 0.43860 -0.08654 1.16306 1.62877 
28 0.17322 0.11186 0.42669 -0.06729 1.05750 1.50623 
29 0.16432 0.12733 0.46108 -0.07794 1.06686 1.23600 
30 0.16342 0.10468 0.46515 -0.15392 1.20791 1.64442 
31 0.17952 0.08434 0.46165 -0.11226 1.10050 1.82625 
32 0.10532 0.04872 0.38129 -0.03903 0.69674 1.01100 
l!Q PROFIT R GROWTH R 
33 0.16843 0.10801 
34 0.14061 0.08672 
35 0.12984 0.09186 
36 0.13172 0.08127 
37 0.15225 0.09211 
38 0.14955 0.09171 
39 0.15648 0.10288 
40 0.17137 0.06753 
41 0.15648 0.09187 
42 0.14494 0.15220 
43 m~17946 0.08492 
44 0.17647 0.08440 
45 0.22100 0.10426 
46 0.14911 0.09023 
47 0.19200 0.12492 
48 0.18824 0.08862 
49 0.14968 0.09697 
50 0.18450 0.07523 
51 0.10213 0.07443 
52 0.18426 0.14590 
53 0.08927 0.02372 
54 0.10908 0.04349 
55 0.16594 0.07392 
56 0.11001 0.05724 
57 0.13186 0.05314 
58 0.18588 0.11907 
59 0.11958 0.13689 
60 0.41283 0.18664 
61 0.08627 0.26004 
62 0.16757 0.11734 
63 0.13532 0.06770 
64 0.17861 0.10433 
65 0.06265 0.05332 
66 0.11594 0.07472 
67 0.13922 0.16923 
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TABLE lIb (contLl 
RETN R LIQ R VAL RATIO 
0.46601 -0.13988 1.22426 
0.43041 -0.17353 0.63611 
0.37500 -0.06587 0.92995 
0.44559 -0.02806 1.26999 
0.43975 -0.08189 1.08846 
0.46891 -0.11226 1.16111 
0.42746 -0.06581 1.00000 
0.27050 0.08965 1.56658 
0.45558 -0.06645 1.06438 
0.43412 -0.02724 1.36497 
0.43083 -0.08010 1.21731 
0.47273 -0.00319 1.01648 
0.39734 -0.00264 1.34804 
0.44242 .0.04762 0.98387 
0.44040 .0.02415 1.14873 
0.41717 .0.02652 1.44321 
0.42580 .0.09256 1.18765 
0.37603 .0.12121 1.08846 
0.46211 .0.13080 0.75731 
0.49033 .0.06341 1.27812 
0.33735 -0.05337 0.65643 
0.38249 .0.04475 0.73938 
0.44324 .0.05901 1.00736 
0.39753 -0.02234 0.73600 
0.38128 -0.10292 0.85145 
0.40201 -0.14524 1.23342 
0.42029 .0.13474 1.20237 
0.44947 0.75666 4.51429 
0.18966 -0.07685 1.13022 
0.40813 .0.01530 1.28400 
0.43259 0.01753 0.86668 
0.47368 .0.01160 1.00047 
0.49333 0.02002 0.53781 
0.43565 .0.05717 0.85728 
0.41960 -0.11946 0.94130 
1.26623 
1.36300 
1.00720 
3.17000 
1.17500 
0.96240 
1.58500 
0.51100 
1.48408 
1.58792 
2.24100 
2.55300 
2.18154 
2.64377 
1.38700 
1.62000 
1.57400 
1.36585 
2.55623 
0.99417 
1.44700 
1.17500 
1.19800 
1.46100 
1.38062 
1.58580 
2.91915 
2.51588 
2.82300 
2.95015 
1.08609 
3.40331 
4.85185 
2.08200 
1.71308 
NOTE: the profit rate i8 taken before tax and size is in £m. All other 
v.~1~b'AB are ratios. The valuation ratiO i8 measured as in regression 
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TABLE III 
RANKED INDUSTRY NO' S BY PROPORTION OF T-O i NO OF T-0 i NO OF RAIDERS 
RANK PROPORTION OF T-0 NUMBER OF T-0 NUMBER OF RAIDERS 
-
1 44 41 9 
2 36 17 41 
3 48 9 10 
4 41 54 36 
5 55 16 62 
6 43 36 61 
7 53 61 25 
8 50 25 54 
9 54 6 53 
10 21 12 42 
11 42 10 5 
12 31 38 16 
13 28 14 56 
14 66 47 
30 
15 7 53 
48 
16 38 56 
46 
17 35 57 
17 
49 30 14 18 
24 8 57 19 
3 11 2 20 
66!: 55 7 21 
25 2 
38 
22 
4 8 23 51 
40 29 
26 
24 
23 35 
25 18 
39 59 
26 39 
50 11 
27 16 
48 44 
28 63 
15 43 
29 56 
42 65 
30 34 
34 6 
31 2 
5 12 
32 57 
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TABLE III (cont.) 
RANK PROPORTION OF T-0 NUMBER OF T-0 NUMBER OF RAIDERS 
-
33 9 7 47 
34 30 51 29 
35 17 28 39 
36 67 22 50 
37 47 62 15 
38 6 26 28 
39 19 49 49 
40 61 35 1 
41 45 44 55 
42 32 40 23 
43 14 59 51 
44 46 1 24 
45 4 46 67 
46 1 21 18 
47 59 20 4 
48 12 43 22 
49 11 65 40 
50 20 31 21 
51 62 3 19 
52 29 66 64 
53 58 37 52 
65 24 20 54 
55 22 32 
31 
23 67 3 56 
15 19 66 57 
33 64 37 58 
37 27 27 59 
27 45 45 60 
26 18 63 61 
8 63 33 62 
10 33 
13 
63 
52 60 64 52 
13 13 
34 
65 
58 32 
66 5 
60 58 
67 60 
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